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
BATTLES OF
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The Battles
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
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PREFACE.

In preparing this work, entitled "The Battles of Chancellorsville and Gettysburg," I have made free use of material furnished by my own recollections, memoranda and correspondence. Being an active participant in the two great battles, which are taken as the basis of this narrative, makes much of what I say my own story. That is, I mean to say I had ideas of my own. They were as follows: When the Union army took up its position that forced the enemy to come out of its strong fortifications and fight the Union army on its own chosen entrenched grounds. I wondered why the Union army, the rank and file of which, it is generally conceded, was among the bravest, most patriotic, gallant soldiers of which any army was composed since civilization began, was defeated in one of the great battles, and the other could hardly be called a very creditable victory. The persistent investigation on my part has unearthed positive evidence showing who was responsible for the defeat at Chancellorsville and why Hooker's anticipations were not realized at Gettysburg, namely, the destruction of the Confederate army. To aid me in arriving at this conclusion I quote such prominent names and numerous authorities that it will not leave any room, after perusing this work, for the most skeptical persons to doubt the correctness of my conclusions. The reader will wonder why someone did not possess the courage to present these plain facts to the public years ago in order

to arrive at a more correct solution of the questions that are involved in this inquiry.

As to the responsibility for the failure to accomplish all that was anticipated by General Hooker, the army commander who planned the battles of Chancellorsville and Gettysburg. In my opinion it is necessary to consider two questions in advance. First, the political conditions that brought on the war, and second, the reason the war did not end sooner. In my opinion a correct solution of why those two great battles did not end more successfully to the Union army and meet the most sanguine expectation of General Hooker cannot be correctly solved and justice be done the rank and file of army without first considering the weak elements that were constantly undermining the army's best efforts. The questions are plainly answered in this work, why the war did not end sooner and why the battles of Chancellorsville and Gettysburg were not great Union victories.

This work will correct the history of one of the most magnificently planned battles, by the Union commander, that was ever fought on this continent. No one has ever pretended to say that the plans of the battle of Chancellorsville and their execution under the immediate supervision of General Joseph Hooker up to 6:30 p. m., Thursday, April 30, 1863, were not the most magnificent in the world's history. From this point each writer flies off on a tangent to find a flaw in Hooker's management of the battle later that resulted in the final defeat of the Union army. They have done this because of a misapprehension of facts that were covered up by the most wily tricks of conspirators, which I propose to unearth. Many of these writers have passed away, but their works live on and are being read, studied, commented upon and will be, if not corrected, to the

end of time. They were written during and soon after the campaign, when history was largely made from newspaper reports of correspondents who were unreliable. Here the errors crept into their works and for lack of thorough investigation have been perpetuated. Over 35 years have passed since the great battle of Chancellorsville, which started off so magnificently, but ended so barren of good results. As to the cause of the defeat of the Union army, public opinion has been divided. I propose to correct the errors that have led to this division and make the cause of their defeat so plain that there will not be any doubt in the future of the justification of my conclusions. That there was treachery and the most wicked conspiracy on the part of men high in rank and power to defeat the Union army and drive General Hooker from his command will be shown by such authorities that no one will question the correctness of the above statements after reading this work. All I ask is a fair, unprejudiced consideration of all the facts presented. The story is a sad one, but sad as it appears, the evidences of its truthfulness are so abundant, as the work progresses, that no fair-minded person will doubt my conclusions. A. H. N.

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
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THE BATTLE OF CHANCELLORSVILLE.

ERRATA.

Page 101, eighth line, fifth word should read Frederick instead of Fredericksburg.

Page 79—The First Corps, killed and wounded should be 192, missing, 100; total, 292. The Third Corps, killed and wounded, 3,439; missing, 600; total 4,039. The Twelfth Corps, killed and wounded, 2,383; missing 500; total 2,883. Total Cavalry killed and wounded, 150. Total Union losses at Chancellorsville, killed and wounded, 12,197, missing 5,000; total, 17,197.



THE BATTLE OF CHANCELLORSVILLE.

Part I.

CHAPTER I.

The Political Condition that Brought On the War of Rebellion, the Cause of so Many Defeats of the Union Army, and the Reason the Rebellion Was Not Put Down Sooner.

A few words as to the cause of the war will not be out of place here, for this is in the line of our study and should precede the description of the battle of Chancellorsville. When our forefathers had struggled through seven long years of war with the mother country, then the most powerful nation on earth, suffering greater privations than had ever been the lot of human beings to endure in the same length of time, and forced that great nation to acknowledge their independence, they then discovered that their troubles were by no means ended, they were left without a national organization, each colony was independent of the rest, so a petition was circulated asking each colony to elect and send delegates to a convention, to be held at Philadelphia, May, 1787. When the delegates came together they found great trouble in drafting a Constitution that would be adopted

by the convention, principally on account of the institution of slavery, that had been introduced while the colonies were a province of Great Britain. The question, after a long struggle, was compromised, so the word slave or involuntary servitude or servant did not appear in that document. Therefore it was adopted by the convention, and finally, after much time had elapsed, was ratified by all the colonies, and they became the United States; thus this vexed question of slavery was thought to be settled. Many thought the institution would die a natural death, but in this institution was sown the seeds that resulted in one of the most cruel, obstinate sectional wars that ever cursed any nation.

War is a cruel manner of adjusting differences among nations at the best, but is far more malignant when the war is between states of the same nationality as a revolution, or a rebellion, of one section of the same nation against the laws of that nation. This was our condition in the War of Rebellion, the Southern leaders claimed that they had a grievance, and that was that the Northern states were about to despoil them of their institutions and slaves, and the only way to save them was to dissolve the union of states and set up a government for themselves. The threat to do this had been made many years before any move by the Southern secessionists, or overt act on their part had been committed. They were constantly demanding further concessions, in the way of special sectional laws that would insure the perpetuation of their pet institutions. The last degree of endurance by the Northern people was the passage of and attempt to enforce the fugitive slave law, which made every citizen of the Northern states a slave catcher, and compelled them to return the escaped slaves to their masters at their own expense, under pain and penalty of fine and imprisonment. Peo-

ple outside of congress in the Northern states became indignant at this attempt to force them against their sense of reason and better judgment, to become negro catchers and be forced to take them back into a condition they abhorred as cruel and worse than death; and they revolted against the law. In their several states they passed laws relieving their citizens from this humiliating obligation; by this means the fugitive slave law became a dead letter, and for that reason the Southern "fire-eaters," so-called, exerted all their energies to bring on a collision at arms between the states. As a means to accomplish this they began to force their institutions into the territories. That brought on the issue.

The Southern agitators claimed they had the same right under the Constitution to take their slaves into the territories, or free states for that matter, and hold them there temporarily as property, as Northern men had to take their horse, ox or other property into a Southern state or territory. The people in the free states said that property in slaves was different from other property, the right of property in slaves was not recognized by any state or nation outside of the state where the special local laws of that state legalized the institution. On this issue political parties began to agitate and were divided as to what should be the political status of the slave states and slavery. There was no political party that could be united upon that question until the organization of the Republican party. That party came together in convention by an informal call of states at Pittsburgh, Pa., Feb. 22, 1856, and organized by adopting a platform which declared that it was not the purpose of the party to interfere with the institution of slavery in states where it then existed, but that no territory, then free, should ever thereafter be ad-

mitted as a slave state. This informal convention completed the organization of the party, and called a national convention, to meet at Philadelphia, June 17th, 1856, for the purpose of nominating candidates for president and vice-president, and this is the manner of proceedings which gave the present Republican party a legal national existence. From the above date began the disintegration of the Whig and Democratic parties in the Northern and border states, and their final dissolution was a question of but a short time. Not one state in the North would have been left to the Democratic party any more than there was to the Whigs at the election in 1856, if a portion of the Democratic party, led by Stephen A. Douglas, had not resorted to the subterfuge of squatter sovereignty. When Mr. Douglas and his followers went on the stump and explained their platform and that what squatter sovereignty meant was, that when the people in a territory desired to be admitted as a state of the Union, they would ask congress for an enabling act to admit them, though it was left for the inhabitants of the territory to decide by a majority vote whether it should be a free or a slave state. This dodging of the real issue by Mr. Douglas enabled him to save the party in 1856, electing James Buchanan president, on his modified platform, but in 1860 the Democratic party split, the pro slavery wing nominated Breckenridge and the squatter sovereignty wing nominated Stephen A. Douglas as their candidate for president. Mr. Douglas made a brilliant campaign and received a large popular vote in every Northern state. While he did not get but seventy-two electors, his popular vote was nearly as large as Mr. Lincoln's, who was elected president, getting 180 electoral votes, but when the War of Rebellion broke out and the rebels fired on Fort Sumter, Mr. Douglas became a strong Union man, and his party in the Northern states followed his example.

This made them very popular with the administration, who favored them by appointments of the highest rank in the army. Soon they were known as war Democrats, and became as staunch and radical Union men as the most radical Republicans. The loyal action of the Douglas Democrats during the War of Rebellion made it possible to perpetuate the Democratic party in the Northern states. People seemed to soon forget that if the policy of squatter sovereignty had prevailed slavery would have been perpetuated and the country kept in a constant turmoil as long as there were any territories to be admitted as states. Eighteen hundred and fifty-six and 1860 was an epoch in the history of the United States that thoroughly tested the durability of a Democratic-Republican government. It would seem that elements could not be devised to test the question of, are the American people capable of self-government, more thoroughly than this rebellion and the manner in which it was finally crushed out. No monarchical government ever did or could have accomplished this great work. The sections North and South were soon organized for the election of 1856 and 1860; the contest was a heated one in both campaigns, on both sides. On the Southern side some of their congressmen were very aggressive and abusive in the halls of congress, and were not at all choice in the language they used toward the Northern people. They called them small-fisted farmers, greasy mechanics, filthy operatives, mudsills of society, and added to this insult that capital should own the labor of the country no matter whether the laborer was black or white. On this issue the Northern free states people won in 1860, electing Abraham Lincoln president, and for this and no other cause the South began to arrange for war, and set up an independent government, and on April 12th, 1861, Gen. Beauregard with a Confederate army of 6,000 men, by order of

the president of the Southern Confederacy, fired on the flag and captured Fort Sumter. Then the war began in earnest. The Northern men, under the President's call for soldiers, volunteered their services, regardless of party, faster than the government could arm them, determined to crush out the rebellion and restore the union of states; they were fighting for a principle that was near and dear to them. Their hearts were in the cause, the rank and file being more intelligent than the Southern soldiers, ought to, and would have beaten them, all things else being equal, man for man, but unequal as they were in numbers, should have crushed them in one year. This is not said in a spirit of brag or unfairness, but in a desire to be fair and to transmit the facts as they existed down in truthful history to coming generations. This was not because nature had done more for the North than the Southern soldiers, but it was the curse of their institutions that degraded the poor whites. They did not have any free school system in the Southern slave states and the facilities for educating the young in border slave states was very limited. On the other hand the rank and file of the Northern soldiers had the advantage of a free school system for many years, and it was a very rare thing to find a soldier in the Union army that did not have a fair business education, and it is a well known, admitted fact that the more intelligent the rank and file of an army is, the better soldiers they make. Weighing the men by this standard, it will not be regarded an exaggeration to say that the rank and file of the Union army were more than equal to the Confederate, man for man, and being so much superior to them in numbers, ought to have conquered the rebellion in one year. I propose to show why they did not do it. There are several potent reasons why the war did not end sooner. In the first place, the Confederate army, especially in

East Virginia, being poorly fed, clothed and armed, won victory after victory over the Union army. The reasons are: First, Jefferson Davis, president of the Southern Confederacy, was not only a great statesman, but was one of the best educated soldiers, practically and theoretically, of his day and age in the United States, and being president of the Confederacy, made him commander-in-chief, with power to appoint, as well as direct his generals. He was familiarly acquainted with every officer in the regular army in the United States, knew them for all they were worth. In selecting his generals for important commands, he put the best men forward, men of military experience and education, and never made a mistake. He was absolute monarch in the Confederacy, their congress as well as their army was ruled by him; thus his great abilities were available during the war.

The Confederates of eastern Virginia were led by one of the most clear headed, careful, cautious strategist this country ever knew. His corps, division and brigade commanders never failed to carry out promptly orders they received from him. If an impartial history is ever written of the War of Rebellion, General Robert E. Lee will rank as one of the greatest captains the world ever knew. And his lieutenants, always prompt to obey orders of their superiors, brave, intelligent soldiers, without which no general could succeed, were all worthy of a better cause. General Lee planned to give his army the advantage of the grounds, its conformation to the surrounding country, and fortified them, which made one man, inside, equal to three or four outside their works. This was like setting traps, and the Union generals had no better judgment than to lead their men straight into them instead of leading them on the flanks and rear, which would render the enemy's intrenchments useless to them.

If the Union army could have exchanged army commanders and General Lee's heart had been in the Union cause, and the Confederates been led by our first army commanders, we could have crushed the Confederate army of Virginia in less than one year. General Lee never found his match as a strategist but once in the history of the war, and that was in General Joseph Hooker, in his movement of the army of the Potomac to Chancellorsville. On the other hand, President Lincoln, when he was first elected president, was a stranger to almost everybody outside of Illinois. It is true, he was one term in congress, but did not become much noted as a congressman, and while he was strange to the public, he was a greater stranger to the army. He was influenced in the appointment of his generals to command armies by politicians who knew nothing of their merits as military men, but recommended their personal friends for promotion, and retained them in important commands, regardless of their qualifications. This practice was kept up to that extent that our best generals were not known until near the close of the war. Another thing that weakened the Union army was the passage of the \$300 exemption and substitute law when the time came to draft. This gave to the army foreign recruits who had no interest in the country, and a great many of them deserted every chance they got. Another reason was the accepting of ignorant negroes as substitutes for intelligent white men, whose duty it was to stand by the draft, and fight side by side with their honest, intelligent neighbor who volunteered with the first 300,000, which they pledged themselves to do when these soldiers left their homes. These exemption and substitute laws were the fault of our vacillating congress, not so much the President, but he was at fault later on for making General Halleck, who had never won a victory or fought a battle, commander-in-chief

of all the armies, with headquarters at Washington. No more incompetent military man could have been selected for that position, and the President ought to have known it. Halleck was in the way of every progressive general during the war. Of all others, he was the least competent major-general for the President's chief adviser. For these mistakes, brave officers and men of the army, especially the army of the Potomac, had to suffer to the extent of years of time, and thousands of lives were sacrificed on the battlefield.

I have always wondered why the President appointed Halleck major-general so early in the war as to make him rank all other major-generals in the army of the President's appointments. And why, after he had appointed him and given him the command of the department of Missouri, where he failed in every movement of that army of which he was in immediate command, that he should, with all his failures, and knowing his faults, promote him to the command of all the armies in the War of the Rebellion, with headquarters at Washington, D. C., and retain him there, is a mystery I am not able to solve; and I have searched all authorities I could get hold of, to see if I could find some redeeming trait of character or military qualifications that would influence the President to do this, but have failed.

The War of the Rebellion in the United States, from 1861 to 1865, was the most bitter partisan contest that has ever been waged since civilization began. So intense and bitter was this contest that the reports of the commanders on both sides in many instances, that were made of battles were a tissue of falsehoods. Each party to the action tried to magnify a defeat or drawn battle into a victory for their side, and the partisan spirit ran so high that it was considered good politics of all, from the President down to the lowest politician, to encourage these false re-

ports. If any officer was ever punished for making a false report of battles he fought, the instance has escaped us. It seems as though political rings were formed by officers high in rank, who were possessed of low, selfish political cunning. So thoroughly dishonest and depraved were they that they would use their rank and power in the army to defeat the Union army for no other purpose than to cause the removal of the commanding officer, so as to get him out of their way, or pull one down who was high in order to climb up on his ruin. Regardless of the lives of the troops engaged if they could accomplish the disgrace of the general in command, they seemed happy. Many of the defeats and drawn battles in the War of the Rebellion, on the side of the Union army, are directly chargeable to the intrigues of under officers in the command, and in many instances the hand of Gen. Halleck can be traced; and in no instance does this vicious disposition crop out more than in Gen. Halleck's conduct toward Gen. Hooker, from the time Hooker took command of the Army of the Potomac until he was relieved from that command. Halleck's object, it seems to us, was to destroy Hooker's influence as a military man so as to keep himself at the head in rank in the army. The loss of life and the disgrace of the army's defeat seemed to be a matter of small consequence to him. This language, I am fully aware, is too strong for a humble person like myself to use without high authority. After giving a short biographical sketch of Halleck I will give authorities to prove he was capable of the low, contemptible acts I charge him with.

I give so much space here to Gen. Halleck because of his interference with Gen. Hooker's movements while he commanded the Army of the Potomac. I believe him to have been at the head of the conspiracy that defeated the army at Chan-

cellorsville, and that his intentions were to drive Hooker from command of the Army of the Potomac in disgrace, which he accomplished before the battle of Gettysburg was fought.

BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH OF MAJOR-GENERAL HALLECK.

Henry W. Halleck—Born in Oneida county, N. Y., Jan. 15, 1816. Graduated at West Point, in 1839. Third in his class. Classmates were Gens. Rickets, Ord and Canby. Made second lieutenant of engineers in 1839. Served a short time in the Mexican War. Was sent to California and promoted to first lieutenant of engineers in 1846. To captain in 1853. Resigned and mustered out of service Aug. 1, 1854. Formed the law partnership of Halleck, Peachey & Billings at San Francisco, Cal., and became very wealthy because of their being appointed agents to settle the Spanish-Mexican land claims the United States assumed with the annexation of California Territory.

Engaged in quicksilver mining. Became president of the Pacific & Atlantic R. R.—from San Francisco to San Jose, Cal. Was appointed major-general of state militia of California in 1860. Appointed major-general of the United States volunteers Aug. 19, 1861. Ordered to relieve Gen. Fremont at St. Louis, and took command of that department Nov. 18, 1861. Commanded that department until July 23, 1862, when he was made commander-in-chief of all the armies of the United States, with headquarters at Washington, by order of the President. Held that position until July 1, 1865. Took command of the Army of the Potomac Aug. 30, 1865, with headquarters at Richmond, Va. Appointed to the military division of the Pacific March 16, 1869. Died while he was on duty in that department.

Now let us see what leading military men say about Halleck:

In his book, entitled "His Own Story," p. 137, Gen. McClellan says of Halleck: "A day or two before he arrived in Washington to take command as commander-in-chief, Secretary Stanton cautioned me against trusting Halleck, who was, he says, probably the greatest scoundrel and most barefaced villain in America. That he was totally destitute of principle and that he (Stanton) had in the Almaden quicksilver case convicted Halleck of perjury in open court."

Gen. Butler, in his book, p. 871, says of Halleck: "I have learned his character, which I find to be that of a lying, treacherous, hypocritical scoundrel, with no moral sense."

Gen. McClellan says, in his book, p. 539: "Halleck perjured himself before the committee on the conduct of the war when called in relation to his (McClellan's) campaigns.

McClellan's book, p. 216, says: "Halleck stole dispatches from the office of the general-in-chief and destroyed them. That Halleck, while he was in command of the Department of Missouri had sent to Gen. McClellan, who was then commander-in-chief of all the armies, a dispatch relative to the conduct of Gen. Grant, who was in Halleck's department. Halleck charged Grant with being absent without leave, refusing to make reports of his command, as ordered, and gave as a reason for this insubordination that he had learned that Grant had resumed his former bad habits." This and much more of a similar nature passed from Halleck to McClellan. McClellan answered, if he (Halleck) thought it for the best interest of the service to not hesitate to place Grant under arrest. Grant did not know Halleck had made these charges against him until 1866. He then asked McClellan for a copy, and for the first time learned the facts, which had not appeared among the regular orders when Grant came to Washington. After he had been appointed

lieutenant-general and had access to headquarters' books, the above communications from Halleck to McClellan had disappeared. This fixes their abstraction from the records upon Halleck.

Gen. Grant, in his *Memoirs*, Vol. 1, p. 325, says that he did not know until 1866 that Halleck had reported him absent without leave and made other unfavorable reports about him. He learned through a private source. He then asked Gen. McClellan for, and obtained, a copy of the dispatches. He, in his book, on page 325, as above stated, explains that he was not absent without leave; that Halleck had never asked him for a report, etc. See Gen. Grant's statement.

Butler's book, p. 872, says the records show that Halleck misrepresented and betrayed Sherman, Butler, Grant and McClellan. With such a record is it not strange that any power on earth would be able to keep such a man at the head of the army. We close our eyes and shudder when we reflect upon how many noble men were sacrificed for no higher purpose than the payment of political debts or the military destruction of generals who were in the way of an ambitious, incompetent, wicked man, who had succeeded in being promoted to a position he never should have received.

The rank and file of the Army of the Potomac won prodigies of valor in spite of the political conditions that would have demoralized any other than the truest patriots, such as composed this army.

Generals McDowell, McClellan and Burnside, three commanders of the Army of the Potomac during a period of over two years. No one of them ever won a victory or showed their competency as strategists at any period in their military history, although they directed that noble army in many hard-fought bat-

ties, where they developed their want of skill. Yet the army never failed them, but fought on bravely, each and every time, as though they never had been whipped. Why put these men forward instead of Wool, Thomas, Hooker, Kerney, Hancock and many others who had seen service. But after the useless slaughter at Fredericksburg the rank and file of the army became terribly demoralized, desertions were taking place at the rate of 200 daily; 2,922 commissioned officers and 81,964 men in the Union army were reported absent without leave.

CHAPTER II.

General Joseph Hooker, Appointed by the President to Supersede General Ambros Burnside. How the Army Was Demoralized After the Battle of Fredericksburg. Hooker's Success as an Organizer and Restoring the Confidence of the Army.

January 25, 1863, Gen. Hooker was appointed to supersede Burnside, in command of the Army of the Potomac. Hooker was a West Point graduate, was in the Mexican war, but soon after that was ended resigned his commission in the regular army and became a private citizen in California. Soon after the breaking out of the War of the Rebellion he went to Washington, offered his services and was appointed brigadier, and later major-general, by President Lincoln. He was a very prepossessing gentleman. A dashing, daring corps commander, and earned justly in the Army of the Potomac the title of "Fighting Joe Hooker." He handled his corps with great skill and success and was a great favorite with his under officers and men, but was never a favorite with Halleck

When General McClellan was relieved from command of the army, Hooker's skill and claim to the promotion was passed over and Burnside, not belonging to the Army of the Potomac, was appointed to the command. After Burnside's disastrous failure at Fredericksburg Gen. Hooker was grudgingly given the command of the army, as above stated.

Gen. Hooker had some enemies among the generals com-

manding brigades, divisions and corps. He went to work to reorganize the army and soon brought it under better discipline than it had ever been since its first organization. The desertions stopped and the officers and men that were absent returned to their commands, and before the first day of April the rank and file was the most confident, proud, patriotic army that ever shouldered a musket. And if they had not been mismanaged by some of the corps commanders the battle of Chancellorsville would have resulted in one of the greatest victories ever won. Gen. Hooker had been in command but a few days before he got a letter from President Lincoln informing him that strange stories were rumored about him, such as an ambition to play the role of dictator, and warned him what would happen if he allowed disaster to befall the Army of the Potomac. This would indicate, as above stated, the fact that some of the officers of the army that were his enemies had been complaining to the President. One reason was that some of the officers could never forgive Gen. Hooker for the answer he made the Congressional Committee on the conduct of the war, when they summoned him before them and asked him why the army on the Peninsula under Gen. McClellan did not succeed. His reply was: The incompetency of the commander. Gen. McClellan had many staunch friends among the officers of that army, and for this answer some of the officers could never forgive him. But it was thought by Gen. Hooker's friends that time and the brilliant services he had rendered the cause had obliterated this feeling among the officers. But what follows will prove their mistake.

When Gen. Hooker took command, I repeat, the outlook for ever putting down the rebellion was indeed gloomy. This feeling was pretty general throughout the whole army. It was no uncommon thing to hear, as you were passing the camps, soldiers

using the most insurrectionary language. One day as I was passing through a strange camp, about Feb. 16, 1863, I heard men cursing the President and the commanding generals, and boasted that they intended to desert the first opportunity. The officers standing by did not attempt to rebuke them. This, in view of the fact that we were soon to meet the enemy again in battle, I must confess, made me feel very serious. When I got to my own camp I reported what I had heard to our chaplain, McAdams, and Dr. Lyman, regimental surgeon. After a short consultation, we concluded that there ought to be some resolutions drafted, and see if our regiment, the 57th Pennsylvania Volunteers, would not adopt them, believing this would be an example the whole army would pretty generally follow, and thus crush out the insurrectionary element that was then present in the army. We went to Lieutenant-Colonel Peter Sydes, then commanding the regiment, and told him what we had been discussing. He at once appointed us to draft resolutions, which were soon prepared. The colonel called out the regiment, formed in hollow square. Chaplain McAdams read the resolutions, expressing confidence in the President and Gen. Hooker, pledging ourselves to stand by them and our glorious flag to the last man, or the war ended. With the restoration of the union, as soon as they were read, a motion was made to adopt them, which was carried unanimously. A sergeant then stepped to the front and called for three cheers for the President, three cheers for General Hooker, and three for the flag. And three times three were given with a will. We then adjourned to our quarters. Soon orderlies came galloping from division and brigade headquarters to ascertain what so much noise meant, thinking (I learned afterwards) that an insurrection had already broken out. But this patriotic action was soon followed

by other commands all over the army, and that army, under the inspiration and discipline of General Hooker, soon became stronger and more efficient than it had ever been since its organization. The cavalry up to this time were of little or no use. They won their spurs and fought their first battle at Kelly's Ford April 17, 1863. From that time on it became one of the strongest arms of our service. It owes all its splendid and efficient record in history to Gen. Hooker.

CHAPTER III.

Gen. Hooker Prepares to Move on the Enemy. The Movement of the Several Corps to Gain Their Position at Chancellorsville.

Settled spring weather was now rapidly approaching and it was apparent to all a great battle was soon to be fought. The time came.

General Hooker's plans for that battle was scientific in all its details. The cavalry was to detach itself from the infantry ten days in advance of the general movement, pass to the rear of the enemy, cut and destroy all his communications with Richmond. Destroy all supplies in reach, then hold themselves behind some of the rivers to prevent a re-establishment of communications and check the retreat of the enemy on Richmond. It was known General Lee had not at any time been able to keep more than four days' supply of rations on account of his limited transportation. When that was exhausted he would have to retreat from his intrenched camp to his base of supplies.

The infantry was to make the famous flank movement. It executed as soon as the effect on Gen. Lee's commissary had time to take effect caused by the cavalry raid. In the planning of the battle the movements of the Union army and the final points of the enemy's lines to be attacked by the Union army, General Lee was completely deceived. In all our previous movements the enemy knew when, where and how we were to move and attack. The result was that they were always on the ground

in advance of us, entrenched and waiting our approach. Before the battle of Chancellorsville began we had gained our position, and our plans were not known to the enemy until General Hooker proclaimed to the army his position by publication of orders—not even in Washington. As proof of this the royal bloods of France (Prince de Joneville and Count de Paris), attaches in previous campaigns to headquarters, were in Washington and came to the army the second day. When they approached the Union lines they inquired for General Hooker's headquarters. A noted wag stepped out and said to them: Keep right on this road to the second line of intrenchments, pass that line about a half a mile and you will come to another line of intrenchments; you pass that about a half mile and you will come to the picket line; you pass that line about sixty rods, there you will find General Hooker's headquarters. This shows the opinion the army had of "Fighting Joe Hooker." He was always on the front line, in the thickest of the firing, encouraging his men and ready to take advantage of weak points in the enemy's lines.

I never knew how unreliable the history of the late War of Rebellion was, especially the history of the battle of Chancellorsville, until I began to search histories to aid me in preparing this work.

I was an attache of the Army of the Potomac for three years, and desire to correct the history of that magnificent, patriotic army, and to some extent place its failure to crush the enemy when and where it came in contact with them, where it belongs. From the first battle of Bull Run down to the surrender of General Lee and his army, it fought like old, well drilled, battle scarred veterans, but was cursed with the most incompetent army commanders known in history.

They were led against an army that were poorly armed, clad and fed, and fewer in number, and yet they were nearly always defeated by that ragamuffin army. Before the battle of Chancellorsville began the Union army was composed of about 124,000 of all arms, 11,500 cavalry, while General Lee's reports show that they had but 62,000, 3,000 of which was cavalry. With this disparity in numbers, when the enemy were dislodged from their strong intrenched camp, forced to come out in open field, they must have been defeated, if not totally destroyed, had all moved and acted in concert, but General Stoneman, commanding the cavalry, did not cross the river as ordered April 13. The order was repeated by General Hooker, but he got this for reply: "The rivers and creeks are so high that we cannot pass them." Finally, April 27, Gen. Hooker became impatient at the delay of the cavalry and ordered the movement to begin of all arms at once. One reason Gen. Hooker rushed the movement of his army was, he had learned that Gen. Lee had detached Longstreet with 24,000 soldiers to another department, and he hoped to crush Gen. Lee before his army could be reunited. Gen. Lee still had 62,000 soldiers present for duty. See his report.

April 28th the Sixth corps (General Sedgwick's), the First corps (General Reynolds'), moved down the river about four miles below Fredericksburg, followed by the Third corps (General Sickels'), all under the immediate command of Gen. Sedgwick. Their movement was in plain view of the enemy, which led them to believe the whole army was moving to attack their right flank. This made operations on the other flank easy.

April 28th two pontoon bridges were built at Franklin's old crossing for the Sixth corps, and two more were laid one mile below for the First corps to cross. Brooks' division of the Sixth

corps crossed the river with but little opposition, a few skirmishers along the banks of the river and firing of artillery from the enemy's fortifications, which was at long range and did but little damage, the valley at this point being wide. General Wadsworth's division of the First corps crossed with equal success below.

On the 27th General Hooker set three corps, the 5th, 11th and 12th, in motion to the right, under the immediate command of Gen. Slocum, accompanied by three batteries to each corps. This column's course was so far north of the river that its movements could not be observed by the enemy, and they crossed the Rappahannock river at Kelley's and Germania fords. On the night of the 28th the cavalry crossed at the same place and preceded the infantry so as to cover their movements from the enemy's cavalry. On the morning of the 29th the infantry was on their way to the Rappidan and crossed that river at Morton and Racoon fords and proceeded to Chancellorsville, preceded by a brigade of cavalry commanded by Gen. Pleasanton, where they arrived at 6 p. m., April 30, and were joined by two divisions of the 2d corps. The other division of the 2d corps was left in camp at Falmouth, it being in plain view of the enemy, on high ground, and was not moved, it having the appearance, to the enemy leaving this division, that most of the Union army was still in camp. So on the 30th Hooker found himself at Chancellorsville with four corps, a movement he had made without any loss. The cavalry under Stoneman proceeded on their mission of destroying of public property and cutting communication between the enemy and Richmond, which they had been ordered to do ten days earlier.

April 30th a circular order from General Hooker was read to Sedgwick's command, informing them that the 5th, 11th, 12th

and two divisions of the 2d corps had successfully crossed the rivers and taken up a strong position at Chancellorsville, which was on the right and rear of the enemy's intrenched camp without the loss of a man, which would make the enemy come out and fight the Union army on their own chosen ground, or ignominiously fly.

April 30th, late in the afternoon, General Sickles's 3d corps was ordered to Chancellorsville. On that night they camped on the north bank of the Rappahannock river, near the United States ford. The mud was deep and that night froze so it bore a horse. Think of it, the soldiers with their underclothes wet with perspiration, with a thin blanket in open fields, lying all night on this frozen ground! The writer will give his experience of that night, which doubtless is the same as many others on such occasions. The soldiers slept in groups of three and four, to make the blankets cover as many as possible. So the outside ones are more or less exposed. On this occasion I was one of the outside of our group. I awoke some time in the night, and found my whole right side was paralyzed. I had no control of my right arm or limb. I reached over and seized my right wrist with the left hand, drew it over my body as far as I could, and working my left limb under my right one as far as I could and by using all the force I possessed was able to roll my frozen side to the comrade on my left. I was a long time thawing out, but by turning often I got through the night, but was not much rested.

May 1st the 3d corps arrived at Chancellorsville at about 11 o'clock, and was posted in the rear and west of Chancellor House. Fredericksburg is distant from Richmond about 50 or 60 miles east of south, Washington 40 miles east of north. Chancellorsville is about 10 or 11 miles west of Fredericksburg. The Rappahannock here runs in an easterly direction. The Confed-

erate fortifications extended along the crest of the hill three or four lines deep, two miles above and four miles below Fredericksburg, with irregular redouts at intervals near all the fords for twenty-five or thirty miles above and many miles below the city. In a front attack Fredericksburg could not be carried by six times their number if a determined resistance was made. Chancellorsville was a city of one house, a country tavern. It is situated at the junction of three roads that pass through and lead to Fredericksburg east, Gordonsville and Culpepper west. One of these roads lead to and down the river to Fredericksburg, and one, known as the turnpike, passing along the higher grounds, and the other, known as the plank road, passing along on lower ground and still farther south. There were two other roads running parallel to the plank and passing near the furnace, with cross or intersecting roads at intervals, leading into the plank, both east and west at Chancellorsville. Therefore our army at Chancellorsville took the Fredericksburg intrenched camp in reverse. The enemy were not only flanked but we were in their rear. This point of advantage was gained before the enemy was aware of or had any idea where the Union army were going to strike, and before it had time to interpose any force to impede their progress.

On the evening of April 30th Stewart's cavalry had been skirmishing with the Union cavalry in the direction of Gordonsville, and learned that there was a heavy column of infantry approaching Chancellorsville, and reported to General Lee the Union army was coming down the river on the south side. They were at Chancellorsville before this report reached Lee, but this report satisfied him that their crossing below the city was only a feint and the real attack would be on his left. That night he ordered General Jackson, who was on his

extreme right, fifteen or twenty miles from Chancellorsville, and the rest of his army, except about 9,000 men under General Early, to leave their intrenchments and march out and check the army of the Potomac. On the night of April 30th Gen. Hooker's line was advanced about one mile on the road to Fredericksburg, on the plank and turnpike, and on the river road still farther and near Bank's Ford. All that night the enemy was forming and intrenching their new line. General Jackson came up at 8 a. m., May 1st, and advanced their lines still farther toward Chancellorsville, and at some points into the thick timber and awaited developments.

CHAPTER IV.



Battle of Chancellorsville, May 1st—The Formation of the Union Lines Around Chancellorsville at Night, May 1st—Jackson's Movement and Attack of the 11th Corps—Gen. Howard's Incredulity and Defeat, May 2d.

About 11 a. m., May 1st, General Hooker ordered an attack on General Lee's lines, in the following order: General Slocum's 12th corps, followed up by General Howard's 11th corps, took the plank road. Sikes' division of the 5th corps, General Hancock's division of the 2d corps on the turnpike in the center, the remainder of the 5th corps took the river road. Frenche's division of the 2d corps turned to the right, crossed the plank and advanced on a road about two miles south of the plank to Todd's tavern. Each column was preceded by a detachment of Pleasanton's cavalry. Sickles' 3rd corps, in reserve west of the Chancellor House, except General Graham's brigade, which was advanced to Dowdle's Tavern, on the plank, facing west. This is sometimes called the Melzy Chancellor House.

General Hooker expected to advance rapidly in this order, drive the enemy before him and establish his line, with his right resting on Tabernacle church, about four miles east of Chancellorsville, and his left covering Bank's Ford. But it was soon found that the whole country, from the river south, a long distance below the plank road, was an impenetrable thicket through which troops could not be moved in concert. Every attempt to deploy from the road to connect the moving columns

a.a.a. *Jackson's Route*
b.b.b. *Route of Tram when*
Driven off the Road.

SCALE OF MILES



resulted in a broken mass. The more they attempted to establish communications with the advancing columns the more broken and disorganized they became. Aides trying to communicate with the advancing columns got lost, not knowing where they were going. The advance of such a line with any accuracy is impossible. The more it advances, the more disorganized it becomes. In this condition it met the enemy at rest, with a fixed, well organized line. The contest was unequal.

(General Doubleday says it was like moving in a dense fog.) Here the struggle was terrible. When night came on no one knew whether friends or enemies were on their right or left flank, so Hooker ordered the Union army to fall back to a line he had ordered laid out by Gen. Warren, of Hooker's staff, and Capt. Pain, of the engineer corps, which they were able to hold on the left flank with but little trouble as long as the army remained on the south side of the river.

To show the density of the forest and the impossibility to advance a line of battle in such a forest in face of the enemy, when the order was given to fall back one of the Union brigades got lost and floundered around and did not reach its place in line assigned it until morning, May 2d.

The decision of Gen. Hooker to fall back and take up the position on which the Union army rested on the morning of May 2d was a wise and a humane thing to do. The Confederates had taken up a strong position, with a force equal, if not greater, at this point than that of the Union army, and many lives would have been sacrificed, and the result was at best doubtful. It was always Gen. Hooker's policy to never attack the enemy's intrenched lines in front, and in this change of position the enemy would have to attack him in his intrenched lines, or retire within forty-eight hours. And he chose to fall back, intrench around Chancellorsville and await results.

The Union line as now formed was in the shape of a U, bottomsides up, the left 5th corps resting on the river near Scott's Dam, the 2d and 12th corps east and south of the Chancellor House, part of the 12th and 3d corps south and southwest of the house. The 11th corps crossed the plank about two miles west of the Chancellor House, at the junction of the plank with the pike, then turned west along the pike about one-half or three-fourths of a mile, then made a slight turn to the right. But its right did not rest upon any object, and as Shurtz told Howard, his right was in the air. This was formed with the view of a front attack on the plank or pike. Then in the rear of Hunting Creek and right of the 11th corps was Barrie's division of the 3d corps, which was soon relieved by the 1st corps. And this division was placed in reserve near the Chancellor House. About one mile west of where General Howard's line crossed the plank road forks, one branch runs northwest to Culpepper, the other southwest to Orange Court House, about one mile west of the forks of the plank road, the two roads passing the furnace and running parallel to each other, crosses the plank and pike. The prospects of Gen. Lee as darkness closed in on the engagement of May 1st was not very encouraging. He had carefully examined the position of the Union army and satisfied himself that so far as the left and center was concerned it was unassailable with any prospect of success. But before giving up the contest he ordered Gen. Stewart, commanding the Confederate cavalry to reconnoitre to the right. Stewart took the roads south of the furnace, which pass through a dense forest in which a moving column could not be seen from the Union lines, except at one or two short intervals where the road passed over high ground. The timber stands thinner here, covered wagons and infantry columns could be seen plainly if they were moving.

It was on these roads that Stewart passed to view the Eleventh corps lines to the right and reported to Gen. Lee and Gen. Jackson, about daylight on the morning of May 2d the result of his reconnoissance. His report was that the right of Gen. Howard's line did not rest on any object, was unsupported and easily turned. On this report General Jackson asked permission to take his corps, 26,000 strong, and make a detour on the same roads Gen. Stewart had passed, believing he could do so unobserved by the enemy, and gain the right of Gen. Howard's line, and with the help of the cavalry, unexpectedly fall upon and crush Howard's force before reinforcements could reach him. Is it possible that Stewart met Howard that night and arranged with him to maintain this position until he returned with Jackson and attacked him next day? Watch and see how it looks.

It is not my purpose to say that such a conference ever took place, but I do say if it had, and Howard had pledged himself to Gen. Stewart that the eleventh corps lines should not be changed until Stewart should return with Jackson and his army of twenty-six thousand and place them on the right flank and rear of the 11th corps and that no pickets or grand guard should be sent out to give notice of their approach, nor should any defense be thrown up for the protection of the eleventh corps on that flank, and a written contract had been entered into by the contracting parties for a consideration, I do say that neither Generals Stewart, Jackson or Lee could ever complain that there had been any breach of contract on Howard's part. This position occupied by the eleventh corps became the key to the battle field as soon as Jackson's movement began. If Jackson failed in his attack the Confederate army was doomed to destruction. If he succeeded he would capture many prisoners and possess himself of a commanding position which would ma-

terially increase the Confederates' chance of success. It was the Confederates' belief if this move succeeded they could destroy the Union army before they could recross the river or be reinforced from their left.

Gen. Hooker has been censured because he did not pass through the thicket on the night of April 30th instead of stopping over night at Chancellorsville as he did. Doubtless this course would have been the better one, from the fact that he intended to finally take up his position three or four miles nearer Fredericksburg, his right resting on Tabernacle church. He could have reached that point that night before Gen. Jackson could have reinforced Anderson's division, which was all that was in his front. He would thus have easily pushed Anderson out of the way. His position would have then been far better, for two reasons: His army would have been on open country, which would have enabled him to use all his artillery to great advantage, and left him four or five miles nearer his base of supplies. And the second reason is, he would have been nearer the 6th, 3rd and 1st corps, which he had left to make the demonstration on the enemy's right, while he with the other wing of the army made this wonderfully successful flank movement on Gen. Lee's left. But this, although it may have been a mistake and a disappointment, it was not necessarily fatal. The position at Chancellorsville was on high ground, naturally strong for defensive operations. The Union army's communication with their base of supplies was perfect. Their formation was strong for defensive operations, and if the cavalry accomplished their work of destroying all communications of the enemy with their base of supplies, as directed by Gen. Hooker, the enemy would have soon been compelled to retreat. This alone would have been a victory. All the Union army had to do was to

hang on to this position and win, while, on the other side, the successful flank movement of Gen. Jackson, or retreat, was all that was left for the Confederates. If Gen. Lee's experience with our former army commanders had not led him to place such implicit confidence in Jackson and led him to hold our army commanders in such utter contempt, he would never have consented to have thus divided his army in the face of this powerful enemy. This move was what General Hooker desired. Nothing could have pleased him better, and he proceeded to distribute his corps to make sure of the enemy's destruction and to notify and warn Howard of Jackson's movement on his right flank. (This movement of Gen. Jackson was a bold, hazardous and reckless move. Gen. Doubleday says: "It was a startling proposition and contrary to all the principles of strategy." For when Jackson was gone Lee would be left with but few men to withstand the shock of Gen. Hooker's entire army, and might be crushed while Jackson would be powerless to render him any assistance.) Jackson's position was equally as critical. If Gen. Howard had prepared for Gen. Jackson's approach by a line properly fortified and turned the right of his line to rest on Big Hunting Creek, then his right could not have been turned by Jackson, and with felled timber in front, tops out, and his artillery placed at the angles of his breastworks, he could have held Gen. Jackson for an indefinite period. But the failure of Gen. Howard to do his duty and obey orders turned the scale and lost the battle, and gave the victory to the Confederates, not only of May 2d, but turned the tide by giving them an advantageous position and making our position almost unattainable on that flank. That was one of the most potent reasons that made the Union army yield the field to the enemy and recross the river and go back to their old camping grounds. Early in the morning of May 2d

Gen. Graham's brigade of the 3rd corps, to which I belonged, was ordered to report to Gen. Howard for duty with a battery of artillery. The order was promptly obeyed and when we arrived at 11th corps headquarters Gen. Howard told Gen. Graham he had no use for him, that his lines were so strong he could hold the whole Confederate army, and desired them to attack him. I was standing within twenty feet of Howard and heard every word. He ordered us to report to Gen. Hooker and be placed where we could be of some use, as we could be of none there. When we returned Gen. Sickles got permission to advance two divisions of the 3d corps, which included Graham's brigade, to the furnace, which was on the right center of our line, near the two roads on which Gen. Jackson was seen to pass. This movement of Jackson was reported by Gen. Birney in the morning at headquarters. We moved out and took possession of the roads, capturing one entire regiment and other prisoners, cutting all communications between Gen. Jackson and Gen. Lee. Thus moving on Jackson's right flank and rear, expecting Gen. Howard to hold him in front. The 3rd corps would then attack his right, the 1st corps being in echelon to the right of the 11th corps, and rear of Big Hunting Creek, and extending to the river, would be able to strike Gen. Jackson in rear and on his left flank. He would thus be held and it would be difficult for him to escape us. Long before the 3rd corps took this advanced position the following order was issued:

"Headquarters Army of the Potomac, Chancellorsville, Va., May 2nd, 1863, 9:30 a. m. Major-Generals Slocum and Howard: I am directed by the major-general commanding to say the disposition you have made with your corps has been with a view to a front attack by the enemy. If he should throw himself upon your flanks, he wishes you to ex-

amine the grounds and determine upon the position you will take in that event. In order that you may be prepared for him in whatever direction he advances, he suggests that you have heavy reserves well in hand to meet this contingency. The right of your line does not appear to be strong enough. No artificial defense worth mentioning has been thrown up, and there appears to be a scarcity of troops at that point, and not in the general's opinion, as favorably posted as might be. We have good reasons to suppose that the enemy is moving to our right. Please advance your pickets as far as may be safe, in order to obtain timely information of their approach.

(Signed) JAMES H. VAN ALLEN,

Brig.-Gen. and Aide de Camp.

General Howard, in the Century Bound Volume, from May to October 1886, denies that this order ever reached him or his adjutant general, Col. T. A. Meysenburg, Century, page 766. If this was true, as Gen. Howard says, that this order never came to his headquarters, to his or to his adjutant general's knowledge, there was some little excuse for his being surprised when Gen. Jackson attacked his corps at 6 o'clock p. m., provided he had not got any other notice of Jackson's movements. Men who served in the War of Rebellion know that if the order was ever issued and sent from headquarters it was delivered to Gen. Howard or some one at his headquarters who receipted for it, the orderly or aide who carried it would never dare to return to headquarters without some one having receipted for that important order. So that point was settled at headquarters, they knew that order had been delivered at its proper destination. Now the only question is did Howard see this order. Major General Schurz, who commanded a division of the 11th corps, and was second in

rank to Howard, says he was at Howard's headquarters when Gen. Howard came in and laid down to rest, and asked him (Schurz) to open and read letters and dispatches that had accumulated, and among the dispatches was the order above referred to. Gen. Howard got up and they sat down and discussed the order, but Howard did not act upon it. No change of front was ordered or defense thrown up, but he (Schurz), without orders, faced some of his regiment to the right. He further says that while Howard and I were discussing this order another order of similar purport came from Gen. Hooker. I am not sure whether Gen. Steinware was present or not. This happened about 12 o'clock m., May 2nd, as near as I can remember. (Century bound volume, May to October, 1886, page 780.) In further contradiction of Howard's statements relative to this order from Hooker, I will offer the affidavit of H. M. Kellogg which is a valuable acquisition for the reason that it shows a disposition not only to tell a willful falsehood on the part of Howard and a disposition to be treacherous to his superior, but to the army and his country; the hiding away of this important order for so long a time until Gen. Hooker was relieved from his command, to our mind shows a premeditated disposition to be false. It looks as though the disappearance of this order from the files of the war department was by Howard's hands or some one in his interest and with his knowledge. That he has made a mistake is disproved by his article in the Century of 1886, on page 766—23 years after the occurrence he denies all knowledge of this important order. Does it require more evidence to prove that Howard's very singular conduct in the management of the 11th corps was premeditated. It has that appearance.

Kellogg says on oath:

AFFIDAVIT.

State of New York, County of Cortland—ss.

Before me, F. J. Peck, a Notary Public in and for the County of Cortland and State of New York, came Henry M. Kellogg, of No. 25 Main street, Cortland, New York, who, being by me duly sworn according to law, deposes and says, that he is 56 years of age, a resident, and business man, of Cortland, New York, where he has resided, and been engaged in business continuously, for the past 26 years. That on the 20th day of April, 1861, eight days after the attack upon Fort Sumter, S. C., he enlisted and was mustered into the 5th Ohio Volunteer Infantry, Company "G," at Cincinnati, Ohio. That at the expiration of his term of service, he was honorably discharged and mustered out. That on the 5th day of August, 1862, he re-enlisted, in Company "G," 55th Ohio Volunteer Infantry, at Upper Sandusky, Wyandot County, Ohio, and served continuously until May 31st, 1865, when he was honorably discharged and mustered out, at the close of the war. That after the Fredericksburg campaign, and while his regiment (the 55th Ohio, Col. John C. Lee) lay, camped in the woods, at Brooks Station, Va., at the request and on the recommendation of his Colonel, he accepted a detail for duty at headquarters of the 11th army corps and reported to Col. T. A. Meysenburg, assistant adjutant general, at said headquarters at Stafford Court House, Va., on February 28th, 1863; and remained on duty, in the adjutant general's department, of said 11th army corps, until the 31st day of August, 1863, when by order of General Howard he was transferred to another department at his headquarters. That from the 28th day of February, 1863, to August 31st, 1863, while connected with the adjutant general's office, as stated above, he had

charge of the records and files of letters, telegrams, and orders received at said office. During that time, the two great campaigns and terrible battles of Chancellorsville and Gettysburg occurred. The first (the Chancellorsville) campaign began in April and ended, by the 11th army corps returning to its former camping grounds, near Brooks Station, Va., the first week in May, 1863. While in this camp during May, 1863, after the battle of Chancellorsville, he filed, endorsed and copied into the record books of said adjutant general's department of the said 11th corps, all the papers and documents which came into his possession in relation to said campaign. That he was ordered by Col. Meysenburg, assistant adjutant general, to also make a complete duplicate set of official copies of all said records ready for use in Washington, if they should be called for. That he prepared as directed the duplicate "official copies," that there was not among these papers the famous and all important order of May 2d, 9:30 a. m., from headquarters of the Army of the Potomac at the Chancellorsville House, from General Joseph Hooker to General O. O. Howard, commanding said corps, directing him to be prepared for the enemy upon his right flank. Neither was the existence of such an order known to the affiant at that time. That on the 13th day of June following, the 11th army corps began its march on what proved to be the Gettysburg campaign. The corps marched north to the Orange & Alexandria railroad through Manassas, Centerville, Goose Creek, to the Potomac, at Edwards Ferry, crossing a pontoon bridge into Maryland, thence via Jefferson and Middleton to Frederick, Md., which place was reached at sundown, June 28th, 1863. That during the night of 28th, General Hooker was relieved of the command of the army. The 11th corps moved at daylight (29th) and marched 30 miles that day to Emmettsburg,

Md., and during the day learned that General Meade, and not Hooker, was then in command. The corps remained in camp on the 30th of June (the day before Gettysburg battle began) at Emmettsburg, Md., 10 miles distant from Gettysburg, Pa., across the state line. During the day (June 30th) headquarter tents were put up and he began work upon the accumulated papers in his possession relating to the campaign of Gettysburg, the accumulation of over two weeks. While seated at his desk that 30th day of June, within 48 hours following the departure of General Joseph Hooker from the said army as its commander, Col. T. A. Meysenburg, assistant adjutant general, entered the tent and handed him a field order, saying, "There is a very important order relating to the Chancellorsville campaign; you will file it in its proper place, among the papers of that campaign, and record it in your book, giving it its proper date, May 2d." He passed out of the tent, leaving it in affiant's possession for record. That affiant read it with amazement and astonishment and immediately made a copy of the order from the original field order, which for two months had been concealed and kept from the files until General Hooker had been relieved from his command. That said affiant filed said paper in its proper place. That he is now credibly informed that it has disappeared from the files in the War Department; that he copied same in record book on that day and that the said order dated May 2d, '63, is official No. 78, and is recorded after other orders dated June 12th, 1863, relating to another (the Gettysburg) campaign, in said record and is now in the vaults of the War Department at Washington, D. C., in the handwriting of said affiant. That the following is an exact copy of said order:

Headquarters Army of the Potomac,

Saturday, May 2d, 9:30 a. m., 1863.

To General Howard:

General—I am directed by the Major General commanding to say the disposition you have made of your corps has been with a view to a front attack by the enemy. If he should throw himself upon your flank he wishes you to examine the ground and determine upon the position you will take in that event in order that you may be prepared for him in whatever direction he advances.

He suggests that you have heavy reserves well in hand to meet this contingency.

Your ob'dt servant,

(Signed) J. H. VAN ALLEN,

Brig. Genl. and A. D. C.

We have good reason to suppose that the enemy is moving to our right. Please advance your pickets for purposes of observation as far as may be safe in order to obtain timely information of their approach.

H. M. KELLOGG.

Subscribed and sworn before me this 30th day of November, 1897.

(Notarial Seal.)

F. J. PECK,

Notary Public.

The two orders, copies of which I have produced, proves that Howard had knowledge of their existence, read and talked the matter over with Gen. Schurz, thus establishing two facts which were as patent to the mind of Gen. Howard at that time, as they are to us now that Jackson was sure to attack his corps on their right very soon. This places him in the position of willfully disobeying orders of his superior in the face of the enemy. The 11th corps did not have any advance pickets

in their right flank, yet Howard was frequently told the enemy was moving to attack that flank. His disobeying Gen. Hooker's orders at that time was one of the highest crimes known in military law. The penalty is death.

Gen. Howard had no concern about Gen. Jackson and the position of his army. Gen. Pleasanton sent reconnoitering squads who reported the position of the enemy to Gen. Howard; Sickles and others did the same thing. To all he replied they were mistaken, but made no move to counteract the movements of the enemy, or ascertain the facts of which he claimed to be in doubt. Scouts repeatedly reported to Gen. Howard. He ignored them all and scoffed at the idea of such a thing, and charged them with telling a story, the offspring of their imagination or fears.

The colonel of the 157th N. Y. Volunteers of the 11th corps and another officer of the regiment went out beyond their line and returned at 2 o'clock p. m. without orders from Howard and reported to him. They distinctly heard the enemy massing their troops on the right and rear of the 11th corps line. Howard's answer was: "You are new troops more scared than necessary." Other officers of the corps reported to Gen. Howard the approach of the enemy. To all he turned a deaf ear. At the same time Gen. Jackson rode forward close to the Union lines, climbed a large hill about 2 p. m., from which he could have a clear view that enabled him to inspect the 11th corps lines, and he took bearings that enabled him to form his corps on their right flank and rear where there were no defenses or obstruction save the natural forest and when this large force did strike the exposed flank of the 11th corps they were as helpless as little children. Some of the regimental officers on the right of the 11th corps, requested Gen. Howard the privilege to change front and asked for tools to intrench, to meet the enemy they knew was

soon coming down on them like an avalanche, but their requests were refused. He told them he would look after the 11th corps formation. Gen. Howard was not surprised, Gen. Hooker had warned him over eight hours before the enemy attacked. Many officers and scouts who had been out and viewed the enemy forming for the attack, reported all their movements to him.

To show that the officers, and enlisted men of the 11th corps knew that Jackson was preparing to attack their right flank and rear and his attack was no surprise, we will give an account of Jackson's attack by Corporal Charles Stacy, of Co. D, 55th Ohio regiment. Corporal Stacy was awarded a beautiful bronze medal for gallantry at the battle of Gettysburg, July 2d, 1863. This is what he has to say about the battle of Chancellorsville:

On the second day of May we took a position in line of battle along a road, being on the extreme right, with the exception of a brigade of Germans. Col. John C. Lee, of the 55th Ohio, obtained a map of a resident, a Union man, showing how the rebels were massing troops on our right and sent it to Gen. Howard. No notice was taken of it by Howard.

Col. Lee sent an orderly to Gen. Howard asking him if he could change front, also saying "If you will furnish my regiment with axes, I will soon make an impassible barrier to the enemy." He received in reply an order to attend to his regiment and he, Howard, would attend to the rest. At this time, 4 o'clock p. m., May 2, 1863, says Stacy, the silence was ominous and the men were getting uneasy, for not one of us but knew we would soon be attacked and we knew we were in a position in which we could do nothing. Col. Lee at this time told our band to go to the rear, the course of which was along our line to the left and past Gen. Howard's headquarters. Howard halted the band and wanted to know where they were going. They told him Col. Lee

had ordered them to the rear, as there would be fighting inside of twenty minutes. Turning to one of his staff Howard said, I guess the colonel is getting scared and he ordered the band to play; they played one tune and then began to play a piece called Dixie Medley, the last part of which was, get out of the wilderness, and while the band was playing this piece the battle began. Just previous to this time two deers ran along in front of our line. This satisfied all that they had been driven up by the advance of the enemy. Our position can be no better described than by using a bow and arrow: the rebels were the bow, and the 55th Ohio was the arrow. Suddenly the rebels broke out from the thick woods on our right, front and rear, and the firing began. The brigade to our right could make no resistance, and were taken prisoners. This left the 55th Ohio on the extreme right of the line. We were attacked from three sides. Oh! how can I describe this terrible scene. Officers and men were doing their best. It appears that I can now see our grand lieutenant, F. H. Bolt, as he stood in the road, swinging his sword over his head, saying, "give it to them, boys, give it to them." We took the best position we could on such short notice, and with deliberate aim sent our shot crashing through the enemy's ranks in our front, but it was found we were being surrounded and fell back. I have made the claim that, for our numbers who were engaged here, we lost the most men, for the length of time engaged, of any command during the war.* This shows that the rank and file of the 11th corps would fight, and were as good and brave soldiers as any army ever possessed. They actually

*We have been informed that the way Col. Lee obtained the map from a citizen referred to by Corporal Stacy, was, the old resident marked it out in the sand, giving position and location of the enemy, and Col. Lee drew the map on paper and sent it to Gen. Howard.

checked the enemy in their front, but seeing heavy columns passing to their right and left flanks, knowing they would soon be surrounded and all captured, fell back, the same as any other soldiers would under like circumstances.

It will be seen by the statements of Corporal Stacy regarding the attack of Jackson on the 11th corps' right, that the rank and file of that corps were fully aware that the enemy was crawling up on their right flank and rear, and that they were liable to burst forth from the dense forest any moment. It must have been a trying ordeal that these intelligent men passed through for the six or eight hours that these soldiers were held by the arbitrary orders of Gen. Howard. The wonder of citizens, who have never been soldiers, will always be why such bright men as Generals Carl Schurz, Steinwher, Ames, McLane, and other military men of that corps, could have been held in such a helpless position until the enemy attacked; but those who have been soldiers know the first thing they learned was to obey orders and ask no questions. Does anybody believe Howard was surprised?

While Corporal Stacy and all the officers and men of his regiment knew Jackson was soon going to attack, that belief was not shared by many others. It is reported that on the right of Devens' division the men had stacked arms, and some were cooking supper, others playing cards, others straggling around their camp in various pursuits, far away from their arms, and Confederate prisoners whom the 3d corps captured that night in their midnight charge, said that when they struck and captured the right of the 11th corps line, that they captured whole rows of guns whose stacks had not been broken. This would be natural, for Gen. Devens did not seem to be much disturbed, and was not inclined to believe the report that Jackson was moving

on his right, and it was natural the men would partake more or less of the confidence of their corps and division commanders. The strangest thing to account for is Howard's refusing reinforcements sent to him by Gen. Hooker. It is further evidence of his incompetency, or premeditated treachery to the army of the Potomac, and his denying that Gen. Hooker ever notified him of the enemy's moving to his right. In view of the fact that Gen. Schurz read to, and discussed the order with him, and, then, who but he was interested in hiding that order for two months, fearing court martial (see Kellogg's affidavit), was there more and better evidence of the treachery of Benedict Arnold, or Hull, than this of Gen. Howard's? It is true the country surrounding Chancellorsville is a dense forest, with here and there small cleared farms, so that troops moving or at rest could not be observed any distance if proper precaution was exercised by their commanders. For this reason it was more necessary for corps commanders to have their pickets stationed as far out in front of their main line as was safe, supported by grand guards, so as to give timely warning to the main lines to enable them to prepare to meet the enemy, no matter in what direction they would approach. It was the duty of Gen. Howard to take this precaution without waiting for orders from Gen. Hooker or anybody else. And in addition to sending out pickets, he should have sent scouts in every direction to ascertain the facts relative to reports and the position of the enemy. This should have been done immediately after learning from any source that the enemy was moving in his direction. But if we believe that the evidence was furnished Gen. Howard of the approach of the enemy, which we have cited in the preceding pages, then we must look for some cause other than a surprise, to account for General Howard's conduct on May 2nd. It seems that there was some sort

of investigation of this affair later by the congressional committee on the conduct of the war, but it was a farce and necessarily unreliable. It could not very well be otherwise. Gen. Hooker claimed that he had taken all the precaution necessary in the formation of his lines and had given Gen. Howard timely notice of Jackson's approach and Howard had been negligent, and instead of making preparation to meet the enemy, refused to believe the enemy was moving to his right and rear, although the source of his information as to the enemy's movements ought to have been considered the most reliable a general could obtain even outside of the two orders issued at headquarters, apprising him of all the facts as appears in full in the foregoing pages. I desire to say a word here in explanation of the two orders of the same date, May 2nd, 9:30 a. m., in almost the exact words: My idea is, it happened this way: When the Union lines around Chancellorsville was formed on the night of May 1st, the formation from left to right by corps, was beginning at the Rapahannock river, as follows: The 5th corps on the extreme left; next came the 2d corps; next came the 12th corps, facing southeast and south of the Chancellor House; then came the 11th corps, which was west and southwest of the Chancellor House; on their right was a division of the 3d corps and cavalry, which held the right to the Rapidan river when Gen Hooker inspected his lines. Early in the morning of May 2nd, he discovered that the space between the 11th and 12th corps was too broad and that space was ordered filled up with Gen. Birney's division of the 3d corps and immediately Birney, on taking this position, discovered Jackson's movement to our right and reported it to headquarters and this report caused the order of 9:30 a. m., May 2nd, to be issued and in the haste of Gen. Van Allen to give notice, and knowing the weak point and open space that had

existed between the 11th and 12th corps, addressed his first note of warning and order to Maj. Gen. Slocum and Maj. Gen. Howard. Immediately after this another order of a similar purport was sent from headquarters, dated 9:30 a. m., and addressed to Maj. Gen. Howard. The first of these orders is the one Howard calls the confused order, which he could not understand, but it must have been discovered by Gen. Van Allen immediately that the 11th and 12th corps did not, at that time, join Birney, having filled up the gap, and that the enemy had passed the aforementioned weak point and that it was the right of the 11th corps that was in danger of an attack by the enemy and immediately issued the second order, same date, 9:30 a. m., May 2d, and directed it to Maj. Gen. Howard individually, which speaks for itself. It is the second order that Gen. Schurz speaks of as of the same import, coming while he and Howard were discussing the first one and was smuggled away, but finally recorded and filed nearly two months after the battle, and would not now be known to exist had not Mr. Kellogg carefully copied the original (see affidavit in foregoing page), but Mr. Kellogg tells me that at his request a gentleman searched the records of the war department and found that the original order he filed away has disappeared from the files, but in the record book of the 11th corps they found the order recorded. But the order had disappeared from the files in the vaults of the war department.

It would appear as though this very important order has been stolen from the vaults of the war department. Who are the thieves that would be interested in the removal of this order? But inasmuch as a true copy has been preserved, and the affidavit of H. M. Kellogg, as to its authenticity published, it would seem as though the abstractor of the original order might as well

return it to the vaults. The fact that it once existed has been proven beyond a doubt, and the evidence fully shows that in the order book of the 11th corps they found a record of the order and its official number in the book is 78. Now to the question again, who stole that order and why did they do it, we leave this for others to decide, and here we leave the matter.

Now let us return to the second day's battle, May 2d, and the 11th corps, and I want to say here and now, being an active participant adjacent to that corps from start to finish, when Jackson drove them out of the position they occupied in the evening of May 2d, that what I knew of the movements of the enemy at that time, and have since learned, I want to go on record and be understood that the attempt of General Howard to charge the defeat of that corps to the cowardice of the rank and file of his command, is the most unjust, wicked attempt to shirk responsibility ever attempted by a human being.

There was not a corps in the army if they had been placed in the same position, but what would have retreated, and probably in no better order than the 11th corps did. The fact is, all the officers and most of the enlisted men of the 11th corps knew it was reported that the enemy was massing in great force on their right and rear. Some of their own command had been so near as to satisfy them that the reports were true. They heard the command of the enemy as they went into position. The forest was so thick that it would not be safe for a man or squad of men to crawl up to see their movements or count their numbers, for they were liable to have pickets or scouts in advance that would capture the squad or individual that would attempt to make close scrutiny. No one could see far in this thick forest, but they could hear the commands for a long ways, and know its meaning, and I never heard of an officer refusing

the report of a scout who reported what he heard, if darkness or other causes prevented a perfect ocular demonstration. Before Howard raised the objection at Chancellorsville, his course here was to bluff everybody that talked that the enemy was massing on their right and rear. Then when the enemy did rush in in such heavy columns from the forest on the flank and rear, every man realized that Howard's judgment was not to be relied upon, or else he had willfully betrayed them and his appearance among the men so soon after he had made this great blunder did not restore their confidence, but would naturally increase the panic that had possession of them. They had lost confidence in their commander. The facts that appear as this narrative proceeds are quite enough to cause this corps to lose confidence in Howard. Any corps treated as the 11th corps was by Howard would have lost confidence in him and would not have halted under the pressure of Jackson's heavy column and changed front under their fire and stopped the enemy, and I now repeat that no troops, not even Napoleon's old guards, had they been placed under Howard and handled and deceived as he did the 11th corps, would have done any better.

About 6:30 p. m., two divisions of the 3rd corps being far in advance of the right center of our lines, heard a little sharp firing on our right, and in the direction of the 11th corps. At once all the men along the line began to discuss the probable battle. "The skirmishing has begun," they said. All were looking upon this as the great turning point of the war, in our favor. All the men in ranks understood we were advanced out so far front to cut all communications between Generals Lee and Jackson, and knew our position had accomplished that object, and also knew our army was in a position to crush either wing in detail and were anxiously waiting for General Jackson

to bring on an engagement which would enable us to locate and then attack their right and rear, drive them in a huddle on the 1st and 11th corps, and crush them. This is no idle boast or delusion. If General Howard had made the stand it was reasonable to expect he would, General Jackson's army would have been destroyed, but judge our surprise when we heard no sound of battle save the light skirmishing before referred to, and while we were resting on our arms waiting for the order to advance, to win a great victory that would soon end the war, firing again broke out afresh, and more rapidly, and soon after we saw General Sickles coming down the road in the direction of army headquarters, his hat in his hand and horse on the dead run, and ordered us to fall in immediately, telling us the 11th corps had broke and run, and General Jackson had captured many prisoners and was in possession of the road we came out on, and had established communication with General Lee, and we were shut off from the rest of our army, and had to cut our way through the enemy's lines to join them, or be captured. We were soon in motion, retracing our steps and about 11 o'clock p. m. found the enemy, and in a grand bayonet charge of the first brigade of Birney's division, commanded by Col. Eagers, with uncapped guns established communication with our army and laid down on the ground on hazel grove hill, tired, and were soon asleep thinking little and caring less, what was in store for us the next day.

When it was about time for Jackson's attack on the 11th corps to begin, Lee caused an attack all along the left of the Union line from the river to the 12th corps. Of course this was only a feint, intended to divert attention from Jackson's movements, and was so regarded as appears in the foregoing. Even the men in ranks were discussing the result of Jackson's

attack on the 11th corps and the Union officer in the 3rd, 11th, and the right of the 12th corps who was on duty with his command, and could not locate the real attacking column to be Jackson's, and the point of the Union lines to be attacked was the right of the 11th corps, was so stupid that he was unfit to fill the position of eighth corporal. I say this advisedly, because of the general discussion among the men in the ranks in my own command, and others I have conversed with, of other commands. Gen. Howard could have learned all the facts to his entire satisfaction if he had gone out with, or sent a strong reconnoitering party, preceded by a skirmish line. This would have developed the enemy's movements and given him timely warning, and by taking advantage of defensive positions, he could have delayed the enemy's movements so as to have given time to throw up defenses and prepare for the enemy's attack and the firing of the reconnoissance would have given notice to General Hooker of the position of the enemy, who would, in that event, been able to have placed his reserve troops in position to support the 11th corps and counteract the movements of the enemy, but no firing was heard until the crash of Jackson's whole force came like thunder from a clear sky.

Let us now return to General Jackson and the 11th corps. General Jackson came down on the right flank and rear of the 11th corps, doubling them up and meeting little or no resistance, so sudden and unexpected was his attack. At headquarters all were surprised, for they had heard no firing. General Hooker had ordered General Howard to change front, fortify, send out pickets and locate the enemy, and well might he expect long and continued firing on our right when General Jackson did attack. Judge of the utter surprise of everybody when little or no firing had been heard along the line of the 11th corps. To

see thousands of them stringing past headquarters, many hatless, coatless, and without arms, a wreck, a mob stampeding to the rear. General Hooker rushed out and tried to stop them. Two regiments of cavalry charged on them. It was soon discovered they were of no use and were permitted to pass on. These were men on the extreme right of the 11th corps, and the first to receive the shock of General Jackson's attack. Farther along down the line an attempt was made to resist this mad attack, but they soon found they were without defenses, overlapped in rear, on their right flank, and front in heavy column, which doubled them up in a heap. Their only alternative was to fly or be captured. Thus General Howard's whole line were nearly all swept into a helpless flying mob. The only available troops to stay the victorious army of General Jackson was Berry's division of infantry which was near headquarters, and three small regiments of cavalry, about 4,000 in all. These troops went forward in great haste, all the reserve artillery was put into position soon as possible. It was thought the artillery would not have time to load their guns before the enemy, who was emerging from the woods, would be upon them. Something desperate had to be done quickly. General Pleasanton ordered Major Peter Kernan, commanding the 8th Pennsylvania cavalry, 400 strong, to charge, which was promptly done. The major and most of his men went down. Brave, noble men, they knew they were riding to sure death, but with drawn sabers and a cheer, they rushed into the timber and at the enemy, making noise enough for ten thousand for a time. The enemy did not know if their number was 400 or 40,000, while the enemy was not less than ten thousand strong at this point, and this small regiment actually checked that overwhelming force, which enabled the Union artillery to load and aim, and when they fired


double canister into the enemy's ranks, it fairly blew them back into a whirling mass. All the reserve artillery soon got to work, and with the small infantry reserve stopped General Jackson one-half or three-fourths of a mile west of the Chancellor House. Darkness came on. Each side began to adjust their line, preparatory for the next day's operations. This brought on several collisions, and in one of them General Jackson got his death wound. The Confederates claim it was his own men fired on him and his escort, when they were returning from reconnoitering in front of their own lines. That may or may not have been true, more than likely it was not true, for it is known a few minutes later General A. P. Hill was severely wounded while leaning over and sympathizing with General Jackson, by shot coming from the Union men. Again, while Jackson was being carried to the rear, General Pender recognized him and complained of the demoralizing effect of the artillery firing on his men, but Jackson replied sharp and sternly: "You must hold your ground, General Pender." This was General Jackson's last command. Now, with all this terrible firing of infantry and artillery, who could tell in the night, whose shot made the fatal wound, even though one might be between the lines, and what is the difference. If the enemy insist they killed their own general, they are welcome to all the honor there is in it; but after the 3rd corps had cut its way back and formed on General Berry's left, with their left resting on an open field beyond Hazel Grove, firing soon ceased, and all was quiet. General Hooker ordered the 3rd corps, at daylight, to swing their left east and connect with the 12th corps. At 9 o'clock p. m., when General Jackson's attack had been checked and a new line established, General Hooker began to plan what could be done to counteract the advantage the Confederates had gained on our right by

the rout of the 11th corps. Hooker knew that General Lee would order every man from his right who could be spared, leaving a very thin line there in his defense, in order to aid General Jackson's old corps, that had gained the advantageous, commanding position, to strike a crushing blow to the Union army the next day at this broken, weakened point of the Union lines.

CHAPTER V.

The Battle on May Third—General Hooker Orders General Sedgwick to Cross the River at Falmouth and Attack Lee in Reverse at Daylight—Sedgwick's Failure and Re-crosses the River—Hooker Wounded—Meade Refuses to Re-enforce Sickles—Union Army Driven Back of the Chancellor House Council of War May 4th—That Night Re-crossed the River, Went Into Camp, Near Falmouth, Va.

General Hooker sent an order to General Sedgwick, who was below Fredericksburg, to move on Lee's right and rear with a force, when united with General Gibbons' Division of the 2nd corps, which was resting at Falmouth, that would give him at least 30,000 men. With this large force Hooker ordered Sedgwick to cross the river at Falmouth, three or four miles above where his command was stationed, during the night, and fall upon the thin line of Gen. Early at Marys Hill, and crush them. Of course, this movement would have struck the left of the enemy's line of entrenchments, which was held by a light force, and could not have been but little stronger, at any one point, than a very thin line of battle, for the reason that Early's command consisted of only nine thousand men, and they had to guard a line of not less than eight miles long. With Sedgwick's heavy force secretly concentrated at any point, and moved forward in successive columns in a night attack, would easily have brushed the enemy's thin line out of the way and hurled them back in the direction of Richmond in disorder, and left Sedg-



wick's command free to execute Gen. Hooker's orders to attack Lee in the rear at daylight, while Early would have been powerless to resist his onslaught. Sedgwick would have been in possession of all the direct roads to Chancellorsville and could have reached Lee's line, attacked them in reverse, and driven him away from the left of the Union army's formation and united the Union forces long before Early could have come to Lee's support.

It is strange that most writers of this campaign and this movement seek to find some means by which they can fix the responsibility for its failure on Gen. Hooker. Gen. Doubleday in his memoirs, says, "doubtless when Gen. Hooker issued the order to Sedgwick to cross the river at Falmouth, and attack the enemy, he had forgotten that he had ordered Sedgwick three miles below Fredericksburg and supposed none but Howe's division had crossed the river." I say this was not at all probable. Gen. Hooker ordered this movement to the enemy's right by three corps, the sixth, third and first, all under the personal command of Gen. Sedgwick. He was constantly in communication with the commander of that movement and at different times had ordered Sedgwick to detach corps from his command to join him at Chancellorsville. First, Sedgwick detached the 3d corps April 30th, which joined Hooker at Chancellorsville, May 1st. Then the 1st corps was ordered to join Hooker at Chancellorsville, and arrived on the evening of May 2d. This shows that Sedgwick and Hooker were in constant communication and that Gen. Hooker knew perfectly well at 9 o'clock p. m., May 2d, where Sedgwick's whole command was located, and knew it would not require any great exertion on the part of the 6th corps to recross the river and march three or four miles to Falmouth, cross again and brush the enemy out

of the way, and attack Lee in rear at daylight. Gen. Sedgwick need not have halted his corps until he struck the enemy. After he had crossed the river at Falmouth, Gen. Benham was with Sedgwick, with his engineer corps and would have taken up and laid all the bridges necessary, so there need not have been any waiting of the troops at the fords if the movement had been made by crossing at Falmouth, all in the night time, the enemy would have been surprised on account of the heavy fog that settles here in the valley this time of the year. The movement of armies cannot be seen until late in the morning. This was demonstrated many times during the war at this point, but when Sedgwick moved up on the Bowling Green road on the south side of the river, close under the enemy's fortified lines, he encountered the enemy's pickets frequently and at Hazel Run met a considerable force, where a sharp skirmish took place, and the position finally had to be carried by a charge. This skirmish and picket firing gave the enemy notice of Sedgwick's movement and enabled them to reinforce their left and be in their works in force ready and waiting the final attack. For this reason the first attack of Sedgwick was unsuccessful and if some of the division commanders can be credited, if the enemy could have had three hundred more men, Sedgwick's army could never have carried the heights.

It is strange that an officer of Gen. Sedgwick's experience and military education would make the mistake to march his corps up the Bowling Green road when his order was to cross at Falmouth. This order meant a heavy column of Union soldiers striking a thin line of Confederates, surprise them in the night time in a heavy fog, and easily brush them out of the way. Gen. Hooker always claimed that if Sedgwick had obeyed his order in spirit, the movement would have been a

great success, and I fully agree with him; in fact, I cannot see how the movement could have failed, except it was made in the manner in which Sedgwick executed it. The movement on the south side of the river was ill advised and poorly executed by Sedgwick, and was a great misfortune to the army, for which Gen. Hooker was not responsible. If Sedgwick had ordered a brass band to play at the head of each of his brigades, it would not have been a surer indication of his movement to the enemy than the picket firings was along Bowling Green road. He must have known he would encounter the enemy's pickets along this road, and to avoid these pickets and surprise the enemy and insure success, Gen. Hooker ordered him to cross at Falmouth. All the forenoon of the third day Gen. Hooker waited to hear Sedgwick's charge on Gen. Lee's thin lines in reverse, that would stampede the enemy, but he heard no sound, and wondered why his order that had been issued at 9 o'clock the night before had not brought the results he had anticipated. Gen. Sedgwick started soon after 12 o'clock p. m. with two divisions of his corps by the way of the Bowling Green road and reached Fredericksburg about 3 o'clock a. m. Gen. Gibbons' division of the second corps laid pontoon bridges, crossed over the river at Falmouth and reported to Gen. Sedgwick at daylight. They attacked and carried the heights about 10 o'clock a. m. and scattered the enemy toward Richmond. Now, all that remained was for Gen. Sedgwick to move immediately along the plank and attack Lee in the rear, for all the force that was opposing him, Gen. Early's 9,000, was scattered towards Richmond, and was not in his way, but he waited to reorganize and send back for Gen. Brook's division he had left behind, and it was 3 o'clock p. m. before he moved on Gen. Lee. During this delay Lee was reinforced by Early's

scattered army, which had passed around Sedgwick's flank and found Gen. Lee, and were faced about with reinforcements to meet the 6th corps. If Gen. Sedgwick had marched with his whole corps at 12 o'clock p. m., even though he marched via Bowling Green road, his force would have been strong and he could have moved straight out on the plank road, after capturing the heights, and not met anything to prevent his striking Lee in reverse, defeating him and uniting with Gen. Hooker, and saved the third day at Chancellorsville; there is no doubt of this.

The failure of Gen. Sedgwick to move his whole force to the attack of the heights and cross the river at Falmouth, instead of marching on Bowling Green pike, was a bad mistake, which caused many hours' delay and was fatal to the success of his movement in aiding Gen. Hooker at Chancellorsville. When he did move he met Gen. Lee's united force and was defeated, and instead of joining Gen. Hooker at Chancellorsville at daylight, May 3d, he was eight or ten miles away, and did not move to attack until fifteen hours later. He then met the enemy's forces he had scattered in his morning attack, reunited and reinforced, standing between him and Gen. Hooker strong enough to assume the offensive; in fact, the enemy had become so strong in Sedgwick's front that on the night of the 3rd he thought it advisable to fall back, which he accomplished during the night, and on the morning of May 4 he had taken a position covering Bank's ford, where he assumed the defensive. This was a very strong position, and Gen. Benham, class mate of Sedgwick at West Point, advised him not to leave this position unless Gen. Hooker ordered him to do so. He was able to, and did, hold this position and repel all the force Gen. Lee was able to bring against him on the evening of May 4; but that night Sedgwick crossed the river without waiting for orders

from Gen. Hooker. There is evidence that Gen. Butterfield, chief of staff, did send on his own responsibility an order to Sedgwick, after urgent request from him for reinforcements or the privilege to recross the river, giving him privilege to cross. Gen. Hooker later sent an order to Sedgwick to hold his ground, but Sedgwick deemed it too late, as all his command but one brigade had then crossed. So the balance was crossed over and the bridges taken up. Seems to us that if Sedgwick had possessed the ambition a commander ought to, when Hooker sent the order for him to hold his ground, he would have turned his men and marched back instead of completing the crossing. We know the reserve artillery had been placed on the high ground on the north side of the river; that would sweep the ground of rebels if they attacked him. This crossing of Sedgwick's was unnecessary and ought not to have been done. His position was a strong, commanding one, and the one Hooker started for May 1st, when he got tangled up in the thicket; it commanded the enemy's intrenchments in rear of Fredericksburg, and if it had been held by Sedgwick it would have accomplished all the results that Hooker's flank movement was expected to do, and resulted in a great victory for the Union army.

At this epoch in the battle at Chancellorsville Gen. Hooker was undecided what to do. Sedgwick's movement had been a failure. And while Gen. Hooker was paralyzed from the wound on the third day the enemy had driven the Union army back and got possession, not only of Chancellorsville, but all the main roads leading to Fredericksburg. The question was: Shall the Union army be concentrated at Chancellorsville, or with Sedgwick at Banksford? At the same time Sedgwick was pleading for reinforcement or to be permitted to cross the river. Gen.

Butterfield, chief of staff, sent the order for him to cross, but later Gen. Hooker countermanded the order, with the result as before stated. Gen. Hooker then decided to take the whole army back to camp, which, under the circumstances, was the proper thing to do.

Gen. Howe, one of Sedgwick's division commanders, says they could and ought to have held their position and not recrossed the river. Now, I venture the assertion that there never was a more scientific, better planned battle than that of Gen. Hooker's at Chancellorsville in the world's history, and none better executed (barring the tardiness of the cavalry in starting as ordered) up to April 30th, when the army arrived at Chancellorsville. There is no doubt but what, if the army had continued their march that night, they could have reached Tabernacle church and taken up their position there with slight loss, and their position would have been better, as before stated. But a lack of energy on the part of some of the Union corps commanders, such as was exhibited at Chancellorsville, and disobedience of orders would defeat any army in any position. Strategy of the world's best general could not save an army from the wiles of some of the corps commanders of the Union army at Chancellorsville. History will fail to produce such a combination of adverse conditions of an army over which the commanding general was powerless to control. That these conditions existed must be patent to all and cause the blush of shame to creep over the countenance of every honest American citizen.

We will return to Chancellorsville and to the position of the Union army on the morning of the third day. The point Gen. Birney's division occupied the night of the second day was a great strategic point, high grounds with large clearing, excellent point to operate artillery, which would enfiladed both our

own and the enemy's lines. So aides were posted to Gen. Hooker's headquarters before daylight to get permission to change the proposed line for the purpose of taking in this high and commanding position. When the aide arrived at headquarters Gen. Hooker was asleep, and nothing that could be said or done would persuade the aide in charge to wake him up, and while this parleying was going on Birney's division, being in line of columns of regiments, by brigades, closed en masse. Gen. Graham's brigade on the left and nearest to the woods, in which we had reason to believe the enemy was in force. The pickets in that direction began firing. It was apparent we were soon to be attacked from that point. Mine was the left company of my regiment; therefore I was on the left of our brigade. I began to be uneasy and went to Gen. Graham and asked him why we remained bunched up in a heap so. I said I believed we would be attacked within ten minutes and told him if we were deployed facing west and the woods we could make it lively for the enemy. To this he agreed, but replied he had been told by Gen. Birney we were going to move, and every minute he was expecting the order—in what direction he did not know—and did not dare to take the responsibility. I then went to Col. Sides, commander of the 57th Pennsylvania regiment, to which my company belonged, and which was the outside regiment, facing north. I begged of him to change front on my company; that would face us west on the point the enemy was expected, had he changed front forward on my company the whole brigade, I believe, would have followed, impelled by their natural instinct. No duty ever seemed more plain, and, instead of running off the field without firing a gun, we would have met and driven the enemy back and held that strategic point that, in a few minutes, we got

orders to hold, but it was too late; we were running off like sheep, not able to fire a gun, without being in danger of shooting our own men. The brigade continued the retreat over the low and swampy grounds to the ridge beyond, which was called Fairview, and higher ground than Hazel Grove hill. Hazel hill was soon covered with artillery by the enemy; that was very annoying. The brigade faced about and formed a line of battle. While we were forming, a man from Company B, as I now remember him, of the 57th regiment came to me and said, "I am going in with you, captain." I said, "Fall in," and I supposed he went to the left of the company. Immediately the order came down the line, "Forward," and we moved forward for Hazel Grove hill, where the enemy had batteries playing on us very lively, and when we reached the low grounds it was quite wet and swampy. I noticed a large water hole. At a glance I discovered that, by taking an oblique step to the right, I would clear it. When I came to it I took the step as I had calculated, and as I did so a shell exploded in our front, and a piece of it cut the top of a man's head off in rear of me. I then discovered it was the man from Company B. He had crowded the orderly sergeant down and was covering me. For a second, perhaps, after the top of the man's head disappeared he was still standing; the nerves then relaxed, and he went down. In this charge we captured the enemy's batteries, their called Fairview, and higher than Hazel Grove hill. Hazel hill rifle pits and a number of prisoners, and we had possession of Hazel Grove hill, with the enemy on three sides of us. This left us in a pocket at the bottom of the pocket and in rear of the enemy's main line which was facing east. The enemy was making desperate efforts to dislodge Gen. Mott's brigade on our right and finally succeeded. This enabled them to close

up the mouth of the pocket. Gen. Graham ordered us about face and double quick out, while the enemy was firing on us from three sides, and when we got out of this hole I found my clothing had become so deranged that it was hard work to make headway. I turned my company over to my lieutenant and stepped to one side of the road between two water holes and laid down on a brush heap to adjust my clothing. A soldier of the 12th corps was filling canteens at one of these places, and he gave me a drink of water. I then started for the road to follow my regiment. I looked up and saw a shell coming straight for me. I stopped and gazed at it, but could not move. It dropped enough to strike an oak sapling about six inches through, eight or ten feet in front of me, and, being a cap shell, exploded. I heard the explosion, then all was blank. How long I lay there I do not know; the next I remember was a distant roaring in my head, and the soldier who had given me the drink was steadying me on my feet and asked me if I was hurt. I told him I had not been touched. He said, "You was flat on the ground and dead as you ever will be." I then discovered my sword was cut in two, and one piece of shell had struck me on my left side, striking on my blanket roll, and passed between my left arm and body. This is what knocked me down, and this is the way it was done. In active service, officers and enlisted men group themselves together in threes and fours nights; in this way they are able to divide their blankets, shelter tents, cookin utensils, etc., and when they go into bivouac at night their house, beds, provisions and cooking utensils are unloaded, and in ten minutes their tents are up, and their supper is well under way. It was because of this dividing up of these necessary traps that saved my life. On this Sunday, May 3d, 1863, I was carrying my blanket and one-



Capt. A. H. Nelson's Sword

Shot away by fragment of
Shell - Sunday, May 3rd 1863
at the Battle of Chancellors-
ville. Va.

half of the roof of the shelter tent. The blanket was rolled lengthwise, the tent roof rolled around the blanket, the two ends of the package were brought together and fastened with a strong cord. We then put our head and left arm through the circle; that lets the roll rest on the right shoulder and against the left hip. I looked up and saw a shell, as I said before, coming as straight for me as you could point a gun. Many times before this I have seen shells coming and stepped to one side and let them pass. This is no uncommon thing for soldiers to do, but this time I seemed to have lost all control of myself. I could not move, believing, in all probability, I would not have more than one more breath of life in this world; yet I was not able to control myself so as to step to one side, and when it struck the sapling, it being a cap shell, the sapling was solid enough to explode the shell and had resistance enough to part the fragments of the shell, and probably send them each side of me. On my left side we know just how close the fragments came; my sword in its steel scabbard, was cut in two just below the lower band while it was hanging by my side; another fragment struck on my roll of blankets, which yielded enough to protect my body and permit the fragment to pass between the body and arm without serious injury to either. I now believe, if I had taken one or two steps forward, or sideways, I would have been terribly mangled, if not instantly killed. As it was I was badly bruised. When I overtook my regiment I fainted for the first time in my life, and I have been afflicted in that manner many times later. The officers of my regiment persuaded me to keep my mutilated sword. Soon after the battle I had an opportunity to send it home, and I now prize it very highly. I never knew or heard of an officer who had his sword shot in twain while it was hanging by his

side, and live to tell how it was done. It was the most miraculous escape I ever knew or heard of. Later in the day, as the 3d corps was gradually being flanked out of their position, facing Jackson's old command that had been reinforced, it let the enemy in on the flank of the 12th corps and Hancock's division of the 2d corps. Here is where Hancock displayed his great abilities as a successful general, fighting the enemy successfully, for a long time, who had attacked his division on three sides, then withdrawing at his leisure (the Union army on his right and left, having preceded him), with the loss of but one regiment, the 27th Connecticut, which a subordinate failed (who was ordered) to notify them that the division was falling back.

The 3d corps giving away, let the enemy in on the right flank and rear of the 12th and 2d corps, and the struggle for them to swing around their right to the rear to keep in touch with the 3d corps was a desperate one.

This was a terrible day and the most desperate fighting the army had ever experienced. The 11th corps giving away, left the enemy in possession of a commanding position for their infantry, and gave them Hazel Grove hill, high grounds and open fields, where they placed their artillery at an angle that enfiladed our lines right and left with plunging shell and canister, which was terrible to stand. While Gen. Hooker was leaning against a post of the veranda of the Chancellor House a shell struck the post he was leaning against and shattered it. The fragments struck and severely wounded him. He was helped on his horse and rode a short distance to the rear, when he got faint and was taken off his horse and laid on a blanket. He soon felt better and was assisted to mount. As he did so a shell came and struck exactly where he had laid, tearing the

blankets on which he had laid into shreds. Gen. Couch, second in rank, then started out to inspect the lines and arrange artillery to check the fire of the enemy on Hazel Grove hill. The battle was raging fiercely on our right front center south and southwest of the Chancellor House.

Gen. Sickles' 3rd corps, southwest or right center, was being terribly punished by the enemy's infantry in front and enfiladed by artillery on his left flank. He sent Gen. Treemain with a dispatch to Gen. Hooker, not knowing he had been wounded, requesting support. Gen. Hooker was suffering paroxysms of pain and he directed the aide to pass the request over to Gen. Meade, who was present, for his action. Hooker was then taken to the rear for treatment. There was at that time available in the rear and right flank 37,000 fresh troops, composed of the 1st, 5th and what was left of the 11th corps. Gen. Meade was in command of that flank. He hesitated and finally decided not to act without the express order of Gen. Hooker, who was not able to give an order, or sanction of Couch, who was not to be found. While this parleying was going on our line in front was being pushed back and had to be abandoned for a new position farther to the rear. Gen. Hooker intended to use these reserve troops when the enemy wore themselves out in his front. The time had come to strike. Gen. Doubleday says probably the reason Gen. Meade hesitated and finally refused to act was he feared Gen. Hooker might come to at any time and assume command. If successful, claim all the honor. If a failure, charge it all to Gen. Meade.

What selfishness and lack of patriotism. A major-general high in rank, who subsequently became commander-in-chief of the Army of the Potomac, hesitating when our noble officers and men were being driven in and slaughtered by thousands,

when he had at his command, being senior officer of that part of the line, and the request for support being handed him by order of the disabled commander. Gen. Meade, by reason of seniority at that part of the line, could have used the reserve, and ought to have done so, to support Gen. Sickles and then attacked the enemy in flank. It was one of the turning points in the battle of Chancellorsville, and to save the day required prompt action. That hesitating again lost the day's battle. It was the propitious time of all others to act promptly. A grand victory was in reach of the Union army at this moment. This failure at this point and time must be charged up to Gen. Meade. Suppose Gen. Lew Wallace, at the battle of Fort Donaldson, the second day had waited for orders from Gen. Grant, who was far away and could not be found by Wallace's aides, and did not know the army had been attacked. Suppose he had waited to change front and attack the enemy until Grant ordered it. The whole army would have been driven into the Cumberland river or disasterously defeated before Gen. Grant could have been found or reached the field to give the order. But Gen. Wallace did change front without orders, thus changing a sure defeat into a grand victory. Gen. Meade could have done the same thing. But he refused to act, and for want of support brigade after brigade was driven out of position and the day was lost.

When Gen. Stoneman failed to cross the river, pass to the rear of Gen. Lee, cut his communications on the 13th day of April, that was a serious mistake and the time frittered away from the 13th to the 28th day of April, seems like criminal negligence. He could, and a more active general would, have gone higher up the river and passed over at some point above and been doing his work and not set down and wait fifteen days for the water to run past. Promptness and secrecy and rapid

movements Gen. Hooker knew were necessary to our success. That is mistake No. 1.

No. 2. The failure of Gen. Howard to change front to meet Gen. Jackson, fortify, etc., as ordered by Gen. Hooker. And his misleading report to Gen. Hooker when he ordered the return of a detachment of the 3rd corps, and said he could hold the whole Confederate army if they should attack him, was criminal deception, and as the facts developed later, was undoubtedly said for the purpose of deceiving Gen. Hooker and defeating the army. He was not surprised. He knew the enemy was massing to attack the 11th corps' right, and knew when they did attack his corps would be helpless. But instead of obeying Gen. Hooker's orders to advance his pickets to ascertain the position of the enemy and their whereabouts, he simply did nothing. Officers of his own corps went out without orders and discovered the enemy massing on an open plain nearly two miles to the right and rear of the 11th corps' lines, at a point indicating that if they attacked from that direction it would be where the 11th corps had no defences, no pickets, and were not faced in that direction. Had he heeded the warning of the officers of his own corps, who at two o'clock p. m. had located the enemy, he would then have had four hours to change front, throw up breastworks, fell the heavy timber in his front, tops out, and so arranged his artillery that he could have held Gen. Jackson's disorganized lines that had marched in line two miles through a dense forest and necessarily broken and disorganized ranks, any length of time, and destroyed them before they could have crossed over the felled timber to have reached his breast works. Why did Gen. Howard, if he intended to be honest, deny that Gen. Hooker had warned him of Jackson's movements to his right. A sure thing if a court

martial had taken place, as was expected, his intention was to brazenly face Gen. Hooker and with his long, sanctimonious face insist that he never got the order, as he did before the board of inquiry that made a whitewashing report. Had he heeded this order he would have had eight hours to change his lines, fortify, cut the timber in his front, get reinforcements, if he needed them. He could then, as he told the reinforcements that he sent away, have held not only Gen. Jackson, but the whole Confederate army if they attacked him. Taking all the evidence that we have produced, does it not prove conclusively that Gen. Howard purposely threw away on the 2d day of May, 1863, the greatest opportunity for crushing the Confederate army under Gen. Lee and ending the war, that was ever presented to the army before or since. Had Gen. Howard obeyed orders there would never have been in history the battle of Gettysburg, Wilderness, Spotsylvania, Cold Harbor, Petersburg or Five Forks. Our victorious army under such a brilliant commander as Gen. Hooker could never have been checked. All the sacrifice of lives since in battle and Southern prisons can and ought to be charged up to Gen. O. O. Howard.

History furnishes but one parallel case, says Gen. Doubleday in his book, and that was the massacre of the garrison of Fort Sims by the savages in 1813 near Mobile, Ala., soon after a negro had been severely flogged by the commanding officer for reporting that he had seen Indians lurking around the post.

Such conduct by a corps commander holding a responsible position, as the 11th corps held at Chancellorsville, would defeat the best general and the noblest tried and true army that ever trod the earth.

No. 3. Gen. Hooker expected Gen. Sedgwick's 6th corps, and ordered him to march at 9 o'clock p. m., May 2. from below

Fredericksburg and attack Gen. Lee in reverse at daylight. But Gen. Hooker's order was to cross the river at Falmouth. This was three or four miles above where Sedgwick's corps laid when he received the orders from Gen. Hooker. To comply with the order it was necessary for Sedgwick to quietly move his corps back to the north side of the river and march to Falmouth, and there cross in the night in a dense fog attack and surprise the enemy in their works, and with his own overwhelming force easily brush the enemy out of the way and move rapidly by the plank road and attack Lee's army in reverse at daylight. It was not unreasonable to think this movement could be made successfully. The only chance for a failure it seems to us was the manner in which Sedgwick failed in carrying out the order as Gen. Hooker directed, which contemplated the massing of the Union forces on the extreme left of Gen. Ewell's thin lines, which was composed of but nine thousand men scattered along a line of six or eight miles. It was no difficult matter for Gen. Sedgwick to secretly withdraw his forces from the south side of the river, three or four miles below Fredericksburg (where most of the enemy were, to watch and keep Sedgwick from turning that flank), in the night, in a heavy fog that prevailed, crush their left flank before reinforcements could have been brought up from the enemy's right to fill their defenses. But, as before stated, Sedgwick moved along the Bowling Green road, encountered the enemy's pickets all along their line of march, who gave notice to their comrades by their firing on Sedgwick's command, which enabled them to move on a parallel line and fill their defenses at the point attacked. The wonder is that the Union forces ever captured the heights. Such bravery as was exhibited by the rank and file of this command has rarely, if ever, been exhibited in any army on this

continent. If we should attempt to describe the steadiness of these charging columns while their ranks were being swept into eternity it would challenge the world's admiration. But how sad to reflect that those noble men were sacrificed and that no good results came from it. We do not agree with Gen. Doubleday in his comparison of this movement to the history of lost nations and empires. This was not a movement of converging columns. The army at Chancellorsville was stationary and expected to remain so. This order was intended for a movement of Sedgwick's heavy column, to be rapidly thrown against a distant slightly defended flank of the enemy, brush them out of the way, which would separate that command from the balance of Lee's main army, and then attack Lee in reverse with this heavy column and crush the enemy on that flank and unite the Union army (not a converging of columns, as Doubleday says) and give them a grand victory. Had the spirit of Gen. Hooker's order been obeyed by Gen. Sedgwick, it is hard to see how the movement could have resulted otherwise than a grand victory. Again we say, it was not a movement of converging columns at all. There can scarcely be a doubt if Gen. Hooker's order to Sedgwick had been carried out in spirit and good faith, it is hardly possible to conceive a condition of circumstances that would result adversely to the Union army. So much has been written that serves to mislead the public relative to the battle of Chancellorsville that one would suppose that Gen. Doubleday in his memoirs of the battles of Chancellorsville and Gettysburg, published in 1882, would have had time enough to have cooled off sufficiently so that he would be able to have weighed all the facts connected with those two great events without prejudice to the commander of the Union army. Where

was his reason and fairness when he says on page 44 that Gen. Hooker did not know when he gave the order for Sedgwick to cross at Falmouth that Sedgwick was on the south side of the river, three miles below, etc. I say he did know where Sedgwick was. He knew one of his divisions was the first to cross the river to mislead the enemy. It was Hooker's direct order for the 6th corps to lead in this movement. It was the plan of battle.

Again on page 53 Doubleday says Hooker felt certain that if Sedgwick assailed Lee in rear while he advanced in front the Confederate army was doomed. And when the time came to co-operate that Hooker failed and let the whole weight fall upon Sedgwick. Now let us see what reason there is for this coloring of the facts. Everybody knows that Gibbons' division, which was temporarily assigned to Sedgwick's command and was to co-operate with him in this movement, was at Falmouth, had not yet broken camp. Now was there anything unreasonable for Gen. Hooker in his order to suppose that Gen. Sedgwick would order Gen. Gibbons to cross the river at Falmouth immediately and then quietly withdraw the 6th corps and secretly march to Falmouth by the north side of the river and cross on the same bridge and unite his whole force for the attack of the heights. This was what Gen. Hooker's order contemplated. Had this order been carried out to the letter and in the spirit of an active commander, and failed, then in that instance Gen. Hooker would and could have been held responsible for the failure. But we fail to see any justice in an attempt to hold Gen. Hooker responsible for this failure, when his orders were not obeyed by Sedgwick. Again it seems strange that Doubleday, who, in most instances in his account of that great battle is so fair and impartial, should say on page

53 that when the time came to carry out the program Hooker failed to hold up his end. Doubleday knew that Hooker ordered Sedgwick to attack Lee in reverse at daylight, May 3d. At the time Sedgwick should have attacked he was eight or ten miles away, and never came nearer than three miles of the point he was to attack at daylight, and did not reach this point until night, ten or twelve hours later than he was expected. In these ten or twelve hours that had elapsed the whole aspect had changed and the army at Chancellorsville had enough to do where they were without going out to hunt for Sedgwick. How unjust it is to infer at this point that Gen. Hooker failed to carry out his part of this movement, and for this cause Sedgwick's movement failed.

If Gen. Sedgwick had struck on Gen. Lee's right and rear any time that forenoon, as he could have done if he had moved his whole corps on the morning of May 3d, instead of two divisions, and the movement had been on the north side of the river crossing at Falmouth, that move would have been a sure winner. That part of Gen. Lee's army at that time of day was disorganized and scattered, and the striking of 26,000 or 30,000 men at that point, under the circumstances, must have scattered the enemy more and given the victory to the Union army. Every move of the army of the Potomac, from the time it broke camp, April 27th, was the most scientific successive strategic movements in history; the final formations of the Union lines and their position was a strong one, which completely turned the enemy's fortified camp without loss. This alone was a victory greater than was ever won on the continent by so large an army over one nearly as large and active, all conditions considered; and the success of that great strategic movement was finally thrown away by these four corps commanders in degree as before stated.

Gen. Howard ought to have been tried by drumhead court-martial and shot before the army recrossed the river for wilful disobedience of orders of a superior in the face of the enemy. And the enemy would have shown most wonderful ingratitude had they not subsequently erected a monument to his memory for the valuable services he had rendered to the lost cause. Gen. Meade should have been cashiered for his refusal to reinforce Gen. Sickles on the third day, according to regulations of the army. He was in command on that wing; he could have saved the day if he had acted promptly. Gen. Stoneman should have been relieved from command for incompetency, which did happen soon after. Gen. Sedgwick should have been relieved for taking his command across the river without orders from Gen. Hooker, and his failure to carry out in spirit the orders he received from Hooker. The failure at Chancellorsville is justly chargeable to these four corps commanders in degree as before stated.

Note: In reviewing this work, and comparing notes, I find that I have unintentionally done Gen. Stoneman an injustice, and was glad to find among notes in my memorandum evidence that would cause me to add this note in vindication of that gentleman. I knew him and his family when we were boys of the same county, Chautauqua, N. Y., and part of the time in the same neighborhood. He went to West Point and I to Pennsylvania lumber woods where I lost track of him. When the war broke out he was soon made a major general and came to command the third corps to which I was assigned, where we renewed acquaintances. From our corps he was promoted to command the cavalry corps, and I did not see him again until after the battle of Chancellorsville, and he had been relieved from his command. We met in Washington, D. C. Among

other things we talked about the battle of Chancellorsville. He blamed Gen. Hooker because he had caused him, as he believed, to be relieved from his command in the manner he was. He said he had a painful disability which came upon him some time before the campaign began, and became chronic, which so disabled him that he was not able to ride a horse. I learned from our conversation that he was a true patriot, and that his fault consisted in his ambition to make a campaign for which he was physically disqualified. I am glad to be able to add this explanatory note.

On the night of May 4th, Gen. Hooker called a council of war, and after stating the situation, absented himself to enable his corps commanders to discuss the matter and not be hampered by his presence. Gen. Slocum was not present, Gen. Reynolds did not act, but said he would agree to what Gen. Meade said; Meade voted to not retreat, because he said it would be impossible to cross the river in presence of the enemy. Gen. Howard wanted to stay, Gens. Sickles and Couch voted to retreat. Gen. Hooker ordered a retreat and recrossed the river unobserved by the enemy. This again proved him to be a superior strategist; although he had been defeated, he took his army across a deep river, that had raised to overflow its banks, during the battle, and safely into camp, but it was after three days' hard fighting with a terrible loss of life to both armies. All the advantageous grounds and roads that made Chancellorsville a desirable position had been lost, and it was the proper thing to do. The movement back to camp was a sad one. The losses had been terrible, and to look upon the thinned ranks of the young and vigorous men as they filed into camp, seeking new tentmates to take the place of the killed and wounded, was in many instances heart-breaking; in some in-

stances brothers as well as tentmates were separated. Not knowing whether they were killed, wounded or prisoners, that, taken with the disappointment of having to go back into their old camps instead of moving on to Richmond, as they fondly hoped they would do when they so successfully accomplished this wonderful flank movement, was truly a very sad disappointment. I never saw the army seem so gloomy. Each one was trying to find out some cause for our defeat. Some were actively engaged in trying to fix the responsibility upon Gen. Hooker, but when they were met with the reply that the army was never moved as scientifically, his enemies would look for some other horn to hang on. Gen. Howard soon gave out as an excuse that he was surprised, not knowing that the enemy was moving on his flank; that he did not receive any notice from Gen. Hooker notifying him of the movement of the enemy to the right, and when the enemy did strike his men broke and ran, and he could not hold them. It was then remembered that not long before Gen. Sigel had commanded that corps and that the rank and file of that corps were Germans, and they had resented the removal of their old commander and substituting Gen. Howard to command the 11th corps. This statement was not only unjust, but it was untrue. This corps was not all Germans. Fully one-third, if not half, of that corps were not only American born, but were not even of German parents, but all of that corps were made to bear the disgrace, and was made responsible for the defeat of the Union army at Chancellorsville, and when one of that corps was seen with their badge on passing through the camps or on the highways, they were sure to be accosted by soldiers of others commands thus: "You fights mit Seigal and runs mit Howard, you tam cowards." As unjust as we now know this epithet to be, it was

applied to the members of that corps as long as they remained in the army of the Potomac, and I am glad that I am now able to clear up this vile slander of a noble organization and true patriots as was ever mustered into the Union service in the War of Rebellion, and place their defeat and disgrace at Chancellorsville, wholly upon Gen. O. O. Howard where it belongs.

The losses in battle at Chancellorsville were as follows:

UNION ARMY.

	Killed and Wounded.	Missing.	Total.
First corps	192	100	232
Second corps	1,525	500	2,025
Third corps	3,459	600	4,039
Fifth corps	399	300	699
Sixth corps	3,601	1,000	4,601
Eleventh corps	508	2,000	2,508
Twelfth corps	2,388	500	2,883
	12,062	5,000	16,997

CONFEDERATE ARMY.

Early	851	500	1,551
Hill	2,585	500	3,083
Colston	1,868	450	2,318
Rodes	2,173	713	2,891
Anderson	1,180	210	1,591
McLellan	1,379	380	1,759
Cavalry and artillery.....	227		227
	10,266	2,753	13,019
Grand totals.....	22,463		30,216

The Confederate loss is believed to have been much greater than reported.

THE BATTLE
OF
GETTYSBURG.



THE BATTLE OF GETTYSBURG.

CHAPTER I.

Army of the Potomac. Back to Camp. Near Falmouth, Va.,
to Await the Filling up of Ranks.

After the battle of Chancellorsville, and the Union army had resumed their position near Falmouth, on the north side of the Rappahannock, they proceeded to make themselves as comfortable as it was possible, so they could get the much needed rest after the fatigue of battle and marches in the past few days they had heroically endured, and await the filling up of their ranks to take the place of the killed, wounded and prisoners lost in battle, and the 30,000 two years and nine months' men that had been mustered out on account of the expiration of their term of service. Many of the wounded soon returned, recruits and drilled reinforcements came in, and the army was soon filled up to about eighty thousand, but the question often came up in camp as to what caused the defeat of the Union army at Chancellorsville. The reply was always, whether the discussion was among commissioned officers or enlisted men, that it was the cowardice of the 11th corps, for Gen. Howard, their

corps commander, said they ran, and he could not do anything with them. Some of the commissioned officers of that corps resigned to escape the unjust disgrace their corps commander had thrust upon them, but the poor enlisted men could not thus escape their humiliation, and it looked as if they were all liable to pass into eternity weighed down to their graves by the hypocritical falsehood advanced by their corps commander, which was that the corps broke and ran without cause and that he could not control them. This is partly true; they did break and run; and that their corps commander did rush out and tried to stop them is true. But this was at a time when all was chaos, and his efforts to stop his corps under the galling fire and cheers of a delighted successful enemy who had gained this victory without loss, and pressing down, in solid column, on front flank and rear. I say it was no credit to the corps commander. Its tendency was to render the condition of his men more chaotic and not to inspire them with confidence in him as a commander. Not one of them that did not know, if they halted, they would be shot down like dogs, without any show of stopping the enemy, or else be taken prisoners, and they chose to continue the retreat. But if the truth could have been presented to the army at this time, I doubt if the atmosphere in the Army of the Potomac would have been a healthy one for Gen. Howard to have lived in. But while this discussion and preparation was going on in the Union camp the Confederates were actively filling up their ranks with conscripts and organized reinforcements, and they soon had a force greater than the Army of the Potomac and determined on an invasion of Maryland and Pennsylvania.

CHAPTER II.

Movement of Confederates for Northern Invasion Begun.

Hooker Going to Attack Hill. Halleck and the President Will Not Permit It.

Towards the latter part of May Gen. Hooker learned by spies and prisoners that a movement by the enemy for an invasion of Maryland and Pennsylvania had begun, and so informed the President on May 28th. He immediately began sending out reconnoissances in force to verify his suspicion. One division of Sedgwick's 6th corps crossed the river below Fredericksburg and was attacked with such spirit by Hill that Sedgwick reported it was his belief that the greater portion of the enemy's force still held their old positions. This division maintained their position on the south side of the river. On June 5th Hooker detached the 5th corps and posted them at Banks and U. S. fords. On the 7th he ordered Pleasanton, with all the cavalry of the army and two brigades of infantry, to make a reconnoissance in the vicinity of Culpepper to ascertain to a certainty if the enemy had begun the movement for an invasion to the North. This move of the cavalry resulted in a hard fought and hotly contested cavalry battle and capturing of dispatches from the Confederates that proved to Hooker that Longstreet's corps was at Culpepper, 28 or 30 miles from Fredericksburg, and Ewell had preceded him and was passing through Sperryville, Va., while more than two-thirds of the Confederate army had made this move, leaving Hill 25 or 30

miles in the rear. Hooker determined to cross the river in force and crush Hill and force Lee to return and try to save Hill and his communications with Richmond and abandon his premeditated invasion; and he notified Halleck of his intention. Both Halleck and the President vigorously opposed this move, which compelled Hooker to abandon his plans. The President in his letter to Gen. Hooker in opposition to his crossing the river said this, by way of illustration: "I would not take the risk of being tangled up on the river like an ox jumped half over a fence and liable to be torn by dogs, front and rear, without a fair chance to gore one way or kick the other." This letter was dated June 5th, 1863. Hooker's idea was to cross the river and crush Hill, then follow up Lee's two other corps if they did not return, and dispose of them. This move must have resulted in a grand victory if Hooker could have had his own way. He had decided on this move before Pleasanton's reconnaissance. It is not often that an army becomes so divided as to enable an enemy to throw themselves in the breach, leaving a margin of 30 miles to operate in, and crush them in detail, but this was Lee's condition at this time. He was fortunate in having Halleck and the President to interpose in time to save him and his army from the most signal victory for the Union army ever won on this continent.

There had never been a more favorable opportunity to crush the Confederate army. Ewell with his corps led in this movement and halted at Sperryville, followed by Longstreet, who halted at Culpepper, which was 30 miles from Hill, while the Union army lay along the north bank of the Rappahannock in a position that they could cross on pontoons, between Hill and Longstreet, and destroy Hill's corps before Longstreet could return to support him. At the same time the Union army was

stationed at the fords so as to detain Ewell and Longstreet, if they attempted to move on Washington, until Hooker had disposed of Hill. But inasmuch as Hooker was not allowed to attack Hill, the movement of the Union army to the rear parallel to Lee was begun, and the base of operations of the Union army was changed from Aquia to Orange & Alexandria railroad.

CHAPTER III.

The Union Army Changes Its Base June 13th. Left the Rappahannock to Follow Up the Enemy on Their Northern Invasion.

Hooker finally gave up his position in front of Fredericksburg, June 13th, and ordered Sedgwick's 6th corps on the south side of the Rappahannock to recross the river and follow, thus leaving Hill to follow Ewell and Longstreet, without being molested. And the march for Gettysburg was fairly begun. That Hooker guided the enemy where he desired them to go is proven by Gen. Butterfield, who says, after the movement from Fredericksburg begun: "Gen. Hooker said to me, 'They blame me for not trying to prevent Lee from crossing the Potomac and going into Maryland from Pennsylvania. Why, he said to me, 'that is what I want him to do. I would lay the bridges for him and present arms to his forces, rather than they should not cross.' He then took a map of Pennsylvania, pointing to it, said to me: 'Gen. Lee will repeat his campaign of last year, cross the Potomac here' (pointing to Williamsport on the map); 'we will guide his march after he crosses and keep him to the other side of the ridge' (pointing to the range of mountains, laid down on the map, extending from the Potomac to the vicinity of Gettysburg); 'and we will fight the battle here' (pointing to Gettysburg). 'We will have every available man in the field, and if Lee escapes with his

army, the country is entitled to, and should have, my head for a football.' " (See Butterfield's printed address at reunion at Chattanooga, Sept. 18th, 1895.) Hooker had been promised by Halleck the co-operation of Dix's command at Fortress Monroe, Va. Hintzleman's corps at Washington and Schenck's corps, of the department of Baltimore, which would add to the Army of the Potomac at least forty or fifty thousand well drilled soldiers, which Halleck afterwards refused, thus countermanding the order of the President without just cause. He had, by direction of the President, previously assigned these troops temporarily to Gen. Hooker's command. Up to this crisis, Hooker had shown himself to be a strategist second to none in the Union army. His movement of the army to Chancellorsville and his checkmate of Lee in his movement of invasion and steering him into the valley—all of this should have given the President confidence in his ability to successfully handle the army. Hooker's attack on Hill, if he had been permitted to make it, must have resulted in the total destruction of Hill's corps and would have compelled Lee to return immediately to try and save Hill—a thing he undoubtedly would have failed to accomplish; but he could have retreated via Gordonsville to Richmond with Ewell's and Longstreet's corps, where they would move into their defenses. This would have been the only safe course left to Lee if Hooker had been permitted to move on Hill, as he had planned. Lee could not have saved Hill, nor would he have dared to continue his march on Maryland and Pennsylvania or attempted to attack Washington. And here comes a test of our theory for the war not ending sooner, and the weakness of our republican government, constitutionally. The constitution makes the President commander in chief of the army, not the Secretary of War, as now prac-

ticed; and there it stops. This is wrong; it should define his powers as to what extent he could command the army in the field in times of war or else it should provide that no man should be President who had not been bred a soldier. The persistence of the President in directing the movements of the Union army in the field while he remained in Washington, D. C., is wrong, and the politicians who were by him made major-generals to rank men who, by education both practical and theoretical, were competent to command, as I have said before, was a source of weakness in the Union army and caused much dissatisfaction and discussion as to the merits of the presidential power. This subject was frequently under discussion among the officers, and no one I ever knew was able to give good reasons why the President, who had no military education, should assume to dictate the movements of the army in the field and override the field commander, a bred soldier, an acknowledged strategist, one of the most active, most brilliant soldiers of the United States.

We ask why a system is continued in the United States, vesting the President with powers in the army, the details of which he is not familiar with, over bright men who have made the subject a life study and practice. Hear what Gen. Butterfield has to say about the President's declaration of the movements of troops in the field in active campaign:

Gen. Butterfield, chief of staff, in a dispatch to Gen. Ingals, chief quartermaster, June 17, 8:20 p. m., at Washington, asking him (Ingals) to get reliable information relative to the number of Confederate cavalry in Maryland and Pennsylvania and damages they were doing, added this: "Since we were not permitted to cross the river and whip Hill, while Longstreet and Ewell were moving through Culpepper and Sperryville, we have

lost the opportunity of doing a thing we knew to a certainty we could accomplish," etc. So there can be no doubt Hooker was ordered by Halleck not to attack Hill; but Hooker maneuvered the right of his army to cover the fords and defend Washington against an attack of Ewell's and Longstreet's corps, the Confederate advance. Lee knew full well that Hill could not last long if attacked vigorously by the left wing of the Union army. Nor could he get away from Hooker. All he could do would be to try and hold out until Lee could relieve him, which would not have been possible for Lee to do. Gen. Lee made this grand play knowing the risk he took in such a movement in front of such a vigilant commander; but in war as well as in other business men take chances, depending upon certain conditions which may or may not make their enterprise successful. The conditions that Lee depended upon were the duplicity of Halleck and his influence with the President, and it was a winner, not because Lee was a greater general than Hooker, but it was because Hooker was handicapped by the duplicity of those who never should have ranked him, but the following general orders and official dispatches, coupled with their being countermanded by Halleck, will show the most determined disposition to either drive Hooker from his command or defeat the army, it seems to us, that was ever attempted upon any general commanding an army.

CHAPTER IV.

Official Orders From the President, Halleck and Secretary Stanton to General Hooker.

Notes from official record, dispatches, orders and reports and correspondence between the President, Gen. Halleck, Sec. Stanton and Gen. Hooker, relative to the movements of the Army of the Potomac prior to the battle of Gettysburg, from June 5 to June 27, 1863. Date of order relieving Gen. Hooker from the command of the Army of the Potomac.

June 6, 1863, Hooker, at 8 p. m., telegraphs Halleck, asking co-operation of Heintzelman's and other forces.

Halleck replies to Hooker's telegram by order of the President: "Any movement you may suggest of these commands (Heintzelman, Dix and Schenk) will be ordered if deemed practicable."—Vol XXVII, Part 1, Page 31.

June 5th. President wrote Hooker relative to being tangled up on the river like an ox jumped over a fence with dogs tearing in front and rear, etc.

Hooker advises Stanton, secretary of war, of the concentration of 20,000 of enemy's cavalry in Culpepper county, June 5, 1863.—Vol. XXVII, Part 1, Page 31.

June 6th. Hooker reports to Halleck severe engagement of Union cavalry with rebel cavalry.

June 10th. Hooker to President Lincoln, urging movement at once on Richmond and enemy's rear.—Vol. XXVII, Part 1, Page 34.

Halleck to Hooker, June 10, 1863, 6:40 p. m.: "The President fears ill results from uncovering Washington."

NOTE.

The above dispatches explain and confirm the fact that Gen. Hooker, after Gen. Pleasanton had captured such dispatches of the Confederates that proved conclusively the enemy had begun the movement for a Northern invasion, and that Ewell's and Longstreet's corps had passed to our right, that Longstreet was at Culpepper, and that Ewell had passed or was about to pass into the Shenandoah valley. Hooker's dispatch to the President, June 10th, was for the purpose of getting permission to attack Hill.—See general orders.

Dumfries, June 13, 1863.—Field orders, June 14, 1863.—Staford, C. H. Gen. Hancock, Gen. Hooker says, hold Banks Ford stoutly to the last. Butterfield chief of staff.

Dispatch from Hancock to Butterfield, June 14, 1863, 8 p. m.: "Lee, with Longstreet and Ewell, and about 70,000 men about Culpepper yesterday. Hill at Hamilton's crossing with between 20,000 and 30,000 men and 60 pieces of artillery."

Halleck to Hooker, June 15, 1863, 2 p. m.: "Your army is entirely free to operate as you desire against Lee's army, so long as you keep his main army from Washington."

June 16, 1863, 7:30 p. m. Hooker to Halleck: "Gen-in-chief. In compliance with your direction, I shall march to the relief of Harper's Ferry."

Hooker to the President, June 16, 1863, 9:40 p. m.: "My orders are out to march at 3 o'clock tomorrow morning. It will likely be one of vigor and power."

Hooker to Halleck, Fairfax Station, June 17, 1863: "As soon as the intentions of the enemy are known to me I shall be

able to advance with rapidity."—Vol. XXVII, Part I, Page 48.

Butterfield to Gen. Stahel, Fairfax Station, June 17, 1863: "We have tonight a corps at Drainsville, one at Guilford Station, one on Goose Creek, near Trap Rock, one at Gum Springs, one at Centreville, one at Songsters Station, one at Fairfax Station. The cavalry at Aldie."—Vol. XXVII, Part III, Page 176.

Gen. Hooker to Halleck, June 17, 1863, 2 p. m.: "Advice of the abandonment of Harper's Ferry renders forced marches unnecessary to relieve it."—Vol. XXVII, Part I, Page 49.

Hooker to the President, June 21, 1863, 5 p. m.: "Pleasanton's cavalry and two brigades of Meade's infantry were directed to attack Stuart's cavalry this morning. The fight commenced about 7 o'clock and for several hours raged with great violence."—Vol. XXVII, Part I, Page 54.

Dispatches and general orders by Halleck relative to the co-operation of placing other troops temporarily under Gen. Hooker's command to co-operate with the Army of the Potomac.

June 22, 1863. Halleck to Hooker: "Orders placing all that part of the 8th corps and the middle department east of the Cumberland under your immediate command. The President directs me to ask you if that arrangement would be agreeable."—Vol. XXVII, Part I, Pages 54 and 55.

Hooker to Halleck, June 22, 1863, 4:30 p. m.: "Yes; provided same authority is continued to me that I now have to give orders direct to the troops in the departments of Generals Schenk and Heintzelman."—Vol. XXVII, Part I, Page 55.

Headquarters, June 22, 1863, 9:30 p. m.: "President, my latest advice from Gen. Pleasanton, dated 4:30 p. m., the 21st: At that time he had driven the rebel cavalry through Upperville,

capturing some of his artillery, and still pursuing. Appearances favorable." Joseph Hooker, Major-General.— Vol. XXVII, Part I, Page 54.

DISPATCH.

Hooker to Halleck, June 24, 1863: "Cannot learn the strength of Heintzelman's and Schenk's commands, nor where they are stationed. Hence I send my chief of staff, Butterfield, to Washington and Baltimore to ascertain, and also to start out a column of about fifteen thousand men on the National road as far as Frederick City."—Vol XXVII, Part I, Page 56.

Butterfield reports as follows:

Headquarters, A. P., June 27, 1863, Poolsville, Md.: Report in part of Major-Gen. Butterfield, complying with Gen. Hooker's instruction of June 24: "I called immediately upon Major-Gen. Halleck and stated the object of my visit. Halleck replied that no troops could be spared from the defences of Washington." Receiving no assurance from Halleck I called upon his excellency, the President. The President said to me I had heard Halleck's views that it was impossible to get any more troops from Washington. I was unable to find Gen. Heintzelman or any of his staff at his headquarters. Therefore I could get from him no report of the forces in and about the defences of Washington. I then proceeded immediately to Baltimore and laid my orders before Major-Gen. Schenk, who freely accorded to me authority to take from his command whatever troops could be used for the purpose of my instruction. I took all the available troops, about 2,500 strong, put them on the road in accordance with my instructions, leaving a small garrison for the City of Baltimore, consisting chiefly of New York militia, and in accordance with your instructions returned to headquarters."

Vol. XXVII, Part III, Pages 357 and 358.

Dispatches here intervened between Gens. Hooker and Halleck, Hooker urging the necessity of attaching the troops around Washington to the Army of the Potomac, and how useless they were there, the enemy's army having passed far beyond, and finally sent the following dispatch:

Hooker to Halleck, Poolsville, June 27, 1863: "My whole force of enlisted men for duty will not exceed 105,000."—Vol. XXVII, Part I, Page 59.

Halleck to Hooker, June 27, 1863, 10:30 a. m.: "Maryland Heights have always been regarded as an important point to be held by us, and much expense and labor has been incurred in fortifying them. I cannot approve their abandonment, except in case of absolute necessity."—Vol. XXVI, Part I, Page 59.

Sandy Hook, June 27, 1863, 2:55 p. m. Hooker to Halleck: "I find 10,000 men at Harper's Ferry in condition to take the field. Here they are no earthly account. They cannot defend a ford of the river. And as far as Harper's Ferry is concerned, there is nothing in it. As for the fortifications, the work of the troops, they remain when the troops are withdrawn. No enemy will ever take possession of them, for them. This is my opinion. All the public property could have been secured tonight and the troops marched to where they could be of some service. Now they are but a bait to the rebels. Should they return I beg that this may be presented to the Secretary of War and his excellency, the President."

Hooker to Halleck, Sandy Hook, June 27, 1863, 1 p. m.: "My original instructions require me to cover Harper's Ferry and Washington. I have now imposed upon me in addition an enemy in my front of more than my number. I beg to be understood, respectfully but firmly, that I am unable to comply

with this condition with the means at my disposal, and earnestly request that I may at once be relieved from the position I occupy." Joseph Hooker, Major-General.—Vol. XXVII, Part I, Page 60.

General Order No. 196, War Department, Adjutant General's Office, Washington, June 27, 1863: By direction of the President Major-Gen. Joseph Hooker is relieved from the Army of the Potomac and Major-Gen. George G. Meade is appointed to the command of that army and the troops temporarily assigned to duty with it by order of the Secretary of War.—E. D. Townsend, Assistant Adjutant-General.—Vol. XXVII, Part III, Page 369.

It is currently reported and never contradicted that Gen. Hooker asked to waive his rank and be assigned the command of the corps of his successor, but it was refused and he was ordered to report at Baltimore for duty.

CHAPTER V.

Hooker Planned to Fight at Gettysburg. Movement of the Army to Force the Enemy to Fight at that Place. Hooker's Order Countermanded by Halleck. Hooker Asks to be Relieved, which was Promptly Complied With, and George G. Meade Succeeded Him.

I here present so many dispatches and orders that passed between the president, Gen. Halleck and Gen. Hooker in order to show that certain troops had been placed under Gen. Hooker's command, by orders of the president through Hallock, and in all honor and military regulations were a part of Hooker's command as much as any corps of the army of the Potomac, and Hooker was no more obliged to ask Halleck's permission to use those troops than any other corps of his army. In all histories of the battle of Gettysburg I ever saw they state that Hooker asked to use troops over which he had no control, and asked to be relieved from his command because Halleck would not assign troops to him that did not belong to his command. I am pleased to furnish official orders and dispatches that prove their mistake, and that Hooker had no other alternative—either be relieved or submit to seeing his whole plans neutralized, and then be held responsible for the results.

The refusal of these troops at this time was a crushing blow to Gen. Hooker. It will be seen by official dispatches I have copied in this work that Gen. Hooker had been promised that these troops should be attached to his command; in fact, they

were turned over to him by order of the president, hence he did not feel the disappointment he would otherwise on account of his being denied the privilege of attacking Hill. Having command of these extra troops, he expected to accomplish his work later, and in his conversation with Gen. Butterfield it shows he depended upon Heintzelman's and Schenk's forces, and his plans were to destroy Lee's army before they could reach Virginia again, but when he saw, on the eve of the great battle, that fully one-fourth, if not one-third, of the forces he had depended upon to accomplish this great work had been snatched from him, for no reasonable cause, he was discouraged. His coup-de-main for the destruction of Lee's army seemed dashed to earth, never to rise again. He had exhausted every reasonable argument to secure the co-operation of this force that had now passed into an inert army of observation. His ambition, pride and heart was broken.

If permission of the president had been given Hooker to cross the river with all the force he could command, or so much as was necessary, and crush Hill, who commanded all the rebel forces in front of the Union army. Hill's entire force was not more than 20,000 or 30,000 troops, and his nearest support was Longstreet, who was thirty miles away. This would make it sure that Hill could not have defended himself against the Union army two hours after they attacked him; and no one knew this better than Gen. Lee, but he depended upon the timidity of the president and his advisers at Washington, believing that his movement, with his two corps and cavalry, to the right of the Union army would so menace Washington and Baltimore that such pressure would be brought to bear by the powers at Washington that Hooker would be forced to leave the Rappahannock and bring his whole force to the defense of

Washington and Baltimore. Lee's was a most desperate move, for the reason he so uncovered his base of supplies that the force left was powerless to defend them one hour against the Union army if the Union army attacked Hill. Lee would either have to attempt to return to save Hill's small army, or else continue his raid and let Hill take care of himself as best he could. In either case, if Gen. Hooker had been permitted to act, as a general having knowledge of strategy should have been permitted to act at this time, it is hard to imagine conditions that would have saved Lee's army from an inglorious defeat, if not total destruction, but Gen. Hooker was handicapped in his desire to strike the enemy a crushing blow here, as well as later, and Lee's army, through the constant blundering at Washington, was permitted to continue its raid into the Northern states and return at its leisure.

Hooker felt that there was a studied determination to handicap and defeat any successful movement he might suggest, and asked to be relieved from the command of the army of the Potomac. It was always Gen. Hooker's plan, after he got command of the army, to so maneuver his command as to destroy Lee's army and end the war at one dash. His move on Chancellorsville would have resulted with that end had his plans and orders been honestly executed, and now, when he again had succeeded in getting the enemy out of his entrenched lines and into states of the Union where almost every citizen was a Union man, ready to report the movements of the enemy to him, he felt sure the end was near. Well might he become so elated as to use the expression that with the superior force he would have when the reinforcements were placed at his disposal that had been assigned to him, that if he did not destroy the Confederate army, the public was entitled to, and ought to, have

his head for a football. And he so maneuvered his army after he crossed the Potomac to cut off Lee's communications with Richmond and compel him to fight at Gettysburg, but when Halleck refused the co-operation of the army corps in and around Washington and Baltimore that had been assigned to him, he felt that although some of his army was within twelve miles of Gettysburg, the place he had planned to fight the battle, and headquarters were at Fredericksburg, and the battle of Gettysburg must be fought within two or three days, that Hallock was bound to cripple and defeat him. He was out of patience, and asked to be relieved from the command of the army, which was promptly done. Hallock was always in the way, and seemed delighted to say "No" to department commanders. He exhibited his evil disposition to a high degree by placing Gen. Hooker under arrest as soon as he arrived in Washington. This act, more than any other, should have shown the president the animus of the man, Hallock, for evil to the service, and the president should have relieved him from his responsible position. As commander-in-chief of all the armies, he had shown in every instance, from the time he was called by the president to Washington to take command, that he did not possess the strategic ability to become a leader of a great army, nor did he possess any executive abilities that would make him useful to the administration. He failed to support McClellan on the peninsula. He failed to furnish suitable transportation to rapidly remove the army of the Potomac from the peninsula to the support of Pope, and kept a large portion of the Potomac army at Alexandria waiting for two or three days for wagon trains to carry their supplies forward, while Pope and his army were suffering for the want of the co-operation of this force that was wrongfully kept from him,

and for this reason this large portion of the army of the Potomac was not able to take part in the battle of Second Bull Run. The Potomac army's cavalry was kept from Pope for a similar reason, an arm of the service he so much needed. Hallock was far more responsible for Pope's defeat than Fitzjohn Porter. Gen. Burnside claimed that Hallock agreed to have pontoons at Fredericksburg as soon as the army could reach there, so they could cross the river immediately on their arrival, but instead of that the army had to wait about one week for the pontoons to arrive. These failures, it would seem, ought to have been enough to have satisfied the president, and he ought to have interfered to prevent his defeating Gen. Hooker's plans, who had shown himself to be a great strategist. It was not unreasonable for Gen. Hooker to ask that Gen. Schenk's corps, stationed at Baltimore, Harper's Ferry, etc., together with Gen. Heintzelman's corps, stationed at Washington, should be attached temporarily to the army of the Potomac, even if they had not already been ordered there, to aid it in repelling the invasion of the Confederate army. And more especially was the reasonableness of his request apparent when it is known that Gen. Hooker, by his superior stratagem, forced the enemy's invading army into the valley and to cross the Potomac at Williamsport, and that they passed on beyond Washington and Baltimore. So these two corps were no longer needed to protect those two cities, and at this juncture of affairs it would seem strange that one could be found pig-headed enough to oppose uniting the two corps temporarily to the army of the Potomac. Hooker expected the co-operation of all forces in and around Washington and Baltimore, and when he said to Gen. Butterfield that if Gen. Lee got back into Virginia with the Confederate army, the public would be entitled to, and ought to,

have his head for a football, it was not unreasonable for him to use the strong language he did.

The movement of Dix's force caused great consternation at Richmond for the reason that Lee had taken nearly all the available troops out of Virginia with him to Pennsylvania and left Richmond in a helpless condition. This move had a good effect in aid of the Army of the Potomac. It compelled all the forces that could reach Richmond to rush to that city and remain there in its defense, and Lee to halt and await developments.


Ewell's corps crossed the Potomac at Williamsport, June 22d, Longstreet and Hill crossed the former at Williamsport, the latter at Shepherdstown, June 24th, and united their columns at Hagerstown the next day, thus supported Ewell, marched to Carlisle, which he occupied June 27th. They immediately sent out the foraging parties to prey on the farmers and small towns. July 27th Longstreet's and Hill's columns reached Chambersburg and began their work of despoilation and robbing of farmers and townspeople, on a great scale. And on the evening of June 27th, Early, after damaging the Northern Central railroad quite extensively, marched into York. Foraging parties preceded these columns and did a thriving business foraging supplies for their armies, giving in exchange in many instances Confederate notes. Early at York did not enact the farce of exchanging Confederate money for supplies; he made a levy on the city for a hundred thousand dollars cash, 200 barrels of flour, 30,000 bushels of corn, one thousand pairs of shoes, etc. He got his contributions and moved on. From the time the Confederate's movement began north it was no part of Gen. Hooker's plans to form the Army of the Potomac for a parallel race into the Northern states, then fight a drawn

battle on ground selected by the Confederates and then to execute the same parallel movement back into Virginia again, permitting the enemy to take with them the wealth they had plundered from the Northern states, as had been done before; but he intended to change the entire program, knowing, as he did, that the strength of the two opposing armies was nearly equal numerically, and if a difference existed it was in favor of the Confederate army; and if the Union army gained any decided victory it must be gained by some strategy that would give the Union army a decided advantage. He began to maneuver his army for the advantage sought. The time came to strike, when Lee left Hill in front of the Union army, thirty miles from any support, but Halleck and the president would not permit Gen. Hooker to strike the blow that must have proven a great success, and when Gen. Hooker was foiled in this he began to plead with Halleck and the president that the isolated corps be temporarily attached to the Army of the Potomac, such as Dix's command at Fortress Monroe, Heintzelman's at Washington and Schenk's at Baltimore, Harper's Ferry, etc. This request was granted. (See general orders of Halleck, June 5th and June 22d.) Telegraphic dispatches to Gen. Hooker, when it was settled that these corps should be directed by Gen. Hooker. He directed the movements of the Army of the Potomac, so that those different commands would co-operate so as to strike a crushing blow to the Confederates and insure a lasting victory for the Union army.

The first thing necessary for him to accomplish was to secure the co-operation of these detached forces before named. This having been done (see dispatches from Halleck to Hooker, June 5th and June 22d, he asked Halleck to direct Gen. Dix, at Fortress Monroe, to march on Richmond with his whole

force and place himself firmly on Gen. Lee's communications. Halleck had no confidence in this move and ordered Gen. Dix to make a reconnoissance to Richmond. This was done in a feeble way. The force for this movement was landed at Yorktown and marched to the White House. They were then divided into two columns. Gen. Getty, in command of one column, of about seven thousand men, moved, June 13th, to Hanover Junction, with orders to destroy the bridge over the North and South Anna and railroads in that section. At the same time Gen. Keys, with another column of about five thousand men, moved to Bottom's Bridge on the Chickahominy. On the 15th, the head of Keys' column reached New Kent court house, fifteen miles from Richmond. Notwithstanding the decorum this large body of troops maintained towards this weak and defenseless city in maintaining the magnificent distance of fifteen miles from the head of their column for a short time, it struck the Richmond government with consternation. At first their fears knew no bounds. They dispatched every station for reinforcements, and all authorities agree that they had in contemplation ordering Gen. Lee's recall. But it was soon discovered by the Richmond authorities that this move of the Union army was a harmless reconnoissance and that they would soon return to their intrenchments, and as they made no attempt to come any nearer the Richmond government calmed down and awaited reinforcements from the Carolinas and other Southern states. And Lee went forward on his raid. The result of this reconnoissance shows that if Gen. Dix, with his whole force of fifteen thousand or more well drilled soldiers, had made a sudden attack on Richmond. It would have resulted in the return of Lee's army or the fall of that city, one or both. It will be remembered that

the head of Lee's invading column (Ewell's corps) did not cross the Potomac until June 22d, seven days after Dix's column had made its appearance at New Kent court house. This seems plain to us, if Dix had attacked Richmond vigorously, Lee's army would have been recalled and instead of their invading Maryland and Pennsylvania, it would have been a race between them and the Union army for Richmond. Hooker knew the man he had to deal with was a great general and was not rash enough to permit a powerful enemy to establish themselves between him and his base of supplies, and every attempt to do this would make Lee turn and fight to keep open and protect his communications. Dix's weak effort failing, Hooker determined to use the same strategy later under his own supervision. The time came. Longstreet and Hill, rear of Lee's army, crossed the Potomac, united at Williamsport June 24th, Hagerstown, June 25th, moved on into Pennsylvania by the Cumberland valley, their objective point being Harrisburg and Philadelphia. Hooker crossed the Potomac river with the Army of the Potomac, June 25th, paying no attention to Stewart's cavalry Lee had left behind to harrass the Union army, and moved rapidly to Frederick. He then ordered the 1st, 11th and 3d corps with one division of cavalry, all under the command of Gen. Reynolds as the left wing of the army, to advance. The 11th corps to Boonsboro, the 1st in front and the 3d corps in rear of Middletown. So they would be in readiness to hold either Crump's or Turner's gaps. The 2d, 5th and 6th corps came to Frederick, on June 26th, to be at hand to support the 1st, 11th and 3d. The 12th corps was ordered to Harper's Ferry to unite with the garrison at that place, of ten thousand men, then to move forward into the Cumberland valley in rear of but in supporting distance of the



The Country from the Potomac to Harrisburg.

rest of the army, thus cutting all communication between Lee's army and Richmond and holding the gaps, which would keep up communications with the main body and block that of the Confederates. The Union troops were moving on the east side of the South Mountain to Gettysburg, this being the order of march, the 1st, 3d and 11th corps and one division of cavalry was ordered in advance. Gen. Reynolds in command. And on the night of June 28th the 1st corps halted at Fairfield, the 11th at Emmettsburg, other corps to follow in supporting distance. June 28th Lee learned from a gentleman of the country that Gen. Hooker's army had crossed the Potomac and had advanced to Frederick that night. He sent dispatches to his whole army to fall back to Gettysburg; thus both armies were in motion at the same time, for the same objective point: Lee to save his communications with Richmond and Hooker to bring on the engagement at Gettysburg and defeat Lee, cut off his communication, and retreat to Richmond and destroy his army before it could return to Virginia. While it will be seen that Gen. Hooker's strategy worked as he had planned, which was that as soon as Gen. Lee found that his communications with Richmond were liable to be broken, he would turn and fall back, to protect it, this would compel the Confederate army to attack the Union army on grounds of their own choosing, and on the defensive, which gives them very much the advantage man for man. The result of the battle shows that, if Gen. Hooker's plans had been carried out, it must have ended in a disastrous defeat of the Confederate army, but Gen. Hooker was doomed to disappointment. Halleck was in the way. It will be remembered that by order from Halleck to Hooker, of June 5th and June 22d, the isolated departments had been temporarily placed under Gen. Hooker's

command, as will more fully appear in the order of the 22d, and Hooker's reply, as follows:

June 22d, '63. Halleck to Hooker. Orders placing all that part of the 8th corps and of the middle department east of Cumberland under your immediate command. * * * The President directs me to ask you if that arrangement would be agreeable. Vol. XXVII., Part 1, pages 54-55.

Hooker to Halleck, June 22d. 4:30 p. m. In reply I have to state yes, if, provided the same authority is continued to me that I now have, which is to give orders direct to the troops in the departments of Gen. Schenk and Heintzelman. Vol. XXVII., Part 1.

Now the sincerity of the men is put to a test. As before stated, Hooker ordered Gen. Slocum, commanding the 12th corps, June 26th, to move to Herper's Ferry and uniting his corps with the garrison at that place of 10,000 troops, and with a detachment of cavalry push forward up the Cumberland valley and hold the gaps, harass Lee and intercept all convoys and dispatches to and from Lee to Richmond and cut off his retreat if defeated by the Union army. This order of Hooker's Halleck countermanded. He would not permit the troops stationed at Maryland heights to be united with the Army of the Potomac to aid them in repelling the invading army. Gen. Hooker used all the arguments at his command to persuade Halleck to consent. He told him the troops were indispensable to the success of the Union army; that where they were stationed they could not so much as guard a ford and were of no earthly use; that all the public property could be moved to a place of safety that night; that the earth works could be left temporarily without any risk to the government and the troops marched to where they can be of some service. Now they are but a bait for the rebels should they return. I beg

that this matter may be presented to the secretary of war and his excellency, the President.

It does seem as though nothing could be more reasonable than Gen. Hooker's order and request, as he said the troops now, where they were, were of no earthly use, and it would seem that the administration would desire, in view of the fact that the enemy had sacked several large towns and cities in Pennsylvania, as well as a large tract of rich agricultural district, and was about to strike Harrisburg and Philadelphia—and it would seem that at this crisis no one could have been found that would withhold any means at their command to repel the invader. And it does seem as though the arguments of Gen. Hooker were so reasonable and convincing that they should have convinced any honest patriot; and if any one can see a good reason and that it was for the best interest of the service to withhold the troops from Hooker, I confess I can not. It looks to me, in view of what followed, that the object was finally attained. And that was to drive Hooker to such desperation that he would ask to be relieved from the command of the army or else to defeat him at any cost, life or treasure not considered. And we think Hooker took the same view of the situation. After exhausting all arguments he could think of, with Halleck, he in desperation sent the following dispatch:

Hooker to Halleck. Sandy Hook, June 27th, 1863, 1 p. m. My original instructions require me to cover Harper's Ferry and Washington. I have now imposed upon me, in addition, an enemy on my front of more than my number. I beg to be understood respectfully, but firmly, that I am unable to comply with this condition with the means at my disposal and earnestly request that I may at once be relieved from the position I occupy. Joseph Hooker, Major-General, official quotations.

Bear in mind these troops that Hooker was pleading with Halleck to have sent forward was a part of Hooker's command, having been temporarily assigned, and Halleck's ordering them not to obey Hooker was equivalent to his halting a part of the old army and telling the balance to go on and fight Lee. It was a childish exercise of power for a purpose. And what purpose will soon appear by the following correspondence:

Hallock to Hooker. Washington, June 27th, 1863, 8 p. m. Your application to be relieved from your present command has been received and referred for executive action, etc.

Halleck must have certified to the President Hooker's request to be relieved, in strong language, for all appearances go to show that the President did not take much time for deliberation. His order to relieve Gen. Hooker must have been issued immediately on the receipt of Hooker's request. The following is a copy of the President's order:

G. O. No. 194. War Department, Adjutant General's Office, Washington, June 27th, 1863. By direction of the President, Major General Joseph Hooker is relieved from the command of the Army of the Potomac, and Major General George G. Meade is appointed to the command of that army and of all the troops temporarily assigned to duty with it. By order of the Secretary of War. E. D. Townsend, Asst. Adjutant General. Vol. XXVII., Part III., page 369.

It has been stated by some writers that the President waived his constitutional rank as commander-in-chief of the Army of the Potomac temporarily to Gen. Meade when he placed him in command of the army, which would infer that Gen. Meade had been clothed with greater powers than Gen. Hooker possessed when he was in command of the army. This is not true.

The fact is that Gen. Hooker had been vested by the President with power to command the departments of Dix, Heintzelman and Schenk, and middle department east of the Cumberland.

See official orders from Halleck to Hooker, June 22, 1863. and Hooker's reply, 4:30 p. m., same date.

When the time came that Gen. Hooker wanted to use these troops he complained to Halleck, June 24, 1863, as follows: "I cannot learn the strength of Heintzelman's and Schenk's commands, nor where stationed. Hence I send my chief of staff, Butterfield, to Washington and Baltimore to ascertain, and also to start out a column of about 15,000 men on the National road as far as Frederick City."

See the official dispatches in preceding pages; also see Butterfield's report on same pages relative to his visit to Washington. He was not able to get any report of the strength of Heintzelman's corps, and Halleck positively refused to permit any of that corps to go to aid the Army of the Potomac in driving the invading Confederates from Pennsylvania and Maryland. Gen. Butterfield then appealed to the President in person and got for reply: "You have heard what Halleck says." This places the President in rather an awkward position. It had long been acknowledged by our best military men that Halleck did not possess strategy necessary to enable him to successfully command a large army. And it was a common expression among the officers of the army that he was wonderfully deficient in executive abilities and moral character. See following quotations:

Secretary Stanton said to McClellan that Halleck was the greatest scoundrel and most barefaced villian in America. See McClellan's book, page 137.

Gen. Butler, in his book, page 871, says: "I have learned

his character, which I find to be that of a lying, treacherous, hypocritical scoundrel, with no moral sense."

McClellan's book, page 539, says: "Halleck perjured himself before the congressional committee on the conduct of the war."

This is the kind of a man the President selected and strenuously held in power as his chief military advisor.

Gen. Hooker had learned from his former experience since he had been in command of the army how fickle Gen. Halleck was. And inasmuch as he had not been able to get any reports from the departments that had been assigned to his command, sent Gen. Butterfield, his chief of staff, to ascertain the facts and report. See Butterfield's report in official orders on foregoing page. Gen. Butterfield was a major-general in the volunteer army and a graduate of West Point, and was looked upon as one of the very brightest officers in the Union army. His social standing as a citizen was second to none. Doubtless these considerations were the cause of Gen. Hooker's selecting him for the mission, as a last resort, thinking his high standing and known ability would influence Halleck and cause him to see the necessity for the co-operation of the troops of these departments and cause the president to give the matter a more serious consideration. But Hooker was unfortunate in this action, as in all others, when the crisis came. Halleck was sure to be where he could block his operations. And in this instance he had influence enough to use the the president for the same purpose, who said: "You have heard what Halleck says." (See Gen. Butterfield's report, among official records, and telegrams on foregoing page.) Still Gen. Hooker had not lost all hope. For when Gen. Butterfield called on Gen. Schenk at Baltimore, Schenk promised all the aid to Gen. Hooker from his department in his power. (See Butterfield's report.) With

this Gen. Hooker seemed encouraged, and he ordered Gen. Slocum with the 12th corps to proceed to Harper's Ferry and unite with the 10,000 troops stationed there of Schenk's command and march, as before stated, up the Cumberland valley in conjunction with the balance of Hooker's command who were to move on the east side of South Mountain to Gettysburg and fight Lee there, as he had planned and expressed himself to Gen. Butterfield some days before. The army crossed the Potomac, but here he was again doomed to disappointment. While Gen. Schenk had assured Hooker, through Gen. Butterfield, that he would render all assistance in his power. (See Butterfield's official report.) Halleck stepped in and countermanded Hooker's order and would not permit the troops to leave their fortifications, although the troops were of Schenk's command, thus banishing the last hope of Gen. Hooker. With this disappointment all hope of the success of his plans fled, and being convinced that he was to be hampered and that the president would stand by Halleck, as he had at all previous tests, he concluded to apply one more remedy. Hooker knew the battle must be fought in three or four days at the furthest, and if the same illiberal policy was to be continued towards him to the end the coming battle must result in either a drawn battle or perhaps worse for the Union cause. And inasmuch as the idea had for a long time become potent to Gen. Hooker that some drastic measures must be pursued towards the Confederates if the rebellion was ever put down and that the garrisoning of cities or the attacking the enemy in their intrenched camps by the front was not the true policy, but to draw them out and crush them in one great battle, was his idea. That would have been the result of Chancellorsville if his plans had been honestly executed. He now proposed, with a greater force, in an open country, under

his personal supervision, to determine, if troops were not withheld that had been promised him, to crush Lee's army here in Pennsylvania. That Hooker was suspicious that Halleck would interfere with him, and to make sure of his premises he sent Gen. Butterfield in person to Halleck and the president. Butterfield got an answer direct that no troops should be taken from Washington. That, of course, meant Heintzelman's corps. But this corps, it will be seen, was one of the corps named, as official dispatches show, that was placed temporarily under Hooker's command. It will be seen by Butterfield's official report that no objection was made to taking any portion of Gen. Schenk's command, for he proceeded from Washington direct to Baltimore and Gen. Schenk immediately detached 2,500 men from Baltimore and all the aid in his power at that point to Gen. Hooker. Gen. Hooker had asked that 15,000 men should be sent out from Washington on the National road to Frederick. Butterfield got 2,500 from Baltimore and Hooker found 10,000 men at Harper's Ferry. This gave him nearly the number of men he had asked for originally. And these troops at Harper's Ferry being isolated and of Schenk's corps, not in a position to defend either Washington or Baltimore, the enemy having passed beyond those cities. Hooker ordered them, as he had a right, to march up the Cumberland valley with the 12th corps to cut Lee's communications. This was a proper thing to do and Hooker was satisfied, although the troops at Washington had been refused to co-operate with his army. The troops which he found at Harper's Ferry were satisfactory to him and he gave the order for them to march. Halleck countermanded the order, and he was blind and deaf to the reasonable arguments Hooker could advance. Halleck attained the object he sought. He goaded Hooker on to the last ex-

treme to where his intelligence and manhood could not stand any more. The end came as Halleck had planned. Hooker was driven from the command of the army and one of Halleck's pets took his place, and the army and country by this act of Halleck's met a loss that was never restored to them.

I want to go on record right here and now as saying, and don't believe any one will ever attempt to gainsay it, that Gen. Hooker was one of the greatest strategists the War of the Rebellion developed on the Union side, and the only one from start to the finish of the war that was able to out-general Lee. This is proven by his movement of the Union army to Chancellorsville without loss and the ability he showed in check-mating Lee in every movement he ever made from the time he left the Rappahannock until he forced him to face about and forego the sacking of Harrisburg and Philadelphia and fight at Gettysburg, the grounds Hooker had selected. The rank and file of the army who had left their comfortable homes voluntarily to save the Union, their friends and citizens at home, had a right to the services of the man who had developed the abilities this man had shown. And if patriotism and love of country had prevailed, instead of an unworthy desire to rule arbitrarily, Gen. Hooker would have fought the battle of Gettysburg and had the force he desired. Had that been done it would have been the last battle and Gen. Lee would never have gone back with his army into Virginia. June 28, 1863, the order relieving Gen. Hooker from the command of the Army of the Potomac and the appointing of Gen. George C. Meade to the command, was published to the army and of all troops temporarily assigned to duty with it. So it will be seen that the troops assigned to Hooker by general orders were turned over to Meade, and he was not given any greater power than Gen. Hooker possessed. No

more, no less. Gen. Hooker took leave of the officers assembled at headquarters, read to them his farewell address, which was published later to the whole army. We again repeat, it was reported and never contradicted that when Gen. Hooker received the order relieving him from the command of the army of the Potomac, that he asked the president to assign him to the command of a corps under his late subordinate. His request was refused. That act shows him to have been a true patriot, unselfish to a degree that challenges comparison in history. It was a sad day, when the news spread through the army that Gen. Hooker had been relieved from the command. The general expression with the rank and file was that it was a great mistake to relieve an army commander on the eve of a great battle and place one in command who had not had any experience in handling a large army. June 28th Gen. Meade, commander of the fifth corps, assumed command of the army of the Potomac, and as was stated in the order, relieving Hooker, and appointing him to the command also of all the troops temporarily assigned to that army. Gen. Meade was a man of bright intellect, a brave soldier, whose experience in the army had been such as gave him the reputation of a brave officer, but it could not be said that he had won any victories that would entitle him to rank as exceedingly brilliant. Nor had he met any reverses. The army, from the major-generals commanding corps to the private soldiers, were determined to drive the invaders from the states of Pennsylvania and Maryland or die in the attempt. Gen. Meade was a favorite with Hallock and the administration, as will appear later, but it cannot truthfully be said that Gen. Meade was deficient in conceit or self-esteem. As soon as Hooker turned over the command to him he abandoned all movements against Lee's line

of retreat and ordered Slocum's twelfth corps that was in the valley to rejoin the army, and all the troops to concentrate in Frederick where he proposed to have a grand review. To this proposition other officers made a vigorous protest. Among the most persistent ones was Gen. Butterfield, Hooker's chief of staff. He argued this would cause much delay and give Lee time to cross the Susquehanna and capture Harrisburg and Philadelphia. Meade finally concluded to let Hooker's orders stand, with some very material changes. But what surprised everybody was that Meade would exercise the hardihood which he did to order the garrison at Harper's Ferry to be broken up and march to Frederick; this, too, without any protest from Washington. These same troops Halleck had refused Hooker less than forty-eight hours previous. To some this may seem strange, but to us, after the investigation we have been compelled to make in order to get material for this work, and the personal knowledge we experienced of men and measures in the army, we learned that men, no matter what their stations are in life, are human, not saints, and sometimes politicians were wonderfully politic in the War of the Rebellion. We had politicians in the army as well as in congress or the White House. These politicians knew Hooker was a brilliant, daring corps commander, who had justly earned the title of Fighting Joe Hooker, but had never suspected he was the great strategist his movement of the army of the Potomac to Chancellorsville and his checkmating Lee at every turn, from the time he left Fredericksburg, Va., until he passed up the Cumberland valley to Chambersburg, Carlisle and York, demonstrated; and when the enemy was about to reach out and capture Harrisburg and Philadelphia he was surprised to learn from a countryman that Hooker's army was following close on his rear and about to

cut his communications with Richmond. He immediately ordered his army to turn and fall back on Gettysburg, just exactly as Hooker had planned. Now the objective point of both armies was Gettysburg, with Hooker practically directing the movements of both armies when he was relieved; and the sequel shows that if Hooker had not been relieved when he was that the Union army would have reached Gettysburg first and, with the isolated commands that had been assigned, closed up to aid the Potomac army. The movement must have resulted in one of two things; either the surrender or the annihilation of the Confederate army. Had this result been obtained, the final result of this great victory would have been that Hooker would have been looked upon, as he deserved to be, as the greatest general in America, and the popular clamor would have demanded that Halleck's vacillating dictation to the army must cease, and that Hooker take his place; and it may have gone further and made Hooker the nominee for the presidency instead of Mr. Lincoln's second term. If there was no selfish motive for the removal of Gen. Hooker, why was he handicapped at every turn? Why was Gen. Dix ordered to make a reconnoissance with a part of his command in the vicinity of Richmond, and then return to camp instead of moving his whole force, as Gen. Hooker recommended, attack that city, and if **not** able to capture it, to besiege and cut all communications with the city and Lee's army? The result of this reconnoissance proves that although the column did not approach Richmond nearer than about fifteen miles, that Lee's army halted and the Richmond government was about to, and would have ordered his return, but they soon discovered that the city was in no immediate danger from that column, and Lee proceeded on his march, and the Richmond government depended

on reinforcements from Southern garrisons for their defense. The sequel proves that if Dix had made an attack on Richmond and carried out Hooker's plans, Lee would have returned to raise the siege, and there would not have been any invasion of Pennsylvania and Maryland. If naught but patriotism governed the administration and Halleck in their actions towards Gen. Hooker in this campaign, why did they permit department commanders whose commands by general orders had been temporarily assigned to him, refuse to report their numbers, and where stationed to Gen. Hooker. (See general orders, dispatches and official reports, etc., on foregoing page.) Why did Halleck refuse any troops from Washington after the enemy had passed that city, and why did the president say to Gen. Butterfield, "You have heard what Halleck says." (See Butterfield's official report.) If the administration and Halleck were not governed by some selfish motive or personal prejudice to Gen. Hooker, why did Halleck interfere and countermand Gen. Hooker's field order to troops that had been assigned to his command, and insist on holding them in a position where they were of no use, and keep them from Hooker, where their services were indispensable to the army of the Potomac in the great battle soon to be fought? And why, after he had been driven to the last ditch, where his pride would not permit him to stand any further humiliation, he turned as a last resort, thinking the authorities would yield, and asked to be relieved from the command of the army, giving his reasons, which must be apparent to all fair-minded persons? Why was his request so promptly accepted and his successor appointed and Hooker ordered to report to Baltimore for orders, and when he went forward to Washington to explain to the president, did Halleck promptly place him under arrest? And again we ask if

there were no undue influences at work to drive Hooker from the command of the army and humiliate him, why was Hooker's successor, as soon as he took command, permitted without a protest to break up the same garrison and order them to join him that Halleck had refused Hooker? All of these successive acts of Halleck happening within a few days of each other, make a bad record; but whether those things were simply errors or done with a malignant purpose, it makes no difference now to the principal actors, or the rank and file of gallant heroes who were unnecessarily sacrificed to save the Union. But it is due the living heroes who survived not only the shot, shell and canister of the enemy, but endured years of camp life and marches, and their friends at home, North and South, that the whole truth be told, so the actors, the rank and file of the army, will realize the sacrifice they have made, and that society generally will appreciate the wonderful service these heroes gave their country. It being true, as we have said, that Hooker was the only man who ever commanded the army of the Potomac that was a match as a strategist for Gen. R. E. Lee, the result of his removal from the command of that army was that the Potomac army was never able to deal the enemy a crushing blow in any one battle, but was forced to fight many useless drawn battles at great sacrifice of life, and finally wear the enemy out, in spite of the blunders of incompetent commanders placed over them. That there was a conspiracy, composed of Halleck and some of the corps commanders of the army of the Potomac, I think we have shown to exist to thwart the best efforts of Gen. Hooker and defeat the army. The corps commanders at Chancellorsville, each for themselves, Howard and Sedgwick, either one of them if they had obeyed Hooker's orders, the result would have been a grand victory for the

Union army. Meade's failure to use the large and idle force at his command to reinforce Sickles and strike the enemy in flank at the time Gen. Hooker was paralyzed by the explosion of a shell was an act hard to explain as consistent with a brave, patriotic corps commander. The animus of the man was more fully exemplified when he was appointed to command the army in his determination to change the order of march and battle Gen. Hooker had ordered, and the persistency with which he opposed fighting at Gettysburg, and the efforts he made to eliminate every semblance of Gen. Hooker's plans goes very far to explain why he did not put his force into action at Chancellorsville.

CHAPTER VI.

Meade Opposed Fighting at Gettysburg. The Battle was Fought there by the Combined Efforts of Corps Commanders, in Spite of Meade's Opposition.

Meade, as has been said before, had no idea of fighting at Gettysburg, but continued to move his army slowly in that direction, with the different corps marching in separate columns on different roads east of South Mountain, so that the formation was much in the shape of a fan spread out. This is in the same order in which Hooker was marching the army on this side of the mountain, with this difference: Hooker's objective point was Gettysburg and Meade's idea was that when one of the advanced corps struck the enemy they were to fight and fall back and all concentrate on a line he had caused to be layed out and entrenched, running from Mechanicstown on the left east crossing the Monocacy river, thence via Pipe creek to the vicinity of Taneytown, making a line of twenty-five or thirty miles long. The object in selecting this line for the battle instead of Gettysburg I cannot see. It did not cover Washington and Baltimore as well as Gettysburg; its disadvantages consisted in the fact that the line was more than twice as long as was necessary to have at Gettysburg, for the reason that all the main roads from Chambersburg, Carlisle and York to Baltimore and Washington centered at Gettysburg, and from Gettysburg these great highways spread out in a northeasterly

direction north of Gettysburg, and southwesterly direction to Baltimore and Washington, the great commercial cities, so that an army stationed at Gettysburg, their flanks would be protected largely from a flank attack by the enemy, for the reason there are no traveled roads in that direction over which an enemy could pass a heavy attacking column rapidly enough to make the movement successful. This made Gettysburg a strong position to fight a defensive battle, but Gen. Meade was not inclined to take this view of the situation. If he had favored Gettysburg as the battle ground, it would have been just as easy to have concentrated the Union army at Gettysburg June 30, or even on the night of the 29th, as it was to wait until the night of July 1. On the 30th Meade learned to a certainty from scouts and advanced cavalry pickets that the enemy had turned his whole column and was marching on the three converging roads from Chambersburg, Carlisle and York to Gettysburg, and so informed his corps commanders, but he gave them no orders to move forward, nor did he do so July 1. If Meade had ordered the army to march to Gettysburg on the night of June 30 or early morning of July 1, the whole Union army, except possibly the fifth and sixth corps, would have been resting in Gettysburg, and in easy supporting distance when the Confederate army approached the town. It was understood by Meade that when any of the advance corps met the enemy they were to show fight and fall back to Pipe creek.

CHAPTER VII.

The Battle of Gettysburg. First Day Gen. Reynolds Killed.

Gen. Pleasanton, commanding cavalry corps, ordered Buford, commanding division of cavalry, June 29th to march to Gettysburg on the morning of the 30th and hold that place until relieved by the infantry. The sequel of Gen. Pleasanton, Reynolds, Buford, Hancock, Sickles and Slocum's movements on Gettysburg goes to show that they had no such idea, as will appear as we go along, of falling back on Pipe creek. Gen. Buford was in advance on the left wing. This wing of the army was composed of Buford's cavalry, the first, third and eleventh corps, all under the immediate command of Gen. Reynolds. Buford attempted, June 30, to march direct to Gettysburg to carry out Pleasanton's order, his direct route being through the mountain at Fountaintdale Gap, where he found a brigade of Confederate infantry. This caused him to turn back and take the route by way of Emmetsburg, but he arrived at Gettysburg early in the day, and fully established his lines. His pickets were advanced almost to Cashtown and Hunterstown. He posted Gamble's brigade across Chambersburg pike and Devin's brigade across the Mumsburg road. Buford's main lines were about one mile west of Gettysburg, well over the ridge. His first or picket line was extended beyond Willoughby's run, a branch of the Monocacy river. The country here is broken and rough surface, largely covered with

timber, making the position well adapted for defensive operations, and this is the position the cavalry occupied during the night of June 30th. In the morning of July 1st the enemy started on the diverging roads for Gettysburg, and very soon came in contact with the pickets Buford had placed in advance on main roads the night before, and skirmishing began in earnest. It had been arranged by Buford and Reynolds that when the enemy advanced in force that three cannon shots should be fired in quick succession as a signal. At this signal Gen. Reynolds ordered the first corps to go forward to the support of the cavalry, and ordered the eleventh corps to follow. Just why he did not order the third corps forward at this time I never knew, for that corps was assigned to his immediate command, the same as the eleventh corps. It has been stated that he suggested or in some way recommended that it should come forward. This I very much doubt. There must be some mistake about this report. I was a member of the third corps from its first organization; so was Gen. Sickles, the corps commander, and I know him to be one of the bravest, most patriotic and brilliant officers that ever drew a sword in the defense of his country, and if he had got a hint that his services were needed the first day he would have marched the third corps to Seminary Ridge and placed them in line of battle as soon as their strength would have permitted them to have made the march. He was no sluggard, nor was he ever known to sulk in his tent. Quite likely the reason the third corps was not ordered up early on the first day is that Gen. Reynolds was killed about eleven o'clock a. m. before he had got the first division of the first corps all in position. The second, third and twelfth corps could, if they had been ordered up early in the morning, have been on the ground by twelve o'clock noon, ready to go into

action, and with the aid of either one of these corps, had they come upon the field by 2 o'clock p. m., would have changed the result of the first day's battle from a defeat into a general victory for the Union army. The fall of Gen. Reynolds, happening at the time and under the circumstances, was a great loss to the army, the country and its cause. He was a West Point graduate, had seen service in the Mexican war and on the frontier and War of Rebellion from the first, a Pennsylvanian, a gallant officer, none more patriotic. He said to Gen. Doubleday: "We must fight the enemy as soon as we can find them, or they will ruin the state of Pennsylvania." He had no idea of fighting and falling back. If he had lived he would have made haste to order up Sickles' third corps and requested Gen. Slocum of the twelfth corps to come to his support, who was not more than five miles from Gettysburg. Sickles was under Reynolds' immediate command at that time, and he had a right to order the third corps forward; and his high standing in the army was such that his request of Gen. Slocum to assist him would have been sufficient to have promptly brought that corps to his assistance. But he fell while he was aiding in the formation of the first division. Gen. Doubleday was in command of a division of the first corps, and when Gen. Hooker placed Gen. Reynolds in command of the left wing of the army, Reynolds turned over the command of the corps to Doubleday, and on the morning of July 1st, Gen. Reynolds was encamped with the first corps at Marsh creek, and when Gen. Buford's cavalry command fired the three successive cannon shots, the signal that had been agreed upon as a notice that the enemy had attacked the cavalry, and that Gen. Reynolds was to move the infantry forward to their support, he promptly ordered Wadsworth to

move at once, and Doubleday to call in the pickets and put the two other divisions, with artillery, etc., on the road to move forward as rapidly as possible. He then ordered Howard's eleventh corps, to march to Gettysburg, then mounted his horse and rode to the front to consult with Gen. Buford, whom he found in the bell tower of the theological seminary which stands on top of the ridge west of Gettysburg, known as Seminary Ridge. This position gave them a splendid view of the enemy's firing line, who were pushing the cavalry in front and flank. It also gave them a view of the approaching troops of the first corps. The head of Wadsworth's division came up, and he descended to the ground and directed them where to move into line. At this time one of Gen. Howard's aides rode up and asked for orders for the eleventh corps. Reynolds told him to say to Howard to halt his corps on Cemetery ridge and form them there as a reserve. He then went forward to assist in placing Wadsworth's division in position to check the overwhelming force that was forcing back the dismounted cavalry on the Chambersburg pike. At this time Doubleday had got the two last divisions of the first corps well on their way to the front, galloped ahead and overtook Meredith's brigade, which was the last or left of Wadsworth's division on the Fairfield road. Just as they were moving forward on to the firing line, he halted and sent an aide over to Reynolds, who was on a high wooded ridge on the Chambersburg road on the east side of Willoughby's run. This position gave him a good front view, as well as to the rear, the direction in which reinforcements were coming. He said to the aide, "Tell Doubleday to watch the Fairfield road and left flank and I will hold on to this road." But his lines were weak at this point, and the enemy was overlapping them, and there was danger of their turning his flanks

before the other divisions could reach him. He ordered up more artillery, and in his anxiety for the arrival of reinforcements kept turning his head, looking back. This he repeated several times. At last, when he turned his head to look back, a minie ball struck him in the back of the head, passing straight through, coming out just over his eye, killing him instantly. So far the attacking column was Hill's corps. It is well to understand here the organization of the two armies. They were about equal numerically. The Confederates had three corps, while the Union army was composed of seven corps. One of the Confederate corps was equal to two and three-sevenths of the Union army's corps. Divisions and brigades in the same ratio. When Reynolds fell, the command of the left wing of the army devolved temporarily upon Gen. Doubleday, who distributed the balance of the first corps very ingeniously as they came up, and the first corps, under his command July 1st, won prodigies of valor, holding back from 9 o'clock a. m. until three p. m., a force equal to three or four to their one. But they were so favorably posted that the enemy could never have forced them back by a front attack. Their danger consisted in the enemy's getting on their flank and subjecting them to a cross fire. This often happened during the day. The enemy's numbers being so much greater, they could swing to either flank and subject the Union army to a murderous cross fire, which caused the Union army as often to change front to meet these flank attacks. It requires a cool commander and the coolest soldiers to successfully change front under a heavy flank fire. The Union soldiers performed this feat several times during the day. The report of killed and wounded tells how desperate and destructive was the fire of the enemy. Gen. Wadsworth reported one-half of his division either killed or wounded.

Gen. Rowley's division, one-half killed and wounded; Gen. Stone's division lost two-thirds killed and wounded. Nearly every field officer killed or wounded. Gen. Robison's brigade of 2,500 men for duty lost 1,667 men killed and wounded.

The 24th Michigan, commanded by Col. Marrow, had five color bearers killed. The colonel then seized and held them up, but was immediately wounded. A private then seized them, who soon got a mortal wound, but he firmly held the regiment's colors in place. While this terrible fighting was taking place on the left center by the 1st corps with six small brigades, who relieved Buford's cavalry and were opposed by eight large brigades of Hill's corps, Howard rode forward in advance of his corps, arriving on the ground about 11:30 a. m. Seeing the desperate fighting being maintained by the 1st corps against Hill, he dispatched an aide to the 11th corps to hurry up double quick. He then learned of the death of Gen. Reynolds and by reason of his rank assumed command of the left wing of the army. He sent a dispatch to Meade to notify him of the death of Reynolds. He requested the 12th corps, commanded by Slocum, resting at two taverns about five miles from Gettysburg, to come forward and take part in the battle. This Slocum refused to do without orders from Gen. Meade, and Meade was at Taneytown, fifteen miles away, but knew on the afternoon of the 30th that Lee's army was marching on Gettysburg; that Buford's cavalry was west of that town; that the 1st corps rested that night within six miles, and the 11th would move forward the next morning, and that the 12th corps was resting five miles south of the town, and, in all probability, a battle would be fought the next day. Still Meade did not consider the matter of importance enough to ride forward so as to keep in easy communication with the

advanced columns. Slocum had been ordered by Meade to the position he occupied within easy sound of the battle with no one at hand with power to order him forward to aid the 1st corps, and Buford's cavalry in their desperate struggle against an enemy very largely outnumbering them. When Gen. Meade learned that Reynolds had fallen he ordered Gen. Hancock to go forward and assume command of the left wing. The head of the 11th corps arrived at Gettysburg at 12:45 and the last division at 1:45. Howard having assumed command of the left wing of the army, turned the command of the 11th corps over to Maj.-Gen. Carl Shurz, who turned over the command of his division to Gen. Barlowe. Schimmelpfenning's and Barlow's divisions were immediately put into action on the right of the 1st corps, on Seminary Ridge. The other division, that of Steinwehr, was placed in rear, on Cemetery Ridge, together with the artillery, that was not in action, as a reserve. Steinwehr utilized his time in strengthening his position wherever rocks and stone fences did not afford the necessary shelter from the enemy's fire for his command, and strengthened the position generally. At 2:45 it was discovered that Ewell's corps was close at hand on the Carlisle road. This heavy column of the Confederates coming from that direction would strike the right flank of the Union line. Gen. Doubleday, on receiving this information from Gen. Buford, sent an aide to Gen. Howard, telling him if he would direct the 11th corps to keep in check Ewell's column, he would try to hold Hill. Howard caused Barlowe's division of the 11th corps to change front to meet Ewell and Early. When they executed this movement Deven's brigade of cavalry, that had been covering this position, fell back and took a position to the right and rear. The fighting was desperate all along the lines from left to the right of the

Union lines. In the morning the Confederates thought they only had raw militia to contend with and were careless about their movements and met some heavy losses in the fore part of the day. On that account they expected that they would only meet militia and that the advance division, Heth's, of Hill's corps, would march into Gettysburg without a halt. But Gen. Pleasanton, in command of the Union cavalry corps, one of the most brilliant major generals in the Union army, ordered Gen. Buford, on the 29th, to occupy Gettysburg on the 30th and hold it until the infantry of the Army of the Potomac came to his relief. Thus it will be seen he realized the importance of this position to the future success of the Union army, and if it had not been for the efforts of Generals Hooker first, then Pleasanton and Reynolds and Hancock, the battle would never have been fought at Gettysburg, and Lee would have marched his army into Gettysburg with no more opposition than he first anticipated—that of the militia. But after the 11th corps had changed front and Schimmelfenning's and Barlowe's divisions were fighting desperately with Ewell's column, on the Carlisle road, Early's division at 3:30 p. m. came up on the York road which struck Barlowe's division on their right flank. This heavy column was too much for them. No changing front or throwing forward light reserves could check them. This practically decided the first day's battle in favor of the Confederates. Here was the time the 12th corps should have been in position to meet Early. This would have insured a victory for the Union army the first day. Here the corps commanders, who was determined the battle should be fought at Gettysburg, made their first failure, in not having some one in advance if misfortune should overtake Reynolds, who would have been respected enough that their request for reinforce-

ments would have brought forward the 12th and 3d corps. Then the Union victory would have been complete; but, no reinforcements being at hand, the two divisions of the 11th corps were compelled to fall back, retreat to Cemetery Ridge. Barlowe was wounded, Von Amburg's brigade was nearly all captured, the two divisions of the 11th corps, or what was left of them, made a hasty retreat to Cemetery Ridge, where their reserve was stationed. This left the 1st corps, under Doubleday, in a very critical situation. A very heavy reinforced line of the enemy was steadily bearing down on the weakened lines of the 1st corps, but the enemy had learned in the early part of the day that it did not pay to try to crush that corps in a rapid front attack, but the great danger to the 1st corps consisted now in the headlong movement of Ewell's corps on both their right flank and their rear, threatening their total destruction. About this time, Doubleday says, he sent aides at two different times to request that Gen. Howard send him reinforcements from the reserve on Cemetery Ridge, but it was refused. Doubleday says for a long time he saw the perilous condition the 1st corps was getting into. The enemy was overlapping them on either flank, and thinking Howard would see this when his attention was called to their situation by repeated calls for reinforcements, he would order them to fall back to the reserve. But he insists that Howard never gave the order. Howard claims he sent an aide with an order to fall back. Doubleday says the order never came, but when the situation became so desperate that it was doubtful if he could save his artillery he gave the order, on his own responsibility, to fall back. One piece of artillery was abandoned, because the horses that hauled it were shot, and there was no time to unhitch them and three broken caissons were abandoned on the field.

The different brigades began the movement to the rear, slowly and coolly, taking advantage of every favorable position, to re-form. And as the enemy would approach, both infantry and artillery would open a murderous fire. This made the enemy very cautious and gave most of what was left alive and sound plenty of time to take their place in line on Cemetery Ridge, which was some time between 3 and 4 o'clock p. m. Hancock claims to have arrived on the ground at 3:30 and took command of the left wing of the army by order of Gen. Meade. There seems to be considerable difference in time at this point from different reports. It is agreed that Early's attack on Barlowe's right occurred at about 3:30. Much time must have been consumed after Early's attack and the 11th corps falling back to Cemetery Ridge, and Doubleday's sending aides at two different times to get reinforcements or permission to fall back; and then, after all this, really retreated two miles, to Cemetery Ridge, on a slow walk in this interval; much time must have intervened. Then Doubleday says he found Howard surrounded by his aides at the main gate of the cemetery, who gave him orders, etc. Hancock claims he came on the ground and took command by order of Meade at 3:30 p. m. Howard says Hancock did not take command until 7 p. m. Doubleday is inclined to think Hancock correct. It looks to us as though Howard was nearest correct. I was in the 3d corps. We came up and took our position on the left at Cemetery Ridge before sundown. There had not been any fighting for some time previous to our arrival except light skirmishing. If this difference in time could be settled it would go very far in settling the question that has been raised between Howard's and Hancock's friends as to which of those gentlemen, or if either of them, selected Cemetery Ridge as the final battle ground.

It is evident that Hancock was highly pleased with the ridge; that he was very active in establishing the line; then rode back that night to Taneytown and persuaded Meade to order up the balance of the army and come forward himself at the same time.

CHAPTER VIII.

Battle of the Second Day. Hancock Persuades Meade to Come to Gettysburg and Order Up the Balance of the Army. Lee Order an Attack. Is Defeated. Meade Objects to Fight at Gettysburg.

Hancock turned over the command of the left wing of the army to Gen. Slocum. Gen. Sickles', commanding the 3d corps (all but two brigades), went forward without orders. It and the 12th corps arrived on the ground about sundown. The 2d and 5th corps came during the night and were assigned position in line. The 6th corps arrived in the afternoon of July 2d, having marched over 30 miles that night, and was placed in rear of little round top in reserve. Gen. Meade arrived on the ground about 1 o'clock a. m. of July 2d and established headquarters at a frame dwelling on the Taneytown road, near Ziglar's grove. At dawn he began massing his forces with a view of attacking Lee's left, but Gen. Warren, of Meade's staff, and some of the corps commanders opposed the movement, and it was abandoned. Meade was dissatisfied with Gettysburg as the battle ground, and at one time placed the cavalry in position to cover the retreat to Pipe creek, the place he had selected to fight Lee; but the corps commanders pleaded for Gettysburg, and Meade reluctantly yielded to their decision, but insisted on assuming the offensive. His plan of attack was to strike a crushing blow on the enemy's left and, as before said, ordered his forces massed on the Union right

for that purpose, but Gen. Warren and Slocum both reported that the plan was impracticable, and Meade abandoned the project. He then turned his attention to the enemy's right, with a view to attacking them on that flank. Attacking the enemy on their right would have been a far better movement for the Union army to have made for two reasons: First, if the attack had been successful it would have resulted in forcing the enemy north and west and firmly placing the Union army between the Confederates Baltimore and Washington, and placed the Confederates' force in danger of being cut off from all future supply of ammunition. This would mean certain disastrous defeat to the Confederates if not immediately remedied. An army is compelled to move with a limited supply of artillery cartridges. Pitched battles and constant skirmishes is a constant drain on this supply that must be replenished only from their base where large amounts are constantly kept stored for that purpose. Once that base is cut an army commander will make great haste to restore his communications with his base of supplies, so that safe convoys can frequently reach them. If these convoys fail to reach an army, especially in artillery cartridges, that army is doomed to a disastrous defeat. This was why Hooker insisted on having the Harper's Ferry garrison broken up so as to give him sufficient force to enable him to effectually cut Lee's communications and compel him to turn and fight him on his own chosen ground in open country. Lee's ammunition would soon give out, and disastrous defeat of his army would have followed. This Lee knew as well as Hooker, and that knowledge caused him to immediately face about, retrace his steps as soon as he learned of Hooker's movements to cut his base, but if Meade's proposition he first advanced had prevailed and he had succeeded in breaking down Lee's left, its

result would have been, in the first place, to have weakened the line of the Union army on their left. If the attack had been successful, which I doubt very much, its tendency would have been to weaken the Union line, and especially on their left, while the reverse would be true with the Confederates. Their columns would be turned towards their base, and the Union army's base would have been in great danger. Further than this, the army acting on the defensive, on either side, had decidedly the advantage for the reason that, as the armies were drawn up in line on each side of Gettysburg on high, commanding ridges, which ran parallel to each other, the Union army facing west and the Confederates east, separated by a valley of about one mile in width in which is situated Gettysburg. All roads in this vicinity radiate from this town. So its appearance is something like a wagon hub with its spokes running in different directions. So an army stationed as above described, one could not move a heavy attacking column suddenly on the flank of the other, and if a flank movement was attempted its operations must necessarily be slow because no roads lead in that direction. This will explain why the Confederates' attempts on the Union army's flank, were no more successful. There is scarcely a doubt if Meade had made the attack on the Confederates on either flank, as he desired, disastrous defeat awaited him, but there is no knowing what the result would have been. The topography of the country, as above described, gave the defense much the advantage, while Meade was debating as to which flank of the enemy he would attack, and not giving any attention to the strong formation of his own lines. The 5th corps came up tired and footsore at 1 p. m., July 2nd, and was placed in the rear on the right center, in reserve. The 6th corps arrived at 3 p. m., and was placed in reserve on the left, in

rear of Little Round Top. This corps was forced to march in heat and dust over thirty miles that day, and, of course, was in no condition to be put into action until they had some rest. But not much time was given those tired soldiers for rest. Meade had blundered by placing those two corps so far away; so they must suffer because of his mismanagement. A consultation of corps commanders was held at headquarters in the afternoon of the 2nd, and the unanimous voice was to fight at Gettysburg. It is a little singular that the corps commanders of both armies should agree so well as to the line of action both should pursue. Longstreet was positive that Lee should take up a position and hold it and compel Meade to attack him, while the Union corps commanders were united that the best course for the Union army to pursue was to assume the defensive. The Union corps commanders were successful in persuading their commander. Longstreet was not. Lee ordered an attack on both flanks of the Union lines at 9 o'clock a. m., July 2nd. Ewell on the Union right and Longstreet on the left, while Hill was to keep up a demonstration on the center to prevent any re-enforcing of the Union flanks from the center. It is very evident that Lee had not stopped to consider the natural barriers that would beset his corps commanders at almost every step of the converging roads and rough, broken country, fences, roads and ravines over and through which they had to pass or else he would have ordered the movement to have taken place the night before in order to give the attacking columns the whole night to get into position, or else ordered the attack to have taken place much later in the day. The sequel proves two facts very conclusively. First, that the commanders of either army did not take into consideration the disadvantage the attacking column must labor under in passing to the flanks of the enemy,

in the direction of which there was no roads passing, and that the movements of the attacking columns must be made far to the rear to avoid the view of the enemy, and to prevent a counter movement by them. If he had taken those conditions into consideration he would never have ordered the attack on both flanks of the Union army at 9 a. m., for he would have known that it would be an impossibility for his corps commanders to comply with his order. It is true Longstreet delayed his movement some time, in the morning, in order to let Law's brigade come up, which was some distance in the rear; and after it came up and was ready for action, there was the marching to the rear of ridges and ravines in order to avoid exposing its movements to the views of the Union army, but after Longstreet's wait for a portion of his command to come up, he was able to bring his corps into action several hours before Ewell could reach the Union lines to deliver the blow he was ordered to strike at 9 o'clock a. m. The Confederates, after the battle, blamed Longstreet for not bringing on the engagement earlier in the day. We claim great injustice has been done those corps commanders. They had the natural and artificial obstructions to overcome. No man could, in advance, accurately measure the time it would require to accomplish the work that had been assigned them. But before describing the attack of the Confederates, it will be best to give some idea of the position the Union army had assumed at this time, for it can hardly be said after the evening, or night, of July 1st that any one general was responsible for its formation. That night, when Hancock had ordered the different corps into line as they came up, their formation was somewhat in the shape of a crescent. The right of the 12th corps rested on Powers Hill. This hill, called Powers Hill, is situated on the west bank of Rock creek, and

this creek is the east branch of the Monacacy river, which unites with the west branch about ten or twelve miles south of Gettysburg. From this point it is known as the Monocacy river. So it will be seen Rock creek is quite a stream, and the rough nature of the ground and timber made it more difficult for the Confederates to reach this flank of the Union army with a well organized force of artillery at Powers' Hill. The right of the 12th corps, the Union line passed along the ridge of said creek north to Culp's Hill. Here one division, Wadsworth's, of the 1st corps, was stationed. Here the line turned west, leaving Rock creek, to Cemetery Hill, on which was stationed the 11th corps, the left flank of that corps turned south, along the ridge, and was joined on their left by two divisions of the 1st corps. On their left was the 2nd corps. Then came the 3rd corps, their left resting at the base of Little Round Top, so-called to distinguish it from a larger spur that shoots up far above the surrounding ridges. Little Round Top, I would judge to be about two hundred and fifty feet high, from its base to the top, while south of this one-half or three-fourths of a mile is Big Round Top, which is fifty or seventy-five feet higher. These two spurs were the key to the whole situation, so far as the Union army was concerned. Once in the hands of the Confederates they could place artillery on the crest of these spurs, and the Union lines, as strong as they were, if attacked in front, could not have been maintained against the enemy a moment. So, too, if it had been decided from the first by the Union commander that this was to be the battle ground, these two spurs would have been crowned with all the batteries and infantry that could have been placed to advantage, on the night of July 1st. If this had been done, Longstreet's attack on the 2nd would have resulted in a disastrous defeat to the Confederates, and the

3d corps would not have been driven from its position on the Emmetsburg road, Peach Orchard and Devil's Den, as will appear by a glance at the map. The force and facts of this statement will appear more fully as we proceed with this narrative. As before said, the corps commanders were invited by Meade to headquarters for a conference on the afternoon of July 2nd, and by the unanimous voice it was decided to hold the position the Union army occupied; and when this conference was in session the Confederates under Longstreet attacked the 3rd corps, and when Gen. Sickles mounted to ride over to his corps, which was being attacked, Gen. Meade rode with him, and it is said that Meade objected to the position the 3rd corps was placed in; but inasmuch as the engagement was on, and Longstreet was forcing the fight, that it was better to permit the line to remain where it was. This may or may not be true. Gen. Sickles says that he made an effort to get Gen. Meade to direct the position the 3rd corps should be placed in. That the ridge, about one-half or three-quarters of a mile in advance of the ridge the 3rd corps occupied on the night of July 1st, along the Emmetsburg road running southwest and turning, as it finally did, at the peach orchard and running southeast, the left resting at or near Little Round Top, was the better position. Gen. Meade did not give the placing of this line his personal attention, but sent a staff officer, Gen. Hunt, chief of artillery, approved of the position, and the corps was finally placed where the battle was fought. It will be seen that this part of the Union line had been neglected by Meade. The line, as finally posted, was crude to excess. There was no force to protect or support its left flank, and the high, commanding round tops that ranked so high and commanding above the surrounding country, was occupied only as a signal station. Soon after Longstreet's at-

tack on the 3rd corps began, the 5th corps came forward and formed in the rear of Little Round Top. Crawford's division, on the right, and advanced in supporting distance of the 3rd corps formation, and while the battle was raging furiously on the left of the 3rd corps, where Hood's division of Longstreet's corps had formed heavy columns to strike the left flank and rear of the Third corps, composed of Ward's and DeTrobriand's brigades of Birney's division, Gen. Warren, chief engineer of Meade's staff, rode to the crest of Little Round Top to view the result of the great shock of Hood's attack, and at once discovered that the left flank of Ward's brigade was bound to be turned, and the enemy's intentions were to possess themselves of Little Round Top, which had no force in position to defend it. He saw Barnes' division of the 5th corps forming at the right for a charge, and about to go to the relief of DeTrobriand, who was being sorely pressed. He also saw the enemy making straight for Little Round Top, the key to the whole battle field, and no troops to defend it. In an instant he grasped the situation. If the enemy got possession the victory was theirs, and the Union army would be compelled to abandon the field. Gen. Warren wheeled his horse and galloped over to Barnes' division, and hurriedly detached Gen. Strong Vincent's brigade from Gen. Barnes' division, who went on double quick to the crest, none too soon, for the enemy was there in force; and not having time to load, they gave the enemy the cold steel, and forced them down the hill. But it was at a terrible sacrifice of precious lives. Vincent soon found that he was confronted with an overwhelming force, and called on Gen. Barnes for re-enforcements, who sent a battery and the one hundred and fortieth New York regiment. This was the most hotly contested point in the whole battle, or of any on the continent. It was the turn-

ing point of the day. If the Union army was driven from this point the result would be a defeat, if not a disaster, to the Union army. The Confederates saw the defenseless condition of this commanding position, and started for it with a rush, and it can truthfully be said that if ever Providence did intervene to aid one army, or prevent the other from the destruction of their opponents, this is one of the instances where the theory could be applied that the Allwise guided the hand that smote the enemy and saved the Union army from defeat. Whether it was Providence that caused Gen. Warren to gallop to the crest of Little Round Top at this time or not, his efforts on this occasion made it possible to record the battle of Gettysburg—second day—in history, as a Union victory. But the possession of these wonderful strategetical points was finally saved to the Union army, at a great sacrifice of life. Generals Vincent and Weede both fell on the crest. The struggle on and around this strategic point was desperate. The ground was fought over, back and forward, and was very reluctantly abandoned by the Confederates. I cannot refrain from going back over the ground again to ask why the commander of the Union army, or some one for him, did not see to it that these wonderful strategetical points, Little and Big Round Tops, were not seized, fortified and manned, either on the night of July 1st, or early morning of the 2nd. Here they were, separate mounds, standing about one-half mile apart, towering about three hundred feet above, and commanding the surrounding country as far as artillery could reach. General Hood, who commanded the division on the right of Longstreet's corps, when he marched that division south of the base of Big Round Top in order to strike the left flank of the 3rd corps, must have been surprised and highly gratified to find that batteries had not been placed by the Union

army on that high accessible tower that would sweep his division from right to left flank, and when he moved on a half mile further and found Little Round Top not belching forth iron and lead hail to the destruction of his command, he ordered the right of his command to change front and pass to the rear of Ward's brigade, which was on the left of the 3rd corps' line, and capture Little Round Top, and this was the movement Warren discovered that caused him to rush on double quick the first brigade he came to on the crest of the mountain.

Since I began the narrative pertaining to the movement on this flank of the army, I have wondered and asked why, the necessity being so apparent to everybody, that these strategetical points were not seized by the Union army and fortified. To me now it is plain. Meade protested against fighting here from the start, and no one knew, until after the conference of the corps commanders with Gen. Meade, at his headquarters, whether the battle, on the Union side, was to be fought on the offensive or defensive, or whether they would fight at Gettysburg at all. But while this conference was taking place, Lee solved the question by bringing on the engagement on the left, a point, unfortunately for the Union army, that had received no attention from Meade, and very little from any one else. But when the enemy attacked, on July 3rd, the center of the Union lines he found Little and Big Round Tops fortified and covered with plenty of artillery and troops. This artillery, although it was long range, raked picket lines from right to left, and did much to demoralize Wilcox and others that Pickett expected would support his charge. We repeat, if the Round Tops had been fortified and mounted with artillery the same the second day when the enemy attacked that they contained the third day, the 3rd corps would never have been driven from their position.

Nor would anyone ever have heard anything about the weakness of the position of the 3rd corps July 2nd, although Little Round Top, the key to the situation when the battle began, was not fortified, nor was there an armed man on it. And when the Confederates made a dash for it and passed the left flank and rear of Ward's brigade in large force, together with the heavy force in his front, his position on his left became vulnerable, that part of the 3rd corps line was gradually forced back, but not until after the most desperate struggle by Ward and DeTrobriand's brigades. Reinforcements were put into this breach of two brigades of the 5th corps, and later two brigades of the Second corps, but they were not able to stay the onset of the overwhelming force Longstreet was able to throw into the breach. They swung to the right, resting on the ridge to the right of Little Round Top. By this time the 5th corps was in line, their left resting on and rear of Little Round Top and extending along the ridge to the right, towards the cemetery, and two brigades of the 6th corps came up and went into line to the left of Little Round Top. Longstreet then gave up any further attempts to break through at this point of the Union line, but the entire line originally occupied by Birney's division of the 3rd corps at the beginning of this battle, was abandoned, because it had been so completely turned on its left flank that the position was untenable, but in addition to the loss of general officers already mentioned in this struggle on the Union side, was killed Cross and York; wounded, Sickles, from which he lost his leg; and Gen. Graham severely, who was taken prisoner. The right of the 3rd corps, up to this time, composed of the second division, commanded by Gen. Humphreys, had not been actively engaged, and when Birney's division fell back to the ridge east of the Emmetsburg road. Sickles, having been wounded, left Birney in command of the 3rd corps.

Humphreys' division was still on the Emmetsburg road. At this point the road runs southwest. The other division of the 3rd corps, now commanded by Gen. Hobart Ward, was resting on the ridge in the rear, whose general direction was north and south. This left the right of Ward's division about a mile in rear of Humphreys' left, a position, if it had been attacked from the left, could not have been maintained for one minute. Birney ordered Humphreys to fall back in prolongation of Ward's line. This changing of front to the rear is a beautiful movement in brigade, division or corps drill, but when it comes to executing it under a severe artillery and infantry flank and front fire, coupled with the charge of Anderson's division in front and Barksdale's brigade of McLaw's division on the left flank, as they were at this time, it is different, and requires the coolest veteran to successfully execute this beautiful movement under such conditions. But this is just what did happen. Humphreys' division coolly took up their position on the prolongation of the 3rd corps' new line, and at the same time delivering stunning blows to their assailants. Three brigades of Anderson's division, Wright, Wilcox, and Perry, immediately followed up Humphreys with a furious charge. It will be remembered we have stated in the foregoing pages that the formation of the two armies were such that a brigade of the Confederate army was equal numerically to a division of the Union army, and so on up and down through their organization. The cause of this difference in the organization of the army, and its effect on the Union army, I will discuss later. The three brigades of Anderson's division that led in this charge were expecting the support of three other brigades as soon as they became engaged, but the supporting brigades, for some reason, failed to come forward. Anderson made a heroic charge. On and on

they came, Wilcox on the right, Perry in the center and Wright on the left. Wright struck the 2nd corps and actually broke through the main line, capturing several pieces of artillery, and turned them on the Union forces, who rallied their forces and charged back, recapturing their lost guns, and drove the enemy from the field. Perry, in the center, did not succeed as well. The concentrated fire on his brigade was too much for him, and he fell back before reaching the main line. This left Wright and Wilcox brigade's flanks unprotected, and the consequence was the infilading fire was terrible, and they were driven off, with great slaughter, which would have been saved to them if Posey, Mahone and Pender's brigades had followed up in support of the charge as it had been arranged they should do. It was a streak of good luck for the Union army that it happened so, for there is no knowing where this powerful column would have been checked. It is quite sure they would have gone through the first line, and might have caused the Union army to have retreated. This ended the battle on the Union army's left for July 2nd. Perhaps I may be pardoned if I say something of my own personal experience the second day on the left at the peach orchard. My regiment was the 57th Pennsylvania vols., and was in Graham's brigade. When the brigade was forming to the right of the peach orchard, an order came to the regiment to detail fifteen picked men and send them to the front as skirmishers. Col. Sykes ordered me to fill the detail, which I did, and placed the detail in charge of Lieut. Crosley, who immediately deployed the men and moved forward to a clump of buildings to the right of the peach orchard; and among the buildings was a brick house. The buildings were standing on the west side of the Emmetsburg road. Soon the whole bri-

gade moved forward, and my regiment halted in the rear of the buildings, where they were soon engaged with the enemy same as the rest of Birney's division. When the enemy broke through on our left, near Little Round Top, regiment after regiment was doubled back from the left and passed in rear of us and to the right on the Emmetsburg road. Nearly all the regiments on our left had passed us, when I became very anxious about the detail I had sent forward, and the last I saw of them they were taking shelter, under a hot fire from the enemy, in the brick house and out buildings. I walked up to the colonel, and, pointing to the retreating regiment, said: "It looks as though we will soon have to move out of here, or be captured." He turned his head to the left, and seeing the regiments near us on the left, going to the rear, said: "Yes, I think we will go now." I remonstrated with him, saying that many of the regiment had taken shelter in the buildings, and that we ought to make a detail who would rush around to the several buildings, and warn the officers and men and the detail I had sent out as skirmishers, that we were going to fall back, but he insisted on taking the regiment out then, replying that I could stay and get as many out as I could. I turned the company over to the second lieutenant, and started on a run from one building to the other. The roar of artillery and bursting of shells and musketry was such that it was necessary to take hold of and shake a man to get his attention. This made slow work, for one man, to get over the ground. When I had made the rounds of the outbuildings and got the men started to the rear, I then went to the main building, and, looking down to the left and seeing that no advance was being made on our west front, thought the enemy was far enough away so I could make a run through the house, up-stairs and down, and get a good many out before the enemy

would reach me. The entrance to the house was from the north, into a hall that led upstairs. I ran up the stairs and from one room to the other, and started them to the rear as fast as I could get them to understand what I wanted of them. I then started down stairs to notify those in the lower part of the house. When I reached the hall, I thought I would look down to the left, where the enemy first broke through our lines, to see how far they had progressed in my direction. I had always said I would never be taken prisoner as long as I could fight or run. There was nothing I dreaded so much as to be taken prisoner. But when I looked out, and there, horror of horrors, the enemy was in the yard in large force not fifty feet away. They saw me as soon as I did them, and ordered me to surrender. I saw at a glance that they were in a bunch, and but few of them could shoot without endangering themselves. So I thought I could run quartering past them, and possibly escape. I took the chance, and made the dive past them, then firing began. Either their aim was poor, or else I outran their shots, for they never touched me. As each shot would whizz past me it increased my efforts. There was some kind of a yard fence around the buildings, how high I do not know; what I do know is, that I did not touch it; nor did I ever make better time on a railroad car than I did until I got out of range of these gentlemen who were so anxious to introduce me to their Southern friends. Of course, the soldiers I had started on ahead had quite a long distance the start of me, but I soon overtook them. While we were passing to our new lines in the rear, we were in range of shells that were thrown by the Confederates at the Union soldiers who were forming their new line, and the shot was traveling on the same line with our squad, and what I want to call attention to, is that a man was killed

by a shell that never touched him. It was this way. The men that I had started ahead of me were following up the regiments in an irregular form, and were men of many regiments who had joined our squad, and shells were dropping in quite thick. At this point in particular one passed very close to me; so close that there was not much room to spare between me and the shell. A man in front I thought was in range, and feared it would strike him square on the back of his head, but instead it just missed him, but he dropped as dead and limp as though his head had been cut off. I know he was not touched, for I rolled him over, and there was no bruise on his head or face.

As I said when we started off on this chapter, that Gen. Lee ordered the Union lines to be attacked on both flanks at the same time, nine o'clock a. m. Longstreet's corps, which was to strike the Union army on their left, was not able to deliver the crushing blow until near four o'clock p. m., nearly seven hours later, but he was fully three hours ahead of Ewell, who was ordered to attack the Union army on their right at the same time. This proves what we said about Gettysburg being a strong position on which to fight a battle on the defense, but weak for offensive movements. The reason is, as before said, that all roads from all cities, north, south, east and west, converge at Gettysburg. All roads lead to this center, and none to the flanks or around Gettysburg to the flanks of the army. Longstreet's attack was near being successful, because the Union army had made but little if any preparations on that flank, and had neglected to occupy and fortify the key to the whole battle field, Little and Big Round Tops. When Longstreet's furious attack had been repulsed, at every point, and all sound quieting down at that flank, strange as it may seem, Gen. Meade ordered Gen. Geary, commanding a division of the 12th

corps, which was intrenched on the extreme right of the Union army, to leave his intrenchments and report to Gen. Sykes, at Little Round Top; and what is still more strange, Gen. Slocum, commanding the 12th corps, to which Gen. Geary belonged, protested that the enemy in heavy column was advancing on his corps, and begged to have Geary's division remain where it was. But Meade would not yield, and Geary moved his division out of his intrenched line, where he was needed, to Little Round Top, where he was not wanted, while Ewell's corps was, as Slocum had reported, moving into position to strike the Union line on their extreme right. Johnson's division was swinging around on the Confederates' extreme left for that purpose, and attacked furiously about sundown. The Confederates were defeated at every point where the Union men were in line, and were driven back, but the trenches that Gen. Geary's division had been ordered to vacate were easily taken possession of. This gave Johnson a strong, fortified position, not only on the right flank of the Union army, but, on account of the horseshoe shape of the Union line, they held a commanding position in their rear, and quite close to headquarters, where the artillery, ammunition and other trains were packed. Fortunately for the Union army, darkness overtook the enemy, and they were compelled to rest here until morning. The time this struggle ended was nine p. m. This success of the enemy would never have been if Meade had left Geary's division where it was needed, instead of ordering it to a part of the field where it was of no use, and it would not have been necessary for Gen. Geary to have sacrificed the many precious lives he did the next morning to get possession of his works, and drive Johnson out. Soon after Johnson's attack on the Union right began, Early's division composed of four brigades, one of his brigades, how-

ever, that of Smith, was sent to support Johnson; but three, those of Hayes, Hook and Gordon, supported by Rhodes and Pender's divisions, began an attack on Cemetery hill. Before this advance struck the Union lines, a vigorous artillery fire, by the Confederates from Benner's hill was kept up for some time, but this part of the Union lines had been fortified with great care, so the Union men and artillery were well protected. And when the Union guns opened in reply they soon silenced the Confederates' guns. Then the enemy's infantry moved forward and struck the position occupied by Von Gilsa's brigade on the right and Ames' on the left. These brigades were posted at the base of the hill behind stone fences. In their rear were posted Rickett's and Weidrick's batteries. On higher ground, further to the rear still was Steware's, Reynold's and Stephen's batteries, and as the enemy came in range all opened on the rebels' left such a terrible fire that they fell back, but their right being sheltered by rough ground, came on and charged through Von Gilsa's brigade infantry line, and captured some of their guns in rear. Darkness favored the Confederates in this movement. If the battery men could have seen to have kept the range of the enemy, they would have cleaned the ground, by use of double canister, of every living Confederate. As it was, the battery men stood by their guns and fought them as long as they were able to fire, and when the enemy rushed on so they could not load, they fought hand to hand with rammers, hand spikes and stones—anything they could lay their hands on. Re-enforcements came from the 2nd corps; also from Gen. Shurz's division, who charged the victorious Confederates and drove them down the hill pell mell. This gave the artillery another opportunity to open a murderous fire on the retreating enemy, and nothing but the smoke of battle, which settled down, and dark-

ness, saved this attacking column from total annihilation. As it was the enemy on this front suffered great slaughter. As a sample the Louisiana Tigers, on which the Confederates doted (their name was expected to strike terror to the hearts of the Yankees), went into this engagement with 1,750 men and came out with only one hundred and fifty men, and, it is said, they never attempted to organize this command again. This closed the fighting for the second day, with the defeat of the Confederates at every point. It is true Johnson had walked into some of the Union vacant entrenchments and had the privilege of resting in them over night, but he was isolated from the balance of the Confederate army, and although Lee determined to re-enforce him, he failed to do this in time to save him from defeat in the morning, he being attacked at daylight by Geary's division, who returned that night. The reason Johnson was not re-enforced in time to save his defeat by Geary in the morning, was the converging roads running into Gettysburg, making it necessary for the Confederates to travel so far to reach him that they were not able to get there in time. Then the Union line being formed something in the shape of a horse shoe, or fish hook, rather, gave them a short distance to travel to re-enforce either flank or center on short notice. On the night of July 2nd a council of war was held at Meade's headquarters, and the corps commanders voted unanimously to stay and fight it out where they were. Meade reluctantly acquiesced in their decision. He said this was no place to fight a battle. But here was Johnson's division holding a position that was a dangerous one to the Union army if he should be re-enforced in time. Hence it was necessary to attack him early in the morning. For that purpose batteries, as before stated, were placed at every point, to rake his lines, that were possible. When Geary came

up with his division about twelve o'clock that night he formed his lines on the flank and front of Johnson. Then waited for daylight to appear for the final attack. In the meantime Geary's division was reinforced from other commands, which the short distance from one flank to the other enabled the Union army to do rapidly without endangering any other part of their lines. Gen. Early was determined to reinforce Johnson, and hold on to the advantageous ground as a basis from which to rout the Union army. And his best efforts failed, because he was not able to reach Johnson in time with re-enforcements, but as soon as the first ray of light made its appearance, the Union artillery opened an enfilading fire on the Confederates. They did not bring any artillery with them because of the roughness of the country, and no highways over which they could transport it, and where troops have no means of defense except musketry it is hard to hold them very long under this kind of artillery fire. In Johnson's case there was but one of two things to do. Either charge the enemy in front and secure a better position, or fall back to cover for his men. He chose the former and ordered a charge, led by Stonewall Jackson's old brigade. They met Kane's brigade, who had never permitted the enemy to run over them. Here the contest was a most desperate one for four hours on the rough ground, among the rocks and trees. Finally the Union forces were working around on the enemy's flank and rear, which compelled Johnson to order his men to fall back in time to save them from being taken prisoners. This ended the fighting of infantry on the Union right and the Union lines were completely restored. This last fighting was wholly caused by the great blunder of Meade in ordering Geary to leave his entrenchments where he was needed, as before stated, and where the enemy was known to be moving for an attack, and go

to a point where he was not needed. When the fighting on the right had ceased, which was about 11 a. m., all was quiet, and the men in the Union army were seeking rest in some reclining position, and pretty generally drawing their rations of whiskey, which had been ordered issued, and never were they more appreciated. I was in command of my regiment, the 57th Pa. Vols., by reason of being senior captain. The major was captured the day before, and the colonel being wounded in one of his fingers after he left me at the brick house, and I did not see him again in five months. I instructed the adjutant to send in the report of the morning before, July 2nd, on which we would draw whiskey rations. Although we had been reduced so we did not have more than one-third of that number, I believed it was right then, and have never changed my mind. Within two hours of the issue of whiskey my brigade was required to make a double quick march for a mile and a half or two miles in the hot sun to the right to meet Pickett's charge, and we accomplished it without a single straggler. With the men in the worn-out physical condition the 3rd corps was July 3rd, I am sure they could not have accomplished that march on such good time without this stimulant. I don't consider this any argument in favor of guzzling whiskey ordinarily, but to show how an exhausted body of men can be stimulated to perform almost superhuman acts, while the stimulant lasts. When we had made this double quick march the whiskey was so well worked out of the command, that they were in excellent trim for a charge. It was a great disappointment to Gen. Lee and Gen. Ewell that Johnson's division was driven out on the morning of the 3rd from the trenches he had captured the night of July 2nd. If he could have been re-enforced in time to hold his position and had succeeded in it, there is not a doubt but what the Union

army would have been defeated at Gettysburg. How disastrous the defeat would have been no one can tell, for no one could tell how many more such blunders Meade would have made. The ordering of Geary out of his trenches by Meade at a time when he knew, from the report of Slocum, one of the most reliable officers in the army, that the enemy was near and about to attack this point, it was at least childish and a pettish thing to do, entirely unnecessary. The Sixth corps, one of the strongest corps, was in reserve nearer to Little Round Top than Geary's division. One of their divisions, or the whole corps for that matter, could have been ordered to take the trenches.

THE BATTLE OF GETTYSBURG.

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


Diagram of the Attack on the Left Centre, July 31.

CHAPTER IX.

Battle of the Third Day. Steward Tries to Secure a Position to Rear of Union Lines. Was Defeated. Pickett's Charge and Defeat. Corps Commanders Desire to Make a Counter Charge. Meade Not Inclined to Do It.

Geary had left and the great sacrifice of human life that was made to regain the trenches would have been saved, to say nothing of the chance of losing for ever a commanding position that would force the Union army to abandon the field, or subject themselves to a disastrous defeat and the only reason they were not compelled to choose between these alternatives was there were no direct roads, and the country was so rough that reinforcements could not reach Johnson in time to enable him to maintain his position. The driving of Johnson out of Geary's trenches takes us up to eleven o'clock, July 3d. All the morning the Confederates had worked industriously to move troops to reinforce Johnson. At the same time Lee was planning and organizing a storming column that would strike the right center of the Union army with great force, while at the same time Johnson with his reinforced columns, as Lee expected, would come forward with all his force to meet the storming column in front. The result of this move could not be doubted. But by the prowess of the rank and file of this noble band, the grandest army on earth, who offered themselves a sacrifice that the Union might live, this little plan was spoiled. Johnson was not in position to aid his Confederates. For this the thanks

of a reunited nation should be extended to the rank and file for all time, but the Confederates' storming columns that were expected to strike the right center of the Union line had been organized and taken their places for the onslaught. Now the chances for their success had been materially lessened by the defeat of Johnson. He was no longer in position to aid them. The situation was being narrowed down on the part of the Confederates to the alternatives of going forward with the charge that had been planned, notwithstanding the changed conditions, or to retreat on Richmond. If the latter course should be adopted the Confederate army and the whole Confederacy would be humiliated beyond reparation. It was conceded by the Confederate government that the fall of Vicksburg was only a question of time, and unless Lee's invasion of the Northern states was a success, so as to counteract the fall of Vicksburg, that the credit of the Confederacy would be gone and all foreign credit and sympathy would be destroyed. Thus Lee was goaded on to almost desperation, and he determined to make the charge of July 3d, 1863. The judgment of his corps commanders was opposed to any further offensive movements on their part, but Lee was obdurate and would not yield. Pickett's division was the only one in the Confederate army that had not suffered to any great extent at this time. So they were early in the day marshalled for the fray in the timber and broken ground to the right of the Seminary, but with all their precaution it was known that the Confederates were massing for some purpose. The Union lines had been strengthened at every point. The two Round Tops had been entrenched and crowned with as much artillery and men as could be used. Just as they should have been on the morning of July 2d, and Gen. Hunt, chief of artillery, ordered up as many guns as could be placed in

position to work to advantage, along the Union line, which was eighty. The Confederates brought in line to oppose these one hundred and fifteen guns. The reason the enemy could bring more artillery into use was their line was much longer, on account of its concave formation, while the Union line being convex, made their line present a shorter front to face any given point on the enemy's line. While the enemy could arrange guns to bear on the Union front from any point on their lines, the Union convex line in passing from right to left would turn so much that it would soon take the guns out of range of the Confederate center. The Union line was much more convex than the Confederates was concave. The preparations for the third day's struggle was going on up to near one o'clock p. m. After Johnson had been driven out of the position he occupied the night before it became necessary to supply his place in rear of the Union line, if possible, with some Confederate force that would be in position if Pickett's charge was successful in breaking through the Union lines to charge from the rear, and aid Pickett to maintain his position and strike a stunning blow on the right flank of the Union army, where the breach had been made by Pickett for this purpose. Stewart's cavalry was hastily thrown in, hoping they would gain a position of advantage that would to a great extent compensate for the one Johnson had been driven out of earlier in the day. Stewart went forward and struck the Union cavalry commanded by Gen. McGregg, at White's creek, where it crosses the Baltimore pike. Here was fought one of the most desperate cavalry battles during the war. There were charges and counter charges on each side successively, of the most desperate nature. The individual daring exhibited in this battle has never been excelled in any war. Stewart claimed if Pickett had succeeded he was in a

position to cut off the Union army's retreat. But we don't see how the army was in much danger from him if he was not able to get away with Gregg's division of cavalry, aided only by Custer's brigade, for he was driven back. In the evening Stewart fell back to guard the left flank of Ewell's corps. This was looked upon as the turning point of the war. All in the Union army looked upon this as the turning point, and hoped to end the war before the enemy could reach Virginia again. The time came for the final test, the enemy had, it is claimed, seventeen thousand troops massed for this charge. Supported on the left by Pettigrew commanding Heath's division, and Pender's division and in rear of Pender was Wright's brigade. Pickett was supported on his right by Wilcox's brigade and such other support as Longstreet could send forward for that purpose. It did not require much time for the Union army to form to meet the attack of the Confederates. Their lines were so formed they could reinforce any point in less than one half the time it would take the Confederates to reinforce theirs. One o'clock p. m. was the time set to open fire by the Confederates, and promptly at that time the first gun was fired. In no time the whole one hundred and fifteen guns were paying their respects to the Union army by dropping their bursting shells among them in every direction. The eighty Union guns immediately replied and soon the ground was being torn up and fragments of shells was sweeping the ground in every direction. Gun carriages and limber boxes were knocked into smithereens. Caisons filled with ammunition were blown up in every direction, destroying every living thing near them. Fully twelve of those monster ammunition wagons were blown up on the Union side and about as many more of the Confederates. Each one would make the ground tremble something

like an earthquake. For two long hours this terrible fire was kept up without cessation. It really seemed much longer to the troops that were supporting the artillery. No more trying position can be found to place a soldier in than supporting batteries when there is no enemy near, so they can use their own guns. A duel of artillery so-called, like this, for two hours renders a great many guns unserviceable. Some that had been injured by some parts being broken by reason of their having been struck with shots from the enemy's guns and all more or less useless by heat, after two hours steady firing. General Hunt, chief of artillery, ordered his men to cease firing and immediately ordered all disabled guns out of line, and replaced them with guns from the reserve that had not been in action, and the whole line was then replaced with serviceable guns and cartridges. This allowed the hot guns that had not been broken, time to cool off. This stop deceived the Confederates. They thought that they had so disabled the Union guns that they could not be used any more and that their charging columns would have an easy walk-over, until they came in range of the infantry fire. We have stated that Gen. Longstreet was opposed to fighting at Gettysburg an offensive battle. Alexander Stephens, vice-president of the Confederacy, says in his history of the War of Rebellion, "When the time came for the charge July 3rd, Pickett waited for Longstreet's order to move. When the signal gun was fired at headquarters for the column to start, Pickett rode over to where Longstreet was and not getting orders to start, said to Longstreet, 'I shall go forward, sir,' to which he got no reply, but Pickett gave the order to move." The distance the attacking column had to travel to reach the Union line on the crest of Cemetery Ridge, was at least a mile and a half. Most of that distance was an open plain. As soon

as the Confederate column cleared the timber on Seminary Ridge, the Union artillery opened fire on them, first with solid shot and then shell, and as soon as they came in range, with double canister. The guns on Little Round Top did excellent service, raking the enemy's columns from right to left. The enemy's guns were not idle all this time. As soon as the Union batteries opened on Pickett's charging column, the Confederate guns opened on them. They had to be cautious about their fire and kept out of range of their own columns, but the Union batteries were tearing great gaps through Pickett's charging columns which would immediately close up. Never slackening their forward, headlong march but once, when the head of their column was near the Emmetsburg road, they coolly halted and in spite of the canister shot that was plowing great gaps through their columns, they changed front obliquely to their left, then rushed forward. Their last course brought them up against the 2nd corps, but it seems to us this last move was a bad one, for two reasons, it separated Pickett's column for a long distance from Wilcox's brigade, which did not change to follow Pickett's movement, and permitted a brigade of the 1st corps, they missed by this oblique movement, to swing around on their right flank and rear and pour in volley after volley in their closed columns, and exposed their right to the fire of the 1st corps as they passed in range of them, so that when they reached the 2nd corps they were too badly shattered to make any serious impression upon that corps, but they were desperate and pushed forward, even breaking through the first line and General Armistead leading what was left of his brigade, in a mad, crazy fit of desperation, took off his hat and put it on the point of his sword, waved it in the air, shouted, "Come on, give them the cold steel," and rushed up to and

laid his hand on one of the Union guns, where he was shot down, while this broken mass of men were desperate and rushing headlong into certain death, the great mass in their rear were being taken prisoners or scattered and retreating. Gen. Armstead, it is said, fought on the Union side at the first battle of Bull Run, but for some cause went over to the Confederates, which he doubtless regretted afterwards, for in his death struggle, he signalled some one to come to him, and in a weak voice, said, "Tell Hancock I have wronged him and wronged my country." When this charge of Pickett's was over and the enemy was straggling to the rear demoralized, the officers of Graham's brigade to which I belonged, was wondering if we would be put in on a counter-charge. We knew we had run a mile or more to our right, while Pickett's charge was going on and saw other troops moving to the same point. We all knew the 6th corps, one of the strongest in the army, had not been engaged. If any man but Meade had been in command that corps would have been placed in position as well as the 12th corps, which was still strong, and in rear of 1st and 2nd corps, where Pickett's columns were steering for. This preparation ought to have all been made when Pickett first developed his movement. Gibbons sent an aide to Meade to notify him of Pickett's advance, thinking probably that he would ride to the front so as to be where he could direct his columns in a counter-charge, for it seems that all the officers were expecting something of this kind. The Confederates, for two days in succession, had made desperate efforts to break the Union lines, and if this, the third effort failed, it was expected every available man would be massed to be ready for a counter-charge, which would crush the enemy. Hancock was wounded and laying in an ambulance in rear, wrote a note to Meade urging him to

mass his forces and make a counter-charge before the enemy had time to rally. All the officers knew that in the attacks of the second and third day, that the enemy would exhaust themselves, so they could make but feeble resistance if a counter-charge should be made by the Union army, but if the Union army waited until the Confederates had time to reinforce their shattered lines and dig trenches, the chances for success would be materially diminished if not nearly impracticable. But Gen. Meade did not make any arrangements for a counter-charge, nor did he have any idea of such a movement. In fact he took but little interest in the battle of Gettysburg from first to last. His greatest effort was to prevent the battles being fought there. When the artillery firing began July 3rd, his headquarters were invaded by the enemy's shells, to the extent that a horse or two belonging to his aides were killed, and others struck uncomfortably close. He then moved headquarters over with Gen. Slocum at Power's hill, and gave little, if any, personal attention to the battle. It was unfortunate for the army that a bilious cholic or some other serious attack of sickness could not have seized Meade on June 29th, so he would have been compelled to have been taken to Washington and held there in hospital until about the tenth or twelfth of July. If this had happened and either Reynolds, Sickles, Sedgwick, Slocum, Hancock, Pleasanton, or, in fact most any of the corps commanders, had taken his place, they would have moved the army so they would all have been in supporting distance at Gettysburg July 1st, which would have saved the 1st corps from almost annihilation by an overwhelming force of the enemy on that day. So, too, would they in all probability have fortified Little and Big Round Tops, and been prepared to fight a successful battle at Gettysburg each day, and not one but what would have ordered a

counter-charge July 3rd. Here is where some optimist will say, "any one can criticise after it is all over, but very few, if any can foresee the events that are to take place." and then repeat the trite saying of Henry Ward Beecher about his foresight not being as perfect as his hind sight, etc., and when they have said this think they have produced an argument which is not susceptible of further discussion. But I want to say to those gentlemen that all military movements, if the army has a competent commander, are governed by perfect scientific principles, among which are these: When an army is moved against the enemy, the commander knows what the enemy must do to counteract his movement and each watches the other, and having well developed plans of battle in case a battle takes place. Every general who is fit to command an army has well matured plans of all great battles he engages in before the battle takes place. Hooker's plan of the battle of Gettysburg was fully developed long before the army crossed the Potomac. When Meade took command his first acts were to obliterate all of Hooker's plans as far as possible. One of Hooker's plans was to fight at Gettysburg. This Meade determined should not be, although he finally yielded to the judgment of his corps commanders, for the reason he could not help it, the battle was on when he arrived. He seemed to act like a stubborn child, as though he did not care whether the battle turned out to be a defeat or a victory. Corps commanders on the third day, when the enemy's movements developed, advised the concentration of all available troops on their right center, where it developed the enemy would strike, for two reasons, first was, if the enemy broke through the lines that had been formed to receive them, that the concentrated forces would be at hand to crush their shattered forces, and the second reason was that they would

be at hand to make a counter-charge. By all the rules of warfare this should have been done. Meade has said he intended to attack the enemy on their right flank, with the 5th corps. Doubleday says he does not believe Meade intended to attack the enemy on their right July 3rd, for he says he conversed with a corps commander the next morning, July 4th, who had just left Gen. Meade, and he said Meade says he thinks he can hold out here part of another day if the enemy attacks. This shows Meade to have been a very timid man, unfit to lead a gallant army like that of the Potomac, to operate against a brave, energetic strategist like Robert E. Lee. This was the situation; the enemy had made two unsuccessful attacks on both flanks of the Union army, and having met with great slaughter and defeat, with not one division or brigade of their army but what was badly crippled, while the Union army had three corps, the 5th, 6th and 12, that were comparatively fresh. The 6th had not been engaged, and the balance of the army although they had fought desperate battles in the past three days, would have rejoiced to have learned that the enemy was going to make the third attack on Cemetery Ridge. Yet the commander of that gallant army, looking across the valley or plain of a mile and a half, at an enemy whose ranks had been broken, shattered and discouraged. Not one of its divisions but what had suffered great loss in the past three days. Some completely disorganized. One can hardly bring themselves to believe that the commander of this gallant Union army could be brought to make the humiliating statement that if the enemy attacked he might be able to hold on there for only a half day longer, and yet the evidence is of such a reliable character that he did say this, that we are compelled to give it credence, and his management of the army later, proves he meant what he said. But his

failure to profit by the advice of his corps commanders, and prepare to make the counter-charge on the third day was a mistake that permitted the enemy to fortify their shattered lines and enable them to begin their retreat to Virginia, which they began as soon as their heavy train could be moved in that direction. When Pickett's charge failed, the officers of the Confederate army were surprised that the Union army did not follow Pickett's shattered columns up with a counter-charge. Hear what they have to say: Gen. Longstreet says, "When Pickett's charge failed I expected, of course, the enemy would throw themselves against our shattered ranks and try to crush us. I sent my staff officers to the rear to assist in rallying the troops, and hurried to our line of batteries, as the only support I could give them. I knew if the army was to be saved these batteries must check the enemy. For unaccountable reasons the enemy did not pursue his advantage."

Colonel Alexander, chief of Longstreet's artillery, says: "I have always believed that the enemy here lost the greatest opportunity they ever had for routing Lee's army by a prompt offensive—is it necessary now to add any statement as to the superiority of the federal forces or the exhausted and shattered condition of the Confederates for a space of at least a mile in their very center to show that a great opportunity was thrown away. I think General Lee himself was quite apprehensive that the enemy would, and it was that apprehension which brought him alone out to my guns, where he could observe all the indications."

The above was a communication to the Southern historical papers.

General Triumble who commanded a division of Hill's corps which supported Pickett in his charge, says: "By all the rules

of warfare the federal troops should, (as I supposed they would), have marched against our shattered columns and sought to cover our army with an overwhelming defeat."

Colonel Simms, who commanded a Georgia brigade, wrote in a letter to General Crawford, of the Union army, as follows:

"There was much confusion in our army so far as my observation extended, and I think we would have made but feeble resistance if you had pressed on on the evening of the 3rd."

General Doubleday says: "General Meade, however, overcome with the great responsibilities of his position, still clung to the ridge and fearful of a possible disaster would not take the risk of making an advance, and yet if he could have succeeded in crushing Lee's army then and there, he would have saved two years of war with its immense loss of life and countless evils. He might at least have thrown in Sedgwick's corps, which had not been actively engaged in the battle, for even if it had been repulsed the blows it gave would leave the enemy little inclination to again assail the heights.

It should have been known to Meade and probably was, that the enemy's artillery cartridges were exhausted, and on account of the long distance it would have to be transported, and reports that came to the Union army of the capture of convoys of ammunition and when firing ceased on the Confederate side they barely had twenty rounds of artillery cartridges left to each gun, and there was a mile from Hill's right to Longstreet's left. That there were no troops to fill their trenches and Longstreet tells us that he knew if the Union army made a counter-charge and the Confederate army was saved, it must be by the use of their artillery, which he went to arrange in the best position for that purpose. How desperate must have been the situation of the Confederates. The general officers rushing from

one point to another, encouraging their commands, trying to arrange them in a position to make the best defense possible, knowing it must be feeble if the Union army followed up their advantage, but were happy when night put an end to the day's carnage. The difference in the situation of the two armies when Pickett's charge on the evening of July 3rd failed, the Confederate officers from Gen. Lee down, were united that if the Union army made a counter-charge and followed Pickett's shattered command up closely that the result would prove disastrous to the Confederates and they were aiding their commander to try and avert the coming disaster to their army. Whereas the Union under officers, were trying to urge upon their commander the necessity of arranging a reserve to be ready in case of Pickett's defeat, to go forward in a counter-charge. But their advice was not heeded. Meade seemed to act as though his army was the only one in danger and if he saved them from annihilation by the Confederates and caused the enemy to retreat back into Virginia, he had done all that was required of him. At 6:30 o'clock p. m., firing on both sides ceased and the battle of Gettysburg was practically ended.

CHAPTER X.

The Confederate Army Retreats To Virginia Soil With Very Little Inconvenience Caused By General Meade.

On the night of July 3rd, Lee sent for his trusted officers, and, as one of them writes to the southern historical journal (copied into Stephens' history), they arrived at headquarters some time in advance of their chief, and when he rode up he dismounted and without saying a word leaned over, placing his arms over his horse's neck and his head resting on his arms, remained in that position, it seemed, half an hour. No one spoke, the reverence which they held for their chief prevented any conversation on their part. After the lapse of this time, he lifted his head and said: "It is all my fault, no one is to blame for this defeat but myself. We have got to retreat, go back to Virginia." He then gave orders for each one to execute, etc. Lee's anxiety seemed to be how he was going to get his army back into Virginia with their long train of wagons, which would stretch out over thirty miles. This was a problem no one could solve. Meade held the key to the situation, and resolved to use it with such due decorum as would enable Lee to get back into Virginia with the least inconvenience to himself and his army. On the 4th of July, the Confederates began their retreat, preceded by a large portion of their train. The outposts reported the Confederates were retreating. It was hard to make Meade believe this. He thought it was a trick Lee was playing to draw him out, a trap set. He sent

the cavalry out to ascertain where the enemy was. General Birney, of the 3rd corps, advanced a reconnoitering party, who found the enemy moving in the direction of Fairfield, to all appearance in a big hurry and retreating. Birney's advance opened fire on them with a battery, but Meade checked this advance and cautioned them that on no account to bring on an engagement. When this reconnoitering party returned, as they were ordered, we talked with some of the officers and they were indignant to think they were not permitted to pursue the enemy. Meade ordered the cavalry to follow in the direction of Frederick. It got on the flank of the retreating army and dashed in at different passes in South Mountain cutout and destroyed large blocks of the enemy's train on the 5th of July. It was known to a certainty that the enemy had left their lines of entrenchments in front of the Union army and was in full retreat. General Meade ordered Sedgwick, of the 6th corps, to follow the enemy up. No other corps was ordered to move. The 6th corps came up with the rear guard of the enemy at Fairfield Pass July 6th. This column of the enemy was commanded by General Early. He was in great trouble trying to get his train out of the mud, which was badly tangled up. Sedgwick started a harmless artillery fusilade which was kept up for some time. He then retired and reported that the position was too strong to be carried.

Gen. Doubleday thinks differently. He thinks Sedgwick ought to have attacked Early and the whole army should have been brought up, that this pass was two miles wide and if Lee had turned back and formed line to prevent Meade's progress against Early it would leave his wagon train more exposed, and the Union cavalry reinforced by the troops that marched out from Washington and Baltimore, could have annihilated Lee's

train, and on account of a great rise in the Potomac and Lee's pontoons having been destroyed, could have intercepted the enemy's convoy of artillery cartridges and with reinforcements that were near could and doubtless would have destroyed the Confederate army. He expected help from militia that were forming in Pennsylvania.

Doubleday's ideas and reasoning was all right, but his plans were based upon the supposition that the Union army would be commanded by a dashing, daring general, who would take advantage of all the conditions that were favorable for the Union army. But General Meade was not that kind of a general. His whole career, from the time he took command of the army until Lee surrendered, is proof against probable success, and that Meade could not be relied upon to make an active, brilliant campaign; his opportunities were many while he commanded the army, but in no instance did he take advantage of a single one whereby he could, had he been a brilliant army commander, have destroyed Lee's Confederate organization. Time and the results of the campaign go to prove that if Meade had followed the campaign Hooker had planned, Lee's army would never have reached Virginia. But in order to please Halleck, his first official act was to change Hooker's plans as far as he could with the acquiescence of his corps commanders and staff. By doing this he failed to have his army massed at Gettysburg, on or before July 1st, in early morning; result, for want of proper support the first corps was so badly cut up as to nearly ruin it, and the 11th corps was badly crippled for the same reason. These two infantry corps and Gen. Buford's division of cavalry were compelled to fight, unaided, four times their number. It is true this small command by their unexampled valor, held this overwhelming enemy, unaided, from

nine o'clock a. m. until near six p. m., when they were reinforced by the arrival of the 3rd and 12th corps. The result of this day's battle was that this small Union force by their indomitable prowess saved Cemetery Ridge, which has gone down in history as the ground on which was fought the second and third days' battle of Gettysburg. But the usefulness of those corps had been too much impaired by reason of their not having been supported in time the first day, and of course, affected materially the result of the three days' battle and all because Meade was determined to so change Hooker's plans that the battle would not be fought at Gettysburg, and as a further result of Meade's determination to change Hooker's plan of battle which worked adversely to the final success of the Union army was his ordering the force which Hooker had placed in the Cumberland Valley, to vacate that position. This according to an old trite saying left the enemy a clear and unencumbered highway by which they did, after their defeat, fold their tents and quietly steal away behind their entrenched camps into Virginia, with little or no opposition, also left those great highways open by which they were enabled to replenish their much needed and exhausted supply of artillery cartridges. It will be remembered that after the third day's battle the enemy only had twenty rounds of artillery ammunition left for each gun, which, if their source of supply was cut off would soon be exhausted and they would then be in a helpless condition. But it now stood this way, the avenue was left open and when the enemy retreated he was left to pursue his course comparatively peacefully, and soon met his artillery cartridge convoys, from which a full supply was obtained. This was the direct result of changing Hooker's plans which made the enemy's escape into Virginia possible. About noon Saturday, July 4th. it began to

rain, in fact it poured and continued until late, or near Sunday morning, July 5th. The country here is mostly clay loam, and as soon as the army began to move artillery and heavy wagons, horses and troops, the mud was worked to a fearful depth and it is a wonder the enemy ever got through with their thirty miles of wagon train, and if they had been hurried they could never have made it. On July 7th, the 57th, 114th and 141st Pennsylvania regiments were temporarily consolidated by order of General Hobart Ward, commanding the division. By this order I was placed in command of the three regiments. This was done because the three regiments had become so used up in battle the second day that it was thought best to consolidate them in order to make a respectable appearing command. The regiments went into action July 2d, with from 375 to 500 guns each. My recollection is when they were united, July 7th, the whole command could not muster but 375 guns, and not a field officer left in either regiment. This consolidation did not last more than a week or ten days, or until the sick and wounded officers and men returned to their commands. To that extent so each regiment was again enabled to assume their separate regimental duties on Tuesday, July 7th. The whole Union army was in motion, very slowly following up the Confederates. Our following was not in rear urging the enemy out of the country, but was a parallel movement at a respectful distance on the east side of South Mountain. The Confederates were on the west side, 15 or 20 miles apart on parallel lines. The Confederates' objective point was Williamsport, and Falling Waters, where they expected to cross the Potomac river into Virginia. To reach this point they would have to march about forty-five miles to reach Falling Waters, or forty miles to reach Williamsport. On Tuesday, July 7th, the main body of the Confederate army

was at Hagerstown, five miles from Williamsport, or ten miles from Falling Waters, but here their trouble began. The river had raised so as to overflow its banks and General French, whose division had been stationed at Frederick, sent out an expedition to Williamsport and Falling Waters, that destroyed all the enemy's pontoon bridges. They were in a bad condition if an active enemy had been pushing them, but the Confederates began cutting timber for a bridge, replenished their artillery cartridges and built strong earthworks from Williamsport to a point five miles below Falling Waters, where the right of their army rested and in one of the strongest natural positions that could have been selected. I don't believe they could have been driven from it if a determined resistance had been made by four times their number. The time had passed for the Union army to strike a crushing blow in this campaign. If, as General Doubleday says, the Union army had followed up and attacked vigorously Sunday, July 5th, or Monday, the 6th, while the enemy was on the move, their artillery cartridges nearly exhausted, a long wagon train to look after and get through the mud, there is very little doubt but what the Union army would have gained a great victory, possibly the destruction of the Confederate army would have followed, and quite probably if the troops at Washington, Baltimore and Harpers' Ferry had co-operated, but what is the use in speculating in what would be the result, while General George G. Meade commanded the army. The press and even the president became restless, and the president ordered Meade to attack. But when the Union army finally started in pursuit it took a route 25 or 30 miles farther than the Confederates had to travel to reach their crossing. So when the Union army started to follow the Confederates up July 7th, they were 65 or 70 miles from Williamsport,

or Falling Waters, the point at which the Confederates must cross into Virginia. While the Confederates were only ten miles from their crossing. The Union army, after marching five days, came up with the Confederates in their entrenched camp around Falling Waters and Williamsport, Sunday, July 12. The rank and file of the Union army expected, and desired to attack the enemy immediately, but the day was used up in getting into position. The next day, Monday, July 13th, was set for the attack. All day was spent in reconnoitering and getting into position. The next morning was set as a sure thing. The 3rd corps was on the left of the army, below Falling Waters, and closed up to the enemy's works in easy range of their rifles, on open ground. No guns were fired. Tuesday morning, July 14th, all were up and had breakfast over by daylight and were anxiously waiting for the general order, forward. Soon after sunrise skirmishing began on our right, which did not last long. Then came a cheer from the skirmishers. We knew the cheer came from Union men and hoped that the Confederates had surrendered, and while we were thus speculating, the news came down the line to us that the enemy had completed the construction of their bridge on the night of Monday, July 13th and all had succeeded in getting across the river safe on Virginia soil, except about fifteen hundred, the rear guard, who had been captured. This was sad news to the rank and file of the Union army. Very few were disposed to boast of their victory at Gettysburg. They had hoped to end the war in Pennsylvania. It is hard now to find language at this late day to express the disappointment of the rank and file of the Union army at the result of this campaign. They were as sanguine of their success in this campaign as their commander, Gen. Hooker, was. They knew the two last days' fighting at Gettysburg had

been very disastrous to the Confederate army, and as a result the Confederate organization had been greatly weakened, and should have been destroyed before they could again have reached Virginia, and wondered why it was not done. All were hopeful this would be the final result, until the Confederates finally crossed the Potomac river on the night of July 13. Then did the rank and file of the Union army realize for the first time since the battle began that a great victory had slipped from them through the timidity, over-cautious incompetency of their present commander. Lee had out-generaled Meade and got away. There was nothing left for the Union army to do but move on a parallel line to the Confederates and protect Washington. They were soon in motion; slowly but sadly they wended their way to Harper's Ferry, where they crossed into Virginia. It was more like a funeral procession than the proud army that marched into Pennsylvania and fought one of the most desperate battles that was ever fought on this continent. All realized that their new commander was too timid and for the balance of the year the army settled down to the humiliating position of an army of observation, but Halleck and the administration seemed to be perfectly satisfied with Meade as a commander of the army of the Potomac. Probably for the reason that he was not liable to become brilliant enough to be a dangerous rival to either.

General F. W. Pelfry, who wrote for Scribners' Sons, one of a series of publications known as Antietam and Fredericksburg, has this to say of the army of the Potomac: "It would be too much to say that there are no sadder stories in military history than that of the army of the Potomac, but its story is sad enough, always better than its commanders, always ready to stand in the evil hour and having done all, to stand. It marched

and fought, and hungered and thirsted for four long years, hardly ever animated by victory. It showed in all it endured and achieved that it was an admirable instrument for the hand that knew how to wield it, but it never had the good fortune to be commanded by a soldier who was worthy of it. It fought through to the end. It did its work and gained its crown, but its path was long and rough and seldom cheered, and one of its saddest and sharpest experiences was its brave, hopeless effort at Fredericksburg."

The above we most heartily endorse, except in one instance, and one paragraph. That one instance is in relation to the commander of the army of the Potomac. It once had a commander who was worthy of it, and that one instance was in General Joseph Hooker. General Pelfry did not know how Hooker was handicapped while he had command of the army, for all the facts had not come to light when he wrote the foregoing, for if they had I am sure he had the courage and independence to have given that gallant commander credit for his masterly efforts of the battle of Chancellorsville, the truth of which has never been written nor was it known to Comrade Pelfry that Hooker was about to cross the Rappahannock and crush Hill, whose nearest support was thirty miles away, but was stopped by the president and Halleck. Nor did he know when the foregoing was written by him, that the troops of Dix, Hintzleman, Schenk and the Middle department had been assigned to Hooker's command by order of the president, and when the time came that Hooker could use some of these troops to crush the Confederate army then in Pennsylvania, he issued the order placing them in line on the eve of a great battle. Halleck seated in his comfortable office in Washington, countermanded the order and was backed up and sustained by the president, and

on account of successive rebuffs, General Hooker was driven from his command. If Comrade Pelfry could have seen Hooker's order to Howard, of Hooker to Sedgwick. If he had possessed the knowledge of the fact that Meade, in command of 37,000 fresh troops, refused a request from General Sickles for reinforcements, Hooker being at this time paralyzed by the explosion of a shell. This and Sedgwick's unnecessary recrossing the river, if we believe Gen. Howe, one of his division commanders, who said it was unnecessary. All this makes a different story. We thank General Pelfry for his kind and truthful words for the army of the Potomac, and hope he and all other writers of the War of Rebellion will hereafter do justice to their grand old commander, Gen. Joseph Hooker, who was the victim of a most wicked and powerful conspiracy. The saddest misfortune of the army was when he was relieved from the command. He was a strategist, more than a match for General Lee. His being removed and Meade substituted, compelled the army of the Potomac to wear the enemy out by main strength in spite of the incompetent commanders who were placed over them. No army ever accomplished as much under such adverse conditions, a grateful people should never fail to recognize this *prima facie* fact and try even at this late day to do those noble heroes the justice and give them the credit for crushing the greatest, best organized rebellion the world ever knew, instead of lavishing all the praise for this work upon incompetent commanders who happened to be placed over them. Let merit not rank, be the basis for our gratitude in the future. Will the time ever come? God knows, I hope so.

The killed and wounded in the battle of Gettysburg, taken from Alexander Stephens' history, which, we think, is nearly correct, is as follows:

THE BATTLE OF GETTYSBURG.

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	Confederates.	Union.
Killed	5,000	2,834
Wounded	23,000	13,523
Missing	8,000	6,643
Total	36,000	23,000

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